Mergenthaler v. Triumph Mortgage Corp.
09C-09-203
| Del. Super. Ct. | Apr 27, 2017Background
- Plaintiff Lawrence E. Mergenthaler obtained a default money judgment against Triumph Mortgage Corp. on January 15, 2010, and later filed multiple writs of attachment/Fi. Fa. garnishments; he did not renew the judgment before issuing the 2016 writ.
- On November 29, 2016 Mergenthaler filed a praecipe and a writ of attachment was issued Dec. 2, 2016 and served on Merrill Lynch (MLPF&S), garnishing proceeds from pledged stock of Kathy L. Galvin; the proceeds were deposited with the Prothonotary by agreement.
- Triumph moved to quash the garnishment on two grounds: (1) Merrill Lynch was part of Bank of America and thus immune from state attachment statutes under 10 Del. C. §3502(b); and (2) the underlying judgment was stale under 10 Del. C. §5072 because more than five years had passed without renewal.
- The Commissioner addressed standing and found Triumph had standing to object because Triumph had an interest in the pledged collateral and would be injured if proceeds were paid to Mergenthaler.
- The Commissioner concluded MLPF&S is a separate broker-dealer (not a bank) and thus not immune from attachment under §3502(b).
- The core legal question decided was whether Superior Court Civil Rule 69(a), read with 10 Del. C. §4711, allows execution on a judgment up to ten years after entry without renewing the judgment, despite §5072’s five-year language.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether garnishee (Merrill Lynch/MLPF&S) is exempt from state attachment laws | Mergenthaler: served proper entity; attachment valid | Triumph: Merrill Lynch merged into Bank of America and is statutorily immune under §3502(b) | MLPF&S is a separate Delaware broker-dealer, not a bank; not immune — service valid |
| Standing to challenge garnishment | Mergenthaler: Triumph lacks standing to challenge praecipe | Triumph: has property interest in pledged collateral and will be injured if garnishment paid to plaintiff | Triumph has standing to object |
| Whether the writ was void because judgment >5 years old and not renewed | Mergenthaler: Rule 69(a) and §4711 extend execution period to 10 years so no renewal required before execution | Triumph: §5072 limits issuance of execution to within 5 years; common-law year-and-a-day rule also bars late execution | Rule 69(a), read with §4711, governs procedure and permits execution up to 10 years; writ valid despite §5072’s 5-year language |
| Whether Superior Court rule can supersede conflicting statute | Mergenthaler: Rule 69(a) governs execution procedure and is controlling | Triumph: court rule cannot effectively repeal or conflict with statute | Under 10 Del. C. §561, court rules on procedure supersede conflicting statutes; Rule 69(a) is procedural and valid |
Key Cases Cited
- Schoon v. Smith, 953 A.2d 196 (Del. 2008) (standing doctrine and who may invoke court jurisdiction)
- Knott v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 95 A.3d 13 (Del. 2014) (history of execution writs and §5072; §5072 extended execution without scire facias from 1 year to 5 years)
- Gamels Corp. v. Gibson, 393 A.2d 1269 (Del. 1978) (judgments remain valid though lien status may expire after ten years)
- Fleming v. Jackson, 888 A.2d 321 (Del. 2005) (court rules may validly extend procedural timelines when within rulemaking authority)
- State ex rel. Massey v. Terry, 148 A.2d 102 (Del. 1959) (courts’ inherent authority to adopt rules governing proceedings)
- Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (U.S. 2010) (test for whether a rule of procedure impermissibly abridges substantive rights)