Michael Alexander v. United States
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 13060
| 7th Cir. | 2013Background
- Alexander, an Indiana criminal defense attorney, alleges an FBI-led conspiracy with state prosecutor McKinney and informants Kirtz and Chrisp to fabricate bribery evidence and suppress exculpatory recordings, leading to his arrest and trial on bribery charges.
- FBI agents Freeman and Howell allegedly destroyed/withheld recordings from a July 2006 meeting that would have exonerated Alexander, submitted manipulated or blank recordings from later meetings, and Freeman prepared the probable-cause affidavit used for Alexander’s arrest.
- During pretrial and trial proceedings, Freeman denied the existence of the July 2006 meeting/recordings, allegedly intimidated a witness (Wills) into recanting an exculpatory taped statement, and testified at trial; Alexander was acquitted in March 2009.
- Alexander filed an FTCA notice of claim in October 2010 and sued the United States for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED); the district court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) as to malicious prosecution and held the IIED claim time-barred.
- On appeal, the Seventh Circuit accepted the complaint’s allegations as true, found the pleadings sufficient to plausibly plead causal involvement, lack of probable cause, and malice for malicious prosecution, and held the IIED claim timely because the alleged wrongful acts continued through trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Alexander pleaded sufficient facts to state a malicious prosecution claim under Indiana law via the FTCA | Alexander alleged agents manufactured evidence, suppressed exculpatory tapes, prepared the probable-cause affidavit, and furthered the prosecution through testimony and witness intimidation — satisfying causation, lack of probable cause, and malice | Government argued the complaint was implausible and conclusory; prosecution was by state actors, not the United States, so causation and malice were not adequately pleaded | Reversed: complaint plausibly pleaded that agents caused the prosecution, that probable cause was lacking due to fabricated evidence, and that malice could be inferred; survived 12(b)(6) |
| Whether malice was adequately alleged without direct motive by the agents | Malice can be inferred from total lack of probable cause and facts alleging retaliatory motive by the prosecutor; intent can be pleaded generally | Government said absence of direct animus by agents rendered malice implausible and conclusory | Reversed: Rule 8 does not require proof of motive pre-discovery; malice adequately alleged for pleading purposes |
| Whether Alexander’s IIED claim is time-barred under FTCA’s two-year limit | IIED accrual is not limited to arrest or first deceptive act; alleged wrongful conduct (perjury, witness intimidation) continued through trial, so claim accrued at the time of the continuing/last wrongful acts within two years of filing | Government argued claim accrued at arrest or at latest by Freeman’s July 2008 deposition, making the October 2010 notice untimely | Reversed: continuing wrongful acts through trial make the IIED claim timely; alternatively, some discrete harms occurred within the limitations period |
| Whether the complaint sufficiently pleaded IIED under Indiana law | Allegations describe extreme, outrageous, and criminal conduct intentionally/recklessly causing severe emotional distress and reputational harm | Government contended allegations were conclusory and time-barred | Reversed: factual allegations meet the low pleading threshold to state an IIED claim at this stage |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (plausibility standard for pleadings)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (applying Twombly plausibility to factual allegations)
- Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400 (7th Cir. 2010) (pleadings must present a story that holds together)
- Ziobron v. Crawford, 667 N.E.2d 202 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (malice may be inferred from total lack of probable cause)
- Devbrow v. Kalu, 705 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2013) (continuing-violation principle for accrual of federal claims)
- Arroyo v. United States, 656 F.3d 663 (7th Cir. 2011) (accrual when plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered injury attributable to government)
- Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (limitations and continuing violations context)
- National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (limitations and discrete vs. continuing acts)
- K Mart Corp. v. Brzezinski, 540 N.E.2d 1276 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (false statements can rebut prima facie probable cause)