Michael C. Hall v. Margaret Hill, A21A0111

Background

In May 2016 Shauntrice Jones died in a car accident. Her mother, Margaret Hill, filed a wrongful-death action in Thomas County as next friend and was appointed guardian ad litem for the minor children.
Maurice Williams Sr. (father of one child) sought appointment of Michael Hall as conservator for the children in probate; Hall was appointed conservator in January 2017.
While the Thomas County suit by Hill was pending, Hall filed a separate wrongful-death action in Gwinnett County, then filed notices in Thomas County withdrawing any intervention and asking that the Thomas County case be dismissed; the Thomas court denied his requests and consolidated the Gwinnett and Thomas cases, joining Hall as a plaintiff.
Hall later filed additional motions to remove Hill as guardian ad litem (denied), voluntarily dismissed his Gwinnett action (which the Thomas court later struck because the cases were consolidated), and filed suit in Gwinnett seeking injunctive relief to prevent Hill and others from proceeding (dismissed).
The appeals challenge (1) whether a conservator has the exclusive right to pursue wrongful-death claims for minors and whether Hall exercised that right, (2) the denial of removal of Hill as guardian ad litem, (3) consolidation/joinder of the cases, (4) striking Hall’s voluntary dismissal and removing/enjoining him as a party, and (5) denial of injunctive relief in Gwinnett County.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Hall)	Defendant's Argument (Hill/others)	Held
Whether a conservator has exclusive power to bring/participate in minors' wrongful-death claims and can displace a previously appointed guardian ad litem	Conservator’s appointment vests him with exclusive power to assert claims for minors; he should therefore supersede Hill	When suit began there was no conservator; next friend/guardian ad litem properly initiated suit; conservator must use intervention/substitution to participate	Conservator has exclusive statutory power once appointed, but Hall forfeited/never exercised it in the Thomas litigation (he withdrew intervention), so he cannot now complain; guardian ad litem’s suit stands
Whether OCGA § 51-1-9 allows Hall to sue for the minors' loss	§ 51-1-9 permits recovery for torts to one’s child/ward so Hall can assert claims	Wrongful-death claim is derivative of the decedent’s right (Jones), not a tort against the minors themselves	§ 51-1-9 is inapplicable; wrongful-death cause is derivative of decedent’s claim
Whether Hall, as administrator, exclusively represents decedent’s estate and whether he was properly dismissed/ enjoined as a party	As administrator he alone may assert estate claims and should not have been dismissed or enjoined from filing	Consolidation and joinder of related claims under Stapleton/Stenger may require coordination; defendants moved for joinder/consolidation	Consolidation and joinder of estate and survivor/minor claims was proper; but trial court erred in dismissing Hall as a party—he is the proper party to assert estate claims (reversed on dismissal/enjoin order)
Whether the court abused discretion by refusing to remove Hill as guardian ad litem, by striking Hall’s voluntary dismissal, and by denying Hall injunctive relief in Gwinnett	Hill is unsuitable (criminal record/probation, conflicts, and conservator’s supremacy); Hall should be allowed to dismiss or enjoin other proceedings	Hill was proper when appointed (no conservator existed then); first-offender status does not bar appointment; consolidation prevents piecemeal dismissals; injunctive relief is improper collateral attack	Trial court did not abuse discretion in refusing to remove Hill, in striking Hall’s voluntary dismissal given consolidation, or in denying injunctive relief; first-offender status not disqualifying; Hall’s collateral injunction was improper (except reversal as to dismissal of Hall as party noted above)

Key Cases Cited

In the Interest of W. L. H., 314 Ga. App. 185 (2012) (a minor must be represented by a guardian ad litem or next friend in civil actions)
CL SNF, LLC v. Fountain, 355 Ga. App. 176 (2020) ("participate" means "to take part" when construing statutory language)
Moosa Co., LLC v. Commr. of Ga. Dept. of Revenue, 353 Ga. App. 429 (2020) (principles of statutory construction and plain-meaning analysis)
Mary Allen Realty & Mgmt., LLC v. Harris, 354 Ga. App. 858 (2020) (a party cannot complain of error induced by its own conduct)
Stenger v. Grimes, 260 Ga. 838 (1991) (joinder/consolidation mandated on defendant’s motion for claims deriving from the same personal injuries)
Stapleton v. Palmore, 250 Ga. 259 (1982) (same-occurrence claims must be joined to avoid inconsistent obligations)
Coker v. Casey, 178 Ga. App. 682 (1986) (voluntary dismissal not allowed when action is mandatorily joined under Stapleton)
Merchant Law Firm, P.C. v. Emerson, 301 Ga. 609 (2017) (injunctive relief is improper to collaterally attack another court’s ruling)