McKnight v. Johnson, 3:18-cv-01036

Background

Petitioner Terrence McKnight was convicted in California state court of first-degree murder and attempted murder (May 17, 2002 shooting); sentenced to 70 years to life; state appeals denied and he filed a timely federal habeas petition.
Three eyewitnesses (Wortham, Hoskins, Willingham) each knew McKnight pre-shooting and ultimately identified him at trial though each gave inconsistent prior statements.
Police officers testified that, at the scene, radio broadcasts relayed an identification: “Black male, 5’11", all black clothing, goes by Tee Baby,” based on unidentified bystanders; the trial court admitted that testimony for the limited purpose of showing officers’ state of mind.
Trial evidence also included references to McKnight’s association with a clique called the Freeway Boys and a letter from McKnight; defense objected to gang-type evidence as more prejudicial than probative.
McKnight raised multiple federal claims in habeas: Confrontation Clause challenge to the radio-broadcast evidence, due process challenge to admission of prejudicial/gang evidence, prosecutorial misconduct (arguing the broadcast identification as proof of identity), exclusion of one prior conviction for impeachment, and errors in jury instructions (second-degree murder and lying-in-wait theories).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admission of radio-broadcast identifying McKnight (Confrontation Clause)	Broadcast statements identifying “Tee Baby” were testimonial out-of-court statements; admission violated Sixth Amendment confrontation rights.	Statements were non-testimonial (made at a chaotic crime scene to end an ongoing emergency), so Crawford does not apply; admission was limited for officer state-of-mind.	Court: Statements were non-testimonial under Bryant/Davis and their admission did not violate the Confrontation Clause.
Admission of broadcast and other hearsay as prejudicial evidence (due process)	Admission of identifications and gang-type evidence was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial, denying a fair trial.	Evidence was relevant (officers’ conduct, motive, and context); strong independent inculpatory evidence made any hearsay admission harmless.	Court: No federal due process violation; Supreme Court hasn’t clearly held admission of such evidence is per se unconstitutional and the overall record supported guilt.
Prosecutorial misconduct (rebuttal argument relying on broadcast as proof of identity)	Prosecutor improperly argued the broadcast identification proved McKnight was the shooter.	Any improper remarks were minor; trial court gave curative instructions; primary evidence of guilt was strong.	Court: Remarks constituted misconduct but were harmless under Brecht given strong identification evidence and curative instructions.
Jury instructions — second-degree murder and lying-in-wait theory sufficiency	Trial removed/obscured second-degree alternative and gave a lying-in-wait instruction unsupported by evidence, violating due process and jury-determination rights.	Instructions, read as a whole, adequately conveyed burden and alternate verdicts; giving an unsupported theory is not cognizable federal error when jurors can assess evidence.	Court: No reasonable likelihood jury applied instructions unconstitutionally; no federal constitutional error warranting relief.
Exclusion of 1995 conviction for impeachment	Excluding a prior sale conviction prevented effective impeachment of witness Hoskins.	Prior conviction was remote; trial court properly limited impeachment scope under Van Arsdall and Jackson.	Court: Denial did not violate the Confrontation Clause or federal law; exclusion of remote conviction was permissible.

Key Cases Cited

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (testimonial hearsay/Crawford framework)
Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (ongoing emergency test for non-testimonial statements)
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (statements to 911/police during emergency are non-testimonial)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (AEDPA deference standard)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (unreasonable application of federal law under AEDPA)
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (harmless-error standard for federal habeas)
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (prosecutorial misconduct/due process test)
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (jury instruction/due process standard)
Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (presumption that jury follows curative instructions)
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (limits on cross-examination under Confrontation Clause)