Mckinney v. Ramsey, 1:18-cv-10548

Plaintiff Obafemi McKinney, pro se, alleges race-, color-, and sex-based employment discrimination after being fired from work at a Yonkers Loews hardware store; he names two individuals (Quayshanna Tanner and Sonja Ramsey) and references staffing companies (Set and Service Resource / Resource Plus).
Plaintiff says Ramsey accused him of theft and terminated him; Tanner did not continue his assignment after receiving Ramsey’s email alleging theft and video evidence.
While working, coworkers misnamed him (“Robyn” v. “Robbie”) and Ramsey confused him with another Black employee; plaintiff filed an EEOC charge and received a right-to-sue notice indicating the EEOC believed it lacked jurisdiction because he was an independent contractor.
Plaintiff asserts claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, New York State Human Rights Law, and New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL).
The Court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), dismissed the NYCHRL claims as inapplicable (events occurred outside NYC), found pleading deficiencies on employee status, proper defendants, and plausibility, and granted leave to amend within 60 days.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Applicability of NYCHRL	McKinney asserts NYCHRL claims for discrimination at his workplace.	Defendants note the conduct occurred in Yonkers, outside NYC.	Court: NYCHRL dismissed because it does not cover acts occurring outside New York City.
Employment status (Title VII/§1981 protection)	McKinney alleges employment discrimination (Title VII/§1981) based on his treatment and firing.	EEOC and defendants contend he was an independent contractor, not an employee.	Court: Pleading insufficient to show employee status; granted leave to allege facts relevant to Reid factors to show he was an employee.
Proper defendants for Title VII and §1981 claims	McKinney named individual supervisors Tanner and Ramsey as defendants.	For Title VII, only the employer (entity) is proper; individuals cannot be liable under Title VII; §1981 can reach individuals/entities.	Court: Instructed plaintiff to name proper employer-defendant(s); individuals may be liable under §1981 but not Title VII.
Pleading sufficiency for discrimination claims	McKinney alleges termination, failure to continue assignment, harassment, and misnaming as evidence of discrimination.	Defendants argue allegations are too conclusory and lack factual detail linking adverse actions to protected characteristics.	Court: Complaint fails plausibly to allege adverse action taken for discriminatory reasons; granted leave to amend with specific factual allegations (who, what, when, where, why).

Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) (sets multi-factor test for employee vs. independent contractor under federal common law of agency)
Salamon v. Our Lady of Victory Hosp., 514 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2008) (Title VII applies only to "employees"; use Reid factors to determine status)
Eisenberg v. Advance Relocation & Storage, 237 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2000) (discusses Reid factors and agency analysis)
Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2015) (pleading standard for employment discrimination: adverse action + protected characteristic as motivating factor)
Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2012) (individuals cannot be liable under Title VII)
Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2004) (§ 1981 can reach individuals and entities for race-based employment discrimination)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility pleading standard)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (established plausibility standard for pleadings)