Michael Anthony Crockett v. District of Columbia, 95 A.3d 601

In Aug. 2011 MPD Officer Hallahan pursued Michael Crockett after observing an illegal U-turn and other driving that risked collision; Crockett saw and ignored marked cruiser lights and siren, sped away, abandoned a running car with keys in ignition, and was later captured after a foot pursuit. Crockett lacked a valid driver’s license.
The Office of the Attorney General (OAG) prosecuted Crockett under D.C. Code § 50-2201.05b for fleeing a law-enforcement officer; the Superior Court found him guilty after a bench trial and rejected his affirmative defense that he reasonably feared for his personal safety.
The parties (and court) agreed the OAG lacked statutory authority under the Home Rule Act to prosecute that particular D.C. fleeing offense, which statutory authority belongs to the U.S. Attorney’s Office (USAO).
Crockett argued the OAG prosecution deprived the court of jurisdiction (standing), that Pelote v. United States was wrongly decided and inapplicable here, and alternatively sought reversal under the plain-error standard.
The trial court credited evidence that Crockett fled to avoid license-related consequences and to return the borrowed car to his mother, not because of a reasonable fear for personal safety.
The D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed: it treated the OAG’s improper prosecution as a procedural (not jurisdictional) error, held Crockett lacked plain-error relief, and found sufficient evidence to reject the safety-defense.

Issue	Crockett's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether prosecution by OAG (not USAO) deprived court of jurisdiction/standing	OAG lacked authority so prosecution was jurisdictionally defective and requires reversal	Error is procedural, not jurisdictional; Pelote controls; court retained jurisdiction	Error is procedural; Pelote binding; no jurisdictional defect found
Whether Pelote is distinguishable or wrongly decided	Pelote was wrong or distinguishable because here OAG handled entire prosecution and caption named D.C.	Pelote governs; factual distinctions do not change jurisdictional character; bound by precedent	Pelote controls; factual differences do not make error jurisdictional
Whether the improper prosecutor entitles defendant to plain-error reversal	OAG’s lack of authority is fundamental; reversal required even if not raised below	Defendant must show reasonable probability of different outcome if USAO prosecuted; plain-error not shown	Plain-error relief denied: defendant did not show reasonable probability of different result
Sufficiency of evidence / affirmative personal-safety defense	Stopping immediately would have been unsafe; defense should prevail	Trial evidence showed motives to avoid license/impoundment; court reasonably discredited safety claim	Evidence sufficient; trial court reasonably rejected safety-defense and conviction affirmed

Pelote v. United States, 21 A.3d 599 (D.C. 2011) (held OAG prosecution of fleeing offense is procedural error not jurisdictional)
In re Crawley, 978 A.2d 608 (D.C. 2009) (discusses prosecutorial authority under D.C. law)
United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693 (1988) (addressed filing by unauthorized representative as jurisdictional defect in Supreme Court context)
Lewis v. United States, 10 A.3d 646 (D.C. 2010) (panel bound by prior D.C. precedents absent controlling Supreme Court authority)
Teoume-Lessane v. United States, 931 A.2d 478 (D.C. 2007) (limits on a panel overruling prior precedent without controlling Supreme Court decision)
In re J.H., 47 A.3d 539 (D.C. 2012) (distinguishable: OAG prosecution reversed where defendant raised timely objection and government could not show harmlessness)
In re Taylor, 73 A.3d 85 (D.C. 2013) (addresses significance of prosecutorial interest and disinterested prosecution in contempt and related contexts)