Medina-Rosales v. Holder, 778 F.3d 1140

Carlos J. Medina-Rosales, a Mexican national, adjusted to lawful permanent resident (LPR) status on November 27, 2001; later convicted (Aug. 2013) of grand larceny in Oklahoma.
DHS initiated removal proceedings charging him with being removable as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony; the Notice to Appear was filed in Dallas though hearings occurred by video with the parties in Tulsa.
Before the IJ, Medina-Rosales conceded removability but sought a § 1182(h) waiver of inadmissibility in connection with an application to adjust status under § 1255(a).
The IJ (sitting in Dallas by video) applied In re Rodriguez and held Medina-Rosales ineligible for the § 1182(h) waiver because his aggravated-felony conviction occurred after he became an LPR; the BIA dismissed his appeal.
On review, the Tenth Circuit determined Tenth Circuit law governed (because the charging document and Administrative Control Immigration Court were in Dallas/Tulsa) and considered whether § 1182(h) bars LPRs who obtained status by post-entry adjustment from seeking waivers.
The court concluded the statutory text distinguishes “admitted” (entry after inspection) from “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” (status) and held that § 1182(h) does not bar LPRs who became LPRs by post-entry adjustment from eligibility for a § 1182(h) waiver; petition granted and remanded.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Choice of law (which circuit's precedent applies)	Medina-Rosales: Fifth Circuit law should apply because hearings were conducted via video with parties in Tulsa (argued applicability of Martinez)	Government: Proceedings commenced where charging document filed; IJ was in Dallas; Tenth Circuit law applies	Held: Tenth Circuit law applies because the charging document was filed with the Administrative Control Immigration Court for Tulsa/Dallas and venue rules govern despite video hearings
Whether § 1182(h) bars LPRs who obtained status via post-entry adjustment from waiver eligibility	Medina-Rosales: § 1182(h)'s phrase “previously been admitted to the United States” refers to lawful entry after inspection and does not include post-entry adjustment; thus he remains eligible for a § 1182(h) waiver	Government: The statute is ambiguous; adjustment should be treated as an admission (citing § 1255(b)) and the BIA's interpretation in Rodriguez should be given deference to bar all LPRs convicted of aggravated felonies after admission	Held: Statutory text is unambiguous — “admitted” means entry after inspection and does not cover post-entry adjustment; § 1182(h) bars only those who were LPRs at entry, so Medina-Rosales (an adjustee) is eligible for discretionary § 1182(h) waiver consideration

Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532 (5th Cir. 2008) (holds LPRs who adjusted status post-entry remain eligible for § 1182(h) waivers)
Negrete-Ramirez v. Holder, 741 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2014) (interprets “admitted” to mean entry after inspection; adjustees eligible for § 1182(h) relief)
Stanovsek v. Holder, 768 F.3d 515 (6th Cir. 2014) (statutory reading excludes post-entry adjustees from § 1182(h) bar)
Papazoglou v. Holder, 725 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2013) (distinguishes admission at port from adjustment of status)
Leiba v. Holder, 699 F.3d 346 (4th Cir. 2012) (construing § 1182(h) to exclude adjustees from the admission-based bar)
Hanif v. Attorney General, 694 F.3d 479 (3d Cir. 2012) (similar textual interpretation favoring adjustee eligibility)
Bracamontes v. Holder, 675 F.3d 380 (4th Cir. 2012) (explains difference between entry admission and adjustment)
Lanier v. United States Attorney General, 631 F.3d 1363 (11th Cir. 2011) (views statutory definitions as status-based, not entry-based)
Roberts v. Holder, 745 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2014) (contrary view: finds § 1182(h) ambiguous and defers to BIA)
Latu v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 1012 (10th Cir. 2004) (limited precedent holding non-LPRs eligible to apply for § 1182(h) waiver)