Menaker v. Hofstra Univ.
935 F.3d 20
| 2d Cir. | 2019Background
- Menaker, hired as Hofstra’s tennis director/head coach in Jan 2016, was fired in Sept 2016 after a Title IX complaint by student Michal Kaplan alleging sexual harassment. Menaker denies the allegations.
- Kaplan’s complaint (sent by counsel) described social-media interactions and alleged quid pro quo threats tied to a scholarship dispute; Kaplan’s father had earlier threatened Menaker over the scholarship issue.
- Hofstra officials met with Menaker twice (July and Sept 2016); Menaker denied the allegations, provided communications and witness names, but Hofstra did not interview the suggested witnesses or produce a written investigative report promised under its Harassment Policy.
- At the September meeting Hofstra informed Menaker he was terminated for “unprofessional conduct” based on the “totality” of allegations; Hofstra did not follow its formal Harassment Policy procedures for investigation and written determinations.
- Menaker sued under Title VII and New York law; the district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Second Circuit vacated, finding the complaint plausibly alleged sex discrimination and procedural irregularities and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Menaker pleaded a prima facie Title VII sex‑discrimination claim after being fired for allegations of sexual misconduct | Menaker: procedural irregularities, departure from Hofstra’s Harassment Policy, and background pressure on universities support an inference of sex bias | Hofstra: Doe v. Columbia is limited to student sexual‑assault cases and intense public pressure; Menaker was fired for unprofessional conduct, not harassment, so Policy protections did not apply | Held: Complaint sufficiently pleads a prima facie claim—Doe applies to employees and harassment allegations; procedural irregularities plus contextual pressure suffice to infer sex bias |
| Whether the District Court improperly made factual findings on a motion to dismiss | Menaker: district court relied on disputed factual conclusions (e.g., officials were not hostile; informal process was followed) instead of drawing inferences in his favor | Hofstra: factual findings supported dismissal | Held: District Court erred by making improper factual findings and failing to draw all reasonable inferences for Menaker |
| Whether Hofstra could justify abandonment of its written procedural protections by recharacterizing the charges as "unprofessional conduct" | Menaker: recharacterization is post‑hoc and cannot defeat the Policy’s application when the investigation was triggered by a harassment complaint | Hofstra: the termination was for unprofessional conduct, so the Harassment Policy’s formal procedures did not govern | Held: Employer cannot avoid promised procedural protections by recharacterizing accusations after the fact; the Policy applied because the process began with a harassment complaint |
| Whether a "cat’s paw" theory (imputing a complaining student’s discriminatory intent to the university) is plausible | Menaker: Kaplan’s complaint may have been motivated in part by sex and Hofstra exercised control over her complaint and scholarship, and acted negligently in effectuating the adverse action | Hofstra: student’s motive cannot be imputed; no agency or negligence linking Kaplan’s intent to Hofstra | Held: Remand should allow the district court to consider a cat’s paw theory—plausible here because Hofstra controlled relevant aspects and allegedly acted negligently in relying on Kaplan’s allegations |
Key Cases Cited
- Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2016) (procedural irregularities plus sex‑based pressure can support inference of sex bias)
- Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2015) (pleading standards and inference drawing at motion‑to‑dismiss stage in employment cases)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (burden‑shifting framework for discrimination cases)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility standard for pleadings)
- Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411 (2011) (cat’s paw liability where biased subordinate’s actions are proximate cause of adverse action)
- Summa v. Hofstra Univ., 708 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2013) (circumstances in which a university’s control over students can permit imputation of liability)