Mehaffy v. United States, 98 Fed. Cl. 604

Mehaffy owns 73 acres of riparian land on the Arkansas River; an easement and flowage rights were conveyed to the United States in 1970 for Lock and Dam No. 7, reserving fill rights up to elevations with certain prohibitions on habitation.
Easement clause expressly reserved Nomikano’s right to place fill above 252 feet m.s.l. and to construct structures on fill, subject to written Corps approval and non-habitation limits.
Clean Water Act section 404 permit was required for discharging dredged or fill material; in 1980 the Easement Deed’s reservation was identified as subject to §404 requirements.
Nomikano’s assets were liquidated; property ultimately sold to Mehaffy Construction Company (MCC) and later transferred to Plaintiff in 2000 for $10 after MCC held it.
Plaintiff submitted a §404 permit application in September 2006 seeking to fill about 48 acres of wetlands; the application contained minimal information.
The Corps repeatedly requested substantial additional information (narrative purpose, location map, plans, alternatives analysis) and emphasized 404(b)(1) guidelines; Plaintiff provided only limited information in reply, and no hydraulic study or alternatives analysis.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Corps’ denial of the §404 permit is ripe for judicial review.	Plaintiff contends ripeness is satisfied because final agency decision occurred upon denial and administrative appeal.	Defendant argues that lack of a meaningful, complete permit application precluded a fully informed final decision.	Ripeness found; final decision occurred after administrative appeal, making claim ripe.
Whether the Corps’ final decision was based on a sufficiently informed evaluation.	Plaintiff asserts the Decision Document reflects an informed, merits-based denial.	Defendant maintains information deficiencies prevented a fully informed evaluation.	Final decision supported by merited evaluation; deficiencies did not invalidate finality.
Whether the decision must require explicit determination of the extent of permitted use before ripe.	Palazzolo-type reasoning supports ripe review where the agency effectively forecloses development.	Williamson County/MacDonald require more certainty of granted uses before ripening.	Regulatory framework and decision demonstrate extent of permitted use; claim ripe.
Does the administrative appeals process under 33 C.F.R. § 331.12 require exhaustion before suit?	Plaintiff asserts exhaustion completed with the April 15, 2008 final appeals decision.	Regulations require exhaustion and a final Corps decision before suit.	Exhaustion satisfied; final decision issued on appeal rendered claim ripe.

Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (U.S. 1985) (finality requirement for regulatory takings ripeness)
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (U.S. 1986) (extent of permissible development must be known before takings review)
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (U.S. 2001) (finality and extent of permitted development may be implicit in agency decision)
Cooley v. United States, 324 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (final decision on merits after complete evaluation used for ripeness)
Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (U.S. 1997) (ripeness and exhaustion principles in takings claims)
Cooley v. United States, 324 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (final decision on merits after complete evaluation used for ripeness)
Bayou Des Families Dev. Corp. v. United States, 130 F.3d 1034 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (ripeness guidance in federal permit denial contexts)
Heck v. United States, 134 F.3d 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (ripe takings claim requires final decision where information required by law was provided)
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. v. United States, 474 U.S. 121 (U.S. 1985) (finality and regulatory discretion in land-use takings)