492 P.3d 993
Cal.2021Background
- Plaintiffs were union operating engineers who ran heavy milling machines on public road-construction projects; when machines were stored offsite they performed "mobilization" (loading, securing, transporting, prepping, returning equipment).
- A collective agreement paid prevailing wages for onsite work but a separate memorandum paid a lower rate for mobilization; plaintiffs sued claiming mobilization on public projects required the prevailing wage.
- The district court granted summary judgment to defendants; the Ninth Circuit certified the question whether transporting equipment to/from a public works site is work "in the execution of [a] contract for public work" under Lab. Code § 1772.
- Section 1720 et seq. specifically defines what constitutes "public work"; § 1771 ties prevailing-wage obligations to that defined work; § 1772 states workers "employed by contractors or subcontractors in the execution of any contract for public work are deemed to be employed upon public work."
- The California Supreme Court held § 1772 does not expand the statutory categories of "public work" beyond the definitions in article 1 (§§ 1720–1720.9); thus § 1772 alone cannot make mobilization subject to prevailing-wage rules unless mobilization independently qualifies as defined public work.
- The Court limited its holding to the certified question and did not decide whether other statutory theories could require prevailing wages for mobilization.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether offsite mobilization (transporting/prepping heavy equipment) is covered by § 1772 as work "in the execution of" a public-works contract | § 1772 "deems" workers performing any activity necessary to carry out a public-works contract to be employed on public work, so mobilization is covered | Prevailing wage coverage is limited to activities that fit the statute’s defined categories of "public works" (§ 1720 et seq.); § 1772 only identifies which workers are covered, not new categories of work | § 1772 does not expand the statutory definitions of public work; it does not by itself render mobilization subject to prevailing wages |
| Whether prior judicial/administrative "integrated into the flow of construction" test (Sansone/Williams/Sheet Metal) properly expands § 1772 coverage | That test reasonably captures activities critically related/integrated into project execution and thus rightly extends § 1772 coverage to such tasks | The test imports principles from federal law and improperly overrides the Legislature’s careful definitions in article 1; it produces uncertainty and expands coverage beyond statutory text | The Court disapproved the extension of § 1772 by the Sansone/Williams/Sheet Metal framework to expand categories of public work; those decisions are not persuasive for expanding § 1772’s scope |
Key Cases Cited
- Kaanaana v. Barrett Business Servs., 11 Cal.5th 158 (clarifies relationship between state and federal prevailing-wage schemes and statutory scope)
- Lusardi Constr. Co. v. Aubry, 1 Cal.4th 976 (explains prevailing-wage law purpose and that wage obligation is statutory, independent of contract)
- City of Long Beach v. Dept. of Industrial Relations, 34 Cal.4th 942 (courts liberally construe prevailing-wage protections to effectuate legislative purpose)
- Bishop v. City of San Jose, 1 Cal.3d 56 (interpreted § 1771; Court here overruled parts inconsistent with historical reading)
- O.G. Sansone Co. v. Dept. of Transportation, 55 Cal.App.3d 434 (earlier Court of Appeal decision applying an "integrated flow" test; disapproved insofar as it expands § 1772)
- Williams v. SnSands Corp., 156 Cal.App.4th 742 (applied "integrated" test to deny coverage for offsite hauling; disapproved where used to expand § 1772)
- Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Assn. v. Duncan, 229 Cal.App.4th 192 (applied integrated/flow analysis to offsite fabrication; disapproved as expansion of § 1772)
- Allied Concrete & Supply Co. v. Baker, 904 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. discussion of integration concept under federal Davis-Bacon context relied on for analogy in lower courts)
