756 F.3d 64
1st Cir.2014Background
- Mejia, a Salvadoran national, entered the U.S. before 1999 and faced state shoplifting charges in Massachusetts; in 1999 he admitted to a single count under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, § 30A, but the trial judge dismissed the charges after a continuance while he was on probation.
- In 2012 Mejia was charged with larceny over $250 in Massachusetts and later admitted to an amended charge of larceny by inducement, resulting in probation and restitution.
- On January 25, 2013, Mejia was served with a Notice to Appear and alleged removability on two grounds: inadmissibility for lacking admission/parole and for a crime involving moral turpitude; Mejia conceded the first but contested the second.
- Mejia sought special rule cancellation of removal under NACARA § 203, conceding the 2012 larceny by inducement was a crime involving moral turpitude but arguing he fell within the petty offense exception based on the statute’s maximum penalties.
- The IJ denied NACARA relief; the BIA affirmed, concluding the shoplifting conviction also involved moral turpitude, but the court notes the BIA failed to analyze whether Massachusetts law, appropriately read, supports that conclusion.
- The First Circuit grants the petition for review, vacates the BIA’s denial on moral turpitude grounds, and remands for proper analysis under the modified categorical approach.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether BIA’s conclusion on moral turpitude was properly grounded | Mejia argues BIA failed to analyze Massachusetts law and apply the modified categorical approach | Government contends BIA’s ruling is sufficient | Remanded for proper analysis under state statute and modified categorical approach |
| Whether the court has jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision | Mejia contends jurisdiction exists to review legal questions | Government argues lack of jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) | Court retains jurisdiction to review the legal issue of moral turpitude determination |
| Whether Massachusetts shoplifting statute implicates moral turpitude under a divisible statute approach | Mejia relies on a modified categorical approach to parse the statute | Government attempts to substitute its analysis for missing BIA reasoning | Remand to BIA to apply the modified categorical approach using Massachusetts § 30A specifics |
Key Cases Cited
- Patel v. Holder, 707 F.3d 77 (1st Cir. 2013) (definitional framework for moral turpitude; BIA cannot rely on statute without proper analysis)
- Idy v. Holder, 674 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2012) (inherent nature vs. record of conviction; modified categorical approach when divisible statutes)
- Nguyen v. Reno, 211 F.3d 692 (1st Cir. 2000) (focus on inherent nature of the offense for moral turpitude analysis)
- Da Silva Neto v. Holder, 680 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2012) (definition of moral turpitude in immigration context)
- Maghsoudi v. INS, 181 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1999) (guidance on moral turpitude analysis for offenses)
- Campbell v. Holder, 698 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2012) (de novo review limits re BIA interpretation; defer where appropriate)