Megos v. Ranta, 179 Conn. App. 546

On October 12, 2014 (one day before the statute of limitations ran), the plaintiff served a negligence complaint against nonresident defendant Ranta by leaving process with the Connecticut Commissioner of Motor Vehicles and by certified mail to a New York address.
The marshal’s return stated service occurred on October 12, 2014 at the commissioner's office and that a certified mailing was sent to 120 Central Park South, Apt. 4C, New York.
The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing the certified mailing went to a prior address she had not occupied for over a year and she never received notice; the trial court granted dismissal for insufficient service.
The plaintiff then filed a new action under the accidental failure of suit statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-592, which permits a new action when a timely commenced suit failed due to insufficient service; the defendant again moved to dismiss.
The trial court held § 52-592 did not apply because the original action had not been "commenced" before the limitations period expired since the defendant had no actual notice; it dismissed the § 52-592 action.
The Appellate Court reversed, holding that service on the Commissioner under § 52-62(a) has the same validity as personal service and thus commenced the original action in time for § 52-592 purposes.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether service on the Commissioner under § 52-62(a) "commences" an action for limitations/§ 52-592 purposes	Service on the Commissioner is equivalent to personal service; therefore the action was commenced before the statute of limitations ran	The action is not commenced unless the defendant actually received or saw a copy of the complaint before limitations expired; certified mailing to an old address meant no effective service	Court held service on the Commissioner under § 52-62(a) constitutes commencement of the action — it has the same validity as personal service, so § 52-592 applies
Whether § 52-62(c)’s mailing requirement prevents commencement absent actual receipt	Mailing requirement affects sufficiency of service but does not negate commencement under § 52-62(a)	Subsection (c) imposes dual requirements (service on Commissioner and mailing) and noncompliance means no commencement	Court held subsection (c) governs sufficiency and possible dismissal for inadequate service, but does not negate that subsection (a) commences the action when Commissioner is served

Henriquez v. Allegre, 68 Conn. App. 238 (motion to dismiss standard admitting well‑pleaded facts)
Metcalfe v. Sandford, 81 Conn. App. 96 (standard of plenary review where facts undisputed)
Capers v. Lee, 239 Conn. 265 (§ 52-592 is remedial and applies only where an original action was timely commenced)
Rocco v. Garrison, 268 Conn. 541 (statutory construction principles; every statutory provision purposeful)
State v. Agron, 323 Conn. 629 (statutory interpretation methodology)