Melvin Morriss, III v. BNSF Railway Company
817 F.3d 1104
8th Cir.2016Background
- Morriss applied for a safety-sensitive machinist position with BNSF, received a conditional offer, and completed medical screening.
- He reported good health, no current diabetes, no activity limitations; his doctor’s records likewise showed no current physiological disorder.
- BNSF examinations showed Morriss’s BMI ≈ 40–41; BNSF policy disqualified applicants with BMI ≥ 40 for safety-sensitive roles and revoked the offer.
- Morriss sued under the ADA and Nebraska law, claiming (1) his obesity was an actual disability and (2) BNSF regarded his obesity as a disability.
- The district court granted summary judgment to BNSF, finding Morriss produced no evidence that his obesity was a physiological disorder affecting a major body system or that BNSF regarded him as having an actual impairment.
- On appeal, Morriss argued obesity alone (including morbid/Class III obesity) qualifies as a physical impairment under the ADA/ADAAA and that BNSF perceived it as such; the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether obesity alone (even morbid/Class III) is a "physical impairment" under the ADA | Morriss: weight outside the normal range (extreme/morbid obesity) is a physical impairment without proof of an underlying physiological disorder | BNSF: "physical impairment" requires a physiological disorder/condition affecting a major body system; weight alone is a physical characteristic, not an impairment | Held: Obesity qualifies as a physical impairment only if it results from an underlying physiological disorder that affects a major body system; Morriss failed to show this |
| Whether BNSF "regarded" Morriss as having a disability under the ADA | Morriss: BNSF acted because it believed his obesity created an unacceptable future health risk, thus regarding him as disabled | BNSF: It acted on predicted risk of future illness, not on a perception of an existing physical impairment | Held: Employer perception of future risk or predisposition to illness is not the same as perceiving an existing "physical impairment" under the ADA; no evidence BNSF perceived an existing impairment |
| Effect of the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) on the definition of "physical impairment" | Morriss: ADAAA's intent to broaden coverage supports treating obesity alone as an impairment | BNSF: ADAAA targeted "substantially limits" and major-life-activity definitions, not the EEOC/ statutory definition of "physical impairment" | Held: ADAAA did not alter the regulatory definition of "physical impairment," so pre-ADAAA precedent requiring physiological cause remains persuasive |
| Weight of EEOC interpretive materials/Compliance Manual vs. regulations and prior cases | Morriss: EEOC guidance and Compliance Manual suggest extremes of weight may be impairments even without physiological cause | BNSF: Compliance Manual statements conflict with the regulatory definition; agency litigating positions without rulemaking receive no deference here | Held: The plain regulatory definition controls; the Compliance Manual's contrary suggestion does not override the regulation or controlling interpretation |
Key Cases Cited
- EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, 463 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2006) (obesity is an ADA impairment only if caused by a physiological condition)
- Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 1997) (obesity, absent physiological disorder, is not a physical impairment)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (summary judgment standard: nonmoving party must show essential elements)
- Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (discussed as a Supreme Court interpretation that ADAAA sought to abrogate limited portions)
- Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (same context regarding ADAAA's corrective purpose)
- Cook v. R.I. Dep’t of Mental Health, 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993) (morbid obesity may be an impairment where expert evidence shows physiological cause)