Mendez v. Banks
65 F.4th 56
| 2d Cir. | 2023Background
- Five parents/guardians of students with disabilities enrolled their children at the private school iBRAIN and obtained pendency (stay‑put) orders from New York impartial hearing officers requiring DOE to fund those placements during ongoing IDEA administrative proceedings.
- Plaintiffs sued in federal court and sought a preliminary injunction directing DOE to immediately fund tuition, transportation, nursing, and related services for the 2022–2023 year; DOE said it would pay in the ordinary course and later made payments through at least March 2023.
- Plaintiffs sought payment for the remainder of the school year (future tuition) and for already‑incurred transportation invoices; DOE argued future tuition claims were not yet ripe because pendency obligations end when administrative proceedings finally conclude.
- The district court denied the preliminary injunction; plaintiffs appealed.
- The Second Circuit held the claim for future tuition was unripe (but the February transportation invoices were ripe), rejected the argument that IDEA § 1415(j) entitles parents to an automatic injunction compelling immediate payment, and affirmed because plaintiffs failed to show irreparable harm or that placements were threatened.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ripeness of claims for future tuition | Mendez: future tuition payments are inevitable because proceedings will remain pending or plaintiffs will prevail | Banks: entitlement to future tuition depends on whether proceedings remain pending; cannot assume future obligation | Future tuition claims unripe; plaintiffs must wait until payment obligation has accrued (but past transportation invoices are ripe) |
| Does IDEA § 1415(j) create an automatic injunction for funding | Mendez: stay‑put is an automatic injunction and "funding goes hand‑in‑hand with placement," so immediate payment required | Banks: § 1415(j) protects placement automatically but does not compel immediate acceleration of payments or bypass ordinary fiscal procedures absent risk to placement | § 1415(j) grants automatic relief for placement, not automatic immediate funding; funding relief requires showing placement at risk |
| Standard for preliminary injunction | Mendez: district court should have treated stay‑put as displacing traditional PI factors | Banks: traditional PI factors apply to funding requests; stay‑put only substitutes automatic relief where placement, not merely payment, is at stake | Traditional PI standard applies to funding; plaintiffs failed to show irreparable harm or a balance of hardships tipping in their favor |
| Risk to placement and irreparable harm | Mendez: delayed payment itself violates procedural rights and causes irreparable harm | Banks: students remained enrolled at iBRAIN; no evidence providers would discontinue services or placements | No showing that delay jeopardized placement; plaintiffs conceded placements were intact—no irreparable harm shown |
Key Cases Cited
- Ventura de Paulino v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 959 F.3d 519 (2d Cir. 2020) (stay‑put preserves placement and pendency orders obligate district to fund placement while proceedings are pending)
- Zvi D. ex rel. Shirley D. v. Ambach, 694 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1982) (characterizing § 1415(j) as an automatic injunction maintaining status quo placement)
- R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2012) (describing New York’s multi‑tier administrative review process under the IDEA)
- Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010) (articulating four‑factor preliminary injunction standard)
- Petties v. District of Columbia, 881 F. Supp. 63 (D.D.C. 1995) (granting preliminary relief where delayed payments risked providers discontinuing placements/services)