Menoken v. Lipnic, 318 F. Supp. 3d 239

Background

Plaintiff Cassandra Menoken, a long-time EEOC attorney, requested a reasonable accommodation on Sept. 11, 2012 (sought paid leave pending resolution of EEO matters). EEOC allegedly delayed processing and offered to approve accommodation in exchange for a release; Menoken refused.
Menoken filed two formal EEO complaints (2013 hostile/adverse environment; 2014 Rehabilitation Act claims including alleged unauthorized access to her OWCP medical file). Administrative Judge dismissed both.
Menoken sued (filed Dec. 20, 2016), asserting Title VII and Rehabilitation Act claims; the district court dismissed the Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim in a March 6, 2018 Memorandum Opinion.
The court held Menoken was not a "qualified individual" for purposes of a reasonable-accommodation claim and that her requested indefinite/extended paid leave was not a reasonable accommodation; it also dismissed confidentiality, interference, and unlawful-access theories under the Rehab Act.
Menoken moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) for reconsideration, arguing factual and legal misapprehension on (1) denial of reasonable accommodation, (2) unlawful medical inquiries/confidentiality violations, and (3) interference; EEOC opposed.
The court denied reconsideration, finding no basis to revisit its prior rulings: Menoken failed to show she was a qualified individual, her requested leave was unreasonable as a matter of law, confidentiality and interference theories were legally insufficient, and she alleged no materially adverse retaliation.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether complaint alleging denial of a reasonable accommodation states a Rehab Act claim	Menoken contends the court misapprehended facts and law; she was qualified and denied accommodation; requested alternatives (reassignment/alternate processing) not indefinite leave	EEOC argued Menoken sought indefinite/extended paid leave (unreasonable) and waived response on qualified-individual point	Court held Menoken not a qualified individual; requested extended/indefinite leave was unreasonable; claim fails as a matter of law
Whether alleged unauthorized access to OWCP medical records or unlawful medical inquiries states a Rehab Act claim	Menoken argues EEOC allowed unauthorized third-party access to her medical file and that confidentiality/medical inquiry claims are actionable	EEOC argued timing/harm defects and that complaint did not allege unlawful inquiries or a statutory basis for a separate medical-inquiry claim	Court held confidentiality/medical-inquiry theories legally insufficient and untimely as pleaded; no basis for reconsideration
Whether an "interference" claim based on EEOC's handling of the accommodation process is actionable	Menoken says COO Withers interfered by delaying processing and offering settlement that conditioned approval on release, constituting interference/retaliation	EEOC contended process disputes are not independently actionable; alleged conduct did not amount to materially adverse action	Court held interference/process-sufficiency is not a separate Rehab Act claim; even under retaliation framework, Menoken failed to show a materially adverse action
Whether Rule 54(b) reconsideration is warranted to avoid manifest injustice	Menoken asserted errors of fact/law justify revisiting dismissal	EEOC opposed; argued no new controlling law, facts, or clear errors warranting reconsideration	Court exercised discretion and denied reconsideration, finding plaintiff failed to demonstrate the requisite mistake or injustice

Key Cases Cited

Menoken v. Lipnic, 300 F. Supp. 3d 175 (D.D.C. 2018) (prior Memorandum Opinion dismissing plaintiff's complaint)
Isse v. American Univ., 544 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2008) (courts have broad discretion to hear Rule 54(b) motions)
Cobell v. Norton, 355 F. Supp. 2d 531 (D.D.C. 2005) (reconsideration appropriate "as justice requires")
United States v. Dynamic Visions, Inc., 321 F.R.D. 14 (D.D.C. 2017) (factors for reconsideration: misunderstanding, overlooked controlling decisions, or changed law/facts)
Floyd v. Lee, 968 F. Supp. 2d 308 (D.D.C. 2013) (elements of a Rehabilitation Act reasonable-accommodation claim)
Pantazes v. Jackson, 366 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C. 2005) (interactive process cannot alone be the basis of a Rehab Act claim; the result matters)
Doak v. Johnson, 798 F.3d 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (§ 12203(b) treated as retaliation provision)
Solomon v. Vilsack, 763 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (elements of prima facie retaliation case)
Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (retaliation standard cited)
Smith v. District of Columbia, 430 F.3d 450 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (requesting accommodation qualifies as protected activity)
Paschal v. District of Columbia, 65 F. Supp. 3d 172 (D.D.C. 2014) (definition of materially adverse action in retaliation context)