McKinney v. Omni Die Casting, Inc., 2017 Ohio 2949

In April 2013 Zachary McKinney was injured operating a machine while in the course of employment at Omni Die Casting; he filed a workers’ compensation claim and received BWC benefits totaling $224,274.85 (plus estimated future costs).
McKinney sued Omni (and Omni VP Derek Lidderdale) in an intentional-tort action and later added spoliation and fraud claims.
The Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (BWC) moved to intervene to protect its statutory subrogation interest under R.C. 4123.93 and 4123.931, seeking to participate so any recovery would account for BWC’s payments.
McKinney opposed intervention, arguing the subrogation statutes do not apply to intentional-tort claims against an employer and that an employer is not a “third party” under R.C. 4123.93(C).
The trial court denied BWC’s motion to intervene, citing ambiguity in the statute and public-policy concerns that intervention could leave the claimant without meaningful recovery; the BWC and Omni appealed.
The Fifth District reversed, holding the denial was a final, appealable provisional remedy and that an employer can qualify as a “third party” under the statutes, so BWC may intervene to protect its subrogation rights.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (McKinney)	Defendant's Argument (BWC/Omni)	Held
Is the July 5 order denying intervention a final, appealable order?	Not final; denial to intervene is not a provisional remedy and thus not appealable.	Denial is a provisional remedy under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4); BWC would be deprived of meaningful relief later.	Court: Order is final and appealable as a denial of a provisional remedy under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4).
Does R.C. 4123.93(C) define an employer as a “third party” for subrogation in intentional-tort cases?	Employer is excluded; statute’s definition and related definitions do not include employers as "third party."	Definition of “third party” includes private entities; an employer may be liable and thus fits the plain statutory text.	Court: Statute unambiguous; a private entity (including an employer) can be a “third party,” so subrogation applies to intentional-tort actions.
Do public-policy concerns bar treating an employer as a “third party” (risk of insulating intentional-tort liability or duplicative recovery)?	Allowing BWC intervention would chill claimant recovery and effectively allow collection against employer insurance for intentional torts.	BWC subrogation is statutory and distinct from private insurance; current statute uses pro rata formulas to prevent double recovery.	Court: No public-policy violation; statutes and pro rata formulas prevent impermissible double recovery and account for claimant incentives.

Gehm v. Timberline Post & Frame, 112 Ohio St.3d 514 (Ohio 2007) (motion to intervene to create a record in a separate action is not an ancillary provisional remedy)
Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation v. McKinley, 130 Ohio St.3d 156 (Ohio 2011) (BWC subrogation arises from the Workers’ Compensation Act and differs from private-insurer subrogation)
Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Co., 92 Ohio St.3d 115 (Ohio 2001) (claimant’s tort recovery is constitutionally protected only to the extent it does not duplicate workers’ compensation benefits)
Groch v. General Motors Corp., 117 Ohio St.3d 192 (Ohio 2008) (statutory mechanisms permitting employer/fund recovery from third-party tortfeasors are broadly recognized)
Cablevision of the Midwest, Inc. v. Gross, 70 Ohio St.3d 541 (Ohio 1994) (where statute is unambiguous, courts must give effect to plain meaning)
Good Samaritan Hospital v. Porterfield, 29 Ohio St.2d 25 (Ohio 1972) (statutory definitions control application of terms within the statute)