Michael Durham v. David Horner, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 16483

Horner used a confidential informant and Accurint to identify Durham as a drug dealer, leading to three controlled drug buys in 2005 without securing a photo of the suspect.
Accurint reported Durham’s ages, addresses, and vehicle details, but warned data should be independently verified; multiple addresses and inconsistent physical descriptions were present.
Three indictments for drug distribution were returned in May 2006 based on the informant’s identification of Durham; bench warrants directed arrest of “Michael Dwayne Durham.”
Durham, living in Memphis, learned of the Virginia warrant in 2006 and surrendered in Memphis in December; he maintained that the wrong person had been indicted and arrested.
By February 2007, counsel obtained Durham’s defense and the Commonwealth dismissed the three indictments on the same day the defense presented the issue to prosecutors.
In 2009 Durham filed a federal § 1983 claim and a state-law malicious-prosecution claim; the district court granted Horner summary judgment on qualified immunity, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Horner is entitled to qualified immunity given reliance on unverified information.	Durham contends Horner acted carelessly without corroboration.	Horner acted in good faith on available information and had probable cause.	Yes; Horner is entitled to qualified immunity.
Whether the grand jury indictments conclusively established probable cause, defeating the § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim.	Indictments do not shield improper or incompetent investigation from liability.	Indictments reflect probable cause; the grand jury determination forecloses § 1983 claim.	Indictments established probable cause, supporting a reasonable seizure; no Fourth Amendment violation.

Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (Supreme Court 1975) (grand jury indictment valid on its face; calls for trial on merits; prob. cause standard)
Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (Supreme Court 1956) (indictment on its face suffices to call for trial; prob. cause)
Goodwin v. Metts, 885 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1989) (officer not shielded when facts show reckless disregard for truth (probable cause concerns))
Miller v. Prince George’s Cnty., Md., 475 F.3d 621 (4th Cir. 2007) (officer not shielded when omitting material information to obtain arrest warrant)
Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178 (4th Cir. 1996) (probable cause determinations can break the causal chain from application for a warrant)
Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362 (4th Cir. 2002) (probable cause exists if there is enough evidence to warrant belief an offense is being committed)
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (Supreme Court 1986) (objective reasonableness standard for police seeking warrants)
Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 2011) (two-step qualified-immunity inquiry; de novo review on appeal)
Jennings v. Patton, 644 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 2011) (discussion of grand-jury testimony and liability; not binding here but cited for framework)
Reaves, 512 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 2008) (anonymous tips and corroboration standards for reasonable suspicion)
Massenburg, 654 F.3d 480 (4th Cir. 2011) (reliance on corroborated information; indicia of reliability)