Michael Brown v. United States, 942 F.3d 1069

In July 2014 Brown was indicted on multiple counts including Count 1: conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, Counts 2–3: drug-trafficking offenses, and Count 5: a § 924(c)(1)(A) charge alleged as based on both a crime of violence and a drug‑trafficking crime.
Brown pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to Count 1 (Hobbs Act conspiracy) and Count 5, but the plea agreement and the plea colloquy specified Count 5 was predicated solely on the Count 1 “crime of violence” (Hobbs Act conspiracy); the government dismissed the drug counts.
The district court sentenced Brown to 30 months on Count 1 and a consecutive 60 months on Count 5; Brown has completed the 30‑month term but remains incarcerated on the 60‑month § 924(c) sentence.
Brown filed a pro se § 2255 motion arguing that § 924(c)(3)’s residual clause is void for vagueness under Johnson; the district court denied relief relying on Ovalles.
After the Supreme Court decided Davis (holding § 924(c)(3)’s residual clause void), the parties jointly moved for summary reversal; the Eleventh Circuit concluded Brown had pled only to a § 924(c) offense predicated on Hobbs Act conspiracy and that conspiracy does not qualify under § 924(c)(3)(A).
The court reversed the denial of § 2255 relief, vacated Brown’s § 924(c) conviction, and remanded for resentencing.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
What offense did Brown actually plead to under Count 5?	Brown: he pleaded to § 924(c) predicated solely on Count 1 (Hobbs Act conspiracy).	Government: the indictment charged both a crime of violence and drug‑trafficking predicates; the conviction could rest on either.	Held: Plea agreement, colloquy, and adjudication show Brown pled only to a § 924(c) offense predicated on Hobbs Act conspiracy.
Does conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery qualify as a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A) after Davis?	Brown: conspiracy does not necessarily include threatened or attempted use of physical force, so it is not a crime of violence.	Government: (earlier) argued Hobbs Act conspiracy is violent under the residual clause; here it relied on pleading history.	Held: Under the categorical approach, Hobbs Act conspiracy's elements do not necessarily require use/threat of force; it is not a § 924(c)(3)(A) crime. Brown's § 924(c) conviction invalid.

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidated ACCA residual clause for vagueness)
Davis v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (held § 924(c)(3)’s residual clause unconstitutionally vague)
In re Navarro, 931 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2019) (addressed § 924(c) challenges post‑Davis in a different plea posture)
In re Fleur, 824 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2016) (substantive Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under elements clause)
United States v. St. Hubert, 909 F.3d 335 (11th Cir. 2018) (categorical‑approach framework for elements‑clause analysis)
United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229 (4th Cir. 2019) (Hobbs Act conspiracy not a crime of violence under elements clause)
United States v. Lewis, 907 F.3d 891 (5th Cir. 2018) (same conclusion regarding conspiracy)
United States v. Barrett, 937 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2019) (same conclusion regarding conspiracy)