Judge David T. Emerson, a superior court judge in Douglas County, issued an order denying a request by The Merchant Law Firm, PC. (the “Firm”) to obtain copies of audio recordings that a court reporter used in preparing trial transcripts. The Firm then filed a complaint seeking mandamus, injunctive relief, and a declaratory judgment in an attempt to copy the recordings. The trial court dismissed the complaint, and the Firm appeals. The Firm argues that it was еntitled to the relief sought because (1) the right of access to court records, as provided by Uniform Superior Court Rules 21 through 21.6 (“Rule 21”), includes the right to make copies of the recordings, (2) the Firm lacked an adequate legal remedy to vindicate that right, and (3) public officials violated their public duties by refusing to allow the Firm to make copies. But the procedures available under Rule 21, including an appeal from Judge Emerson’s order, constitute an adequate remedy at law. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the Firm’s mandamus and injunctive claims, which require a showing that no such adequate remedy exists. We also affirm dismissal of the Firm’s claim for declaratory judgment, because such a claim cannot be used as a collateral attack on Judge Emerson’s order.
The record shows that in the course of representing criminal defendants in two cases, an attоrney at the Firm participated in three hearings before Judge Emerson in June and October 2015. Each of these proceedings was open to the public and audio-recorded by court reporter Melinda Cantrell, who subsequently transcribed the hearings. On October 8, 2015, the Firm sent an e-mail to Cantrell requesting copies of the audio recordings of the three hearings. On October 9, Cantrell responded, stating that she had consulted with Judge Emеrson, who advised that the Firm should file a motion in order to make a formal request for the recordings. Later that day, the Firm responded by e-mail to Cantrell (and copied to Judge Emerson) that “no such motion is needed, and any instruction that these tapes be withheld until a motion is filed (and presumably ruled upon) is contrary to the Court’s rules and the long-established black-letter law in Georgia regarding the public’s access to court recоrds[,]” which the Firm argued included the requested recordings. On October 11, 2015, Judge Emerson issued an order sua sponte in each of the two underlying criminal cases; the order allowed the Firm to listen to the recordings but expressly did not allow the Firm to make copies of the recordings or require Cantrell to do so.
Following further efforts to persuade Judge Emerson to reconsider his ruling, and to persuade Cantrell to reconsider her own refusal tо provide copies of the recordings, the Firm filed the complaint in this case against Judge Emerson, Cantrell, and Cantrell’s court reporting firm, CA-BO Enterprises, Ltd. (collectively, “Appel-lees”). The complaint did not specify in what capacity Appellees were sued. The complaint sought a writ of mandamus, alleging that the Firm, acting in its capacity as a member of the public, has a clear legal right to “inspect and cоpy” the audio recordings of the hearings, and that the Firm had exhausted all other avenues for relief and had no other adequate legal remedy to assert this right. The complaint also sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction compelling Appel-lees, as
The trial court dismissed the complaint, concluding that mandamus relief was unavailable because the Firm was offered the adequate legal remedy of listening to the audio recordings, and the Firm had not established a clear legal right to make copies of the recordings. Thе trial court also dismissed the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, finding that the Firm faced no risk of future injury because the requested recordings would be preserved.
1 .Mandamus is unavailable because Rule 21 provides an adequate legal remedy.
The Firm argues that the trial court erred in dismissing its mandamus claim, because the Firm’s ability to listen to the recordings was not an adequate legal remedy, and it had a clear legal right to сopies of the recordings. We agree that merely listening to the tapes is not an adequate legal remedy when the Firm has requested copies. Nevertheless, we conclude that the trial court was right to dismiss the mandamus claim because the Firm had an adequate legal remedy; unlike the trial court, we conclude that the adequate remedy was a request under Rule 21 and an appeal from Judge Emerson’s October 11 order denying that request. In arriving at this conclusion, we conclude that Rule 21 and its procedures apply to records in criminal cases (not merely civil), anda member of the public who has requested and been denied access to records need not take any affirmative action to become a party to the case before appealing the court’s order denying that request.
“Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy to compel a public officer to perform a required duty when there is no other adequate legal remedy.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) R.A.F. v. Robinson,
The Firm claims that it has a clear legal right to copies of the audio recordings at issue under Rule 21. That right, if it exists, may be vindicated by requesting the cоurt records under Rule 21. To see why, we must review the scope of Rule 21 in order to understand how a member of the public, the alleged status in which the Firm seeks the audio recordings, may request court records.
(a) Rule 21 provides non-party members of the public with the right of access to court records.
Rule 21 governs the right of access to court records and the process for limiting that right with respect to specific records. “All court records are public and are to be available for public inspection unless public access is limited by law or by the procedure set forth below.” USCR 21. Rule 21.1 states that “[u]pon motion by any party to any civil or criminal action, or upon the court’s own motion, after hearing, the court may limit access to court files respecting that action. . . An order limiting access may be amended, as Rule 21.5 provides:
Upon notiсe to all parties of record and after hearing, an order limiting access may be reviewed and amended by the court entering such order or by the Supreme Court at any time on its own motion or upon the motion of any person for good cause.
The text of the cited rules shows that Rule 21 provides a mechanism for non-parties to access court records. Rule 21 references public inspection and publiс access, while Rule 21.5 states that “any person” may move to amend an order limiting access. This language stands in contrast to Rule 21.1,
(b) Rule 21 allows non-parties to request court records in criminal cases.
The Firm argued that it could not appeal Judge Emerson’s October 11 order because it was not a party to the underlying criminal cases in which the orders were entered, and intervention of the sort provided in the Civil Practice Act is not allowed in criminal cases. See OCGA § 9-11-24. But the Rule 21 process applies equally to criminal and civil cases. It is well settled that the right of access under Rule 21 is coextensive with the common law right of access to court proceedings. See Altman v. Altman,
Because the common law right of access applied to court records in criminal cases, the right of access to court records preserved by Rule 21 (and thus the right of appeal from orders denying that access) applies to court records in criminal cases. See also USCR 21.1 (expressly providing that a court may limit access to files in a criminal case). Accordingly, where a trial court issues an order denying a non-party’s Rule 21 request to access putаtive court records of criminal cases, that person may seek judicial review of that order regardless of whether that person could properly intervene in the underlying case. See USCR 21.4; see also Long,
(c) Rule 21 provides an adequate legal remedy.
Given that Rule 21 provides non-рarty members of the public with the right of access to court records, including in criminal cases, we conclude that the Rule 21 procedures constitute an adequate legal remedy that bars the Firm’s claim for mandamus relief. In fact, the Firm already attempted to use Rule 21 to obtain relief, as it made an informal request to obtain a copy of the audio recordings and cited Rule 21 in support. The Firm has insisted that its request was made as a member of the public — not on behalf of the Firm’s clients in the underlying cases — and Judge Emerson’s October 11 order denying that request made clear that it expressly considered and rejected the Firm’s argument that members of the public had a right to copy the recordings under Rule 21 and case law interpreting the rule.
2. The Firm also challenges the denial of its claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, arguing that the court erred in analyzing the merits of these claims. Appellees argue, as they did below, that because the Firm sued them in their official capacity as public officers, the Firm’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are barred by sovereign immunity Cameron v. Lang,
(a) Injunctive relief.
Above, we concluded that Rule 21 provided the Firm with an adequate remedy at law and, therefore, precluded mandamus relief. For this same reason, injunctive relief is also unavailable. See Lue v. Eady,
(b) Declaratory relief.
The availability of other adequate legal remedies does not preclude relief by declaratory judgment. OCGA § 9-4-2 (c). But the Firm’s claim for declaratory relief is barred for another reаson. Before the trial court, Appellees argued that the Firm was attempting to relitigate its claim that it was entitled to copies of the recordings, an issue that was adjudicated by Judge Emerson in his order denying the Firm’s request to copy the recordings. We agree, and affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the declaratory judgment claim as right for any reason.
The Declaratory Judgment Act is “not intended to be used to set aside, modify, or interpret judicial decrees or judgments,” nor does it “authorize a petitioner to brush aside previous judgments of the same court, and seek a determination of his rights as if they had never been adjudicated.”
Although Judge Emerson entered the orders in two criminal cases in which the Firm was not a party, his orders denying the Firm the ability to copy the audio recordings was an adverse ruling against the Firm that the Firm could have appealed. The Firm makes no claim that Judge Emerson’s order was unclear or ambiguous, nor does the Firm seek any guidance regarding the application of that order. The Firm may disagree with the merits of that ruling, but it may not use a declaratory judgment action to collaterally attack the decision specifically adjudicating the Firm’s claim. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Walker,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
As to the significance of the recordings, the complaint alleged that “[t]he audio recordings, unlike the official written transcript, contain information regarding the demeanor and tone of the Court and counsel and, therefore, the actual audio recordings of the Hearings are necessary in order to formulate a complеte understanding of these open court proceedings.”
In most cases, our appellate jurisdiction is prescribed by the Constitution. See, e.g., Collins v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.,
Although Rule 21.5 states that “an order limiting access may be reviewed and amended by the court entering such order or by the Supreme Court at any time оn its own motion or upon the motion of any person for good cause,” such review in this Court must still be sought by filing an application for review consistent with Rule 21.4. See In re Motion of Atlanta Journal-Constitution,
In his order limiting the Firm’s access to the recordings, Judge Emerson referenced the Firm’s correspondence to the court reporter in which the Firm argued about the public’s right of access. Later, when considering additional arguments by the Firm, Judge Emerson noted that the Firm’s request was mаde as a member of the public.
Our holding here should not be read as precluding all mandamus claims in the Rule 21 context, for there may be instances where the trial court refuses to rule on a Rule 21 request or refuses to issue an order from which judicial review may be sought. See Titelman,
Cf. Hobbs v. Roberts, 999 F2d 1526, 1528 (II) (A) (11th Cir. 1993) (“Where the complaint is unclear on whether officials are sued personally, in their official capacity, or both, courts must look to the course of the proceedings which will typically indicate the nature of the liability sought to be imposed.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).