151 Conn.App. 861
Conn. App. Ct.2014Background
- Petitioner Robert McMillion was convicted of first‑degree assault (bat injuries to victim) and sentenced to 8 years plus 5 years special parole; conviction affirmed on direct appeal.
- Petitioner filed a second amended habeas petition alleging, inter alia, trial counsel Jon Imhoff rendered ineffective assistance by misadvising about a pretrial plea offer (allegedly a five‑year deal) and failing to inform petitioner of maximum exposure (20 years) until trial.
- At the habeas hearing the petitioner testified he was told the plea was five years and that going to trial would also result in five years (thus he rejected the plea), and that he would have accepted the plea had he known the true exposure.
- The habeas court granted the respondent’s midtrial motion to dismiss under Practice Book §15‑8, concluding the petitioner failed to establish prejudice under Frye/Lafler because he had not shown the trial court would have accepted the plea; the court denied certification to appeal.
- The appellate court reversed: it held the habeas court abused its discretion in denying certification and erred in dismissing the ineffective‑assistance plea claim, concluding the petitioner had presented a prima facie case under Strickland as informed by Frye, Lafler, and Connecticut’s Ebron decision; remanded for a new habeas trial limited to the plea‑advice claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether habeas court abused discretion by denying certification to appeal | McMillion: reasonable jurists could debate whether his testimony established a prima facie ineffective‑assistance claim about plea advice | Commissioner: petitioner failed to show prejudice; dismissal proper because no evidence the trial court would have accepted the plea | Court: denial of certification was an abuse of discretion; certification should have been granted |
| Whether dismissal under Practice Book §15‑8 was proper on the plea‑advice claim | McMillion: his testimony and record evidence, taken as true, showed deficient performance and reasonable probability he would have accepted plea and the judge would have conditionally accepted it | Commissioner: petitioner did not prove that the plea court would have accepted the deal; later sentence shows prosecutor/counsel valuation was reasonable | Court: dismissal was improper; petitioner made a prima facie showing of Strickland prejudice under Frye/Lafler/Ebron standards |
| Proper standard for establishing prejudice when a plea offer is rejected due to counsel error | McMillion: under Frye/Lafler and Connecticut’s Ebron, need show reasonable probability defendant would have accepted plea and that trial judge would have conditionally accepted it; intervening sentencing matters go to remedy | Commissioner: argued court required direct evidence the trial judge would have accepted plea | Court: adopts Ebron approach—objective assessment that a reasonable trial judge would have conditionally accepted the plea; intervening factors addressed at remedy stage |
| Appropriate remedy after reversal of dismissal | McMillion: appellate court should credit his testimony and grant relief (e.g., entry of plea or resentencing) | Commissioner: case should be remanded for a new habeas trial so fact‑finding occurs below | Court: remand for a new habeas trial on the plea‑advice claim (appellate courts do not make factual findings) |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong test for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012) (prejudice in lapsed‑plea cases requires a reasonable probability the defendant would have accepted the offer absent counsel’s errors)
- Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012) (in plea context, defendant must show outcome of plea process would have been different with competent advice)
- Ebron v. Commissioner of Correction, 307 Conn. 342 (2012) (Connecticut standard: to show prejudice petitioner must show reasonable probability of acceptance and that the trial judge would have conditionally accepted the plea; intervening sentencing matters considered at remedy stage)
- Simms v. Warden, 230 Conn. 608 (1994) (standard for appellate review when habeas court denies certification to appeal)
- Winn v. Posades, 281 Conn. 50 (2007) (prima facie case standard on motion to dismiss: accept plaintiff’s evidence as true and draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor)