256 A.3d 585
Vt.2021Background
- Forrett (plaintiff) obtained temporary and then final relief-from-abuse (RFA) orders against Stone (defendant) in 2019; the final order ran through April 3, 2020 after the parties stipulated and waived findings.
- Forrett filed a motion to extend the RFA on April 7, 2020 (four days after expiration, two business days), explaining she had been unable to locate Stone’s address earlier.
- Stone moved to dismiss, arguing 15 V.S.A. § 1103(e) requires a motion to extend be filed "at the expiration of" the order (i.e., by the expiration date) and that the court therefore lacked jurisdiction.
- At the extension hearing Forrett testified (mainly via bench questioning) about two post-order incidents: Stone racing a car over a speed bump near her and walking/glaring into a park where she played softball; the court barred evidence about the facts underlying the original RFA.
- The trial court denied dismissal, found Forrett’s late filing excusable, and extended the RFA. On appeal Vermont Supreme Court held the statute may be read to permit post-expiration extension motions but reversed the extension for insufficient evidentiary support and remanded for a new evidentiary hearing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §1103(e) requires an extension motion before an RFA expires | §1103(e) permits a motion filed at or after expiration; statute ambiguous; remedial purpose favors post-expiration filings | The phrase "at the expiration of" imposes a firm deadline — motion must be filed by expiration; after expiration there is nothing to extend | Statute ambiguous; construed to allow motions filed before, on, or after expiration (post-expiration filings permissible) |
| Whether the court lacked jurisdiction because motion was filed late | Forrett’s April 7 filing was timely under court’s construction and excusable delay | Filing after expiration deprived the court of subject-matter jurisdiction; motion to dismiss warranted | Court had jurisdiction to consider post-expiration extension motions under §1103(e); appellate court did not decide excusable-neglect question |
| Whether the extension was supported by sufficient evidence that additional time was "necessary to protect the plaintiff from abuse" | Forrett relied on incidents during the prior order and alleged history of abuse supporting need for extension | Stone argued the isolated incidents were minor/technical and insufficient absent findings of underlying abuse or present danger | Extension vacated: trial court lacked sufficient evidence to find the extension necessary because it excluded/declined to consider evidence of the underlying abuse and there were no findings from the original stipulated order to support extension |
| Whether the trial court improperly limited evidence and findings (waiver of findings at initial order) | Forrett argued she should be allowed to present evidence about the facts that led to the original RFA and conduct during the order to meet her burden on extension | Stone contended the court properly focused only on post-order violations and need not revisit underlying facts | Trial court erred in barring/discounting evidence of the underlying abuse; remanded for a new evidentiary hearing permitting presentation of original-abuse facts and intervening conduct as relevant to necessity for extension |
Key Cases Cited
- Raynes v. Rogers, 955 A.2d 1135 (Vt. 2008) (describing remedial nature and liberal construction of Vermont Abuse Prevention Act)
- Heffernan v. Harbeson, 861 A.2d 1149 (Vt. 2004) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
- Arbuckle v. Ciccotelli, 857 A.2d 354 (Vt. 2004) (distinguishing modification jurisdiction under a different statutory scheme)
- O’Brien v. Weber, 48 A.3d 230 (Me. 2012) (construing similar protection-order statute and emphasizing promptness for post-expiration extension)
- Dyer v. Dyer, 5 A.3d 1049 (Me. 2010) (extension must be supported by proof of continuing harm or threat related to the original abuse)
- In re Laberge Shooting Range, 198 A.3d 541 (Vt. 2018) (abuse of discretion standard for trial-court decisions)