McKie v. State
306 Ga. 111
| Ga. | 2019Background
- In 2014 McKie was indicted in DeKalb County for murder-related charges and, separately, for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon predicated on an earlier Fulton County forgery in the first degree charge.
- At McKie’s 2016 trial the State admitted into evidence a two‑page certified accusation showing McKie pleaded guilty to first‑degree forgery; no judgment of conviction or sentencing record was included.
- Defense counsel conceded in closing that McKie "was a convicted felon," while arguing justification/self‑defense to negate culpability for the firearm counts.
- The jury was instructed that the accusation “purport[ed] to be a copy of a prior conviction” and could be considered only regarding impeachment and the felony‑conviction element of certain counts; circumstantial‑evidence instructions were given.
- The jury acquitted McKie on all counts except possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 7); he was sentenced to five years and appealed.
- The Court of Appeals (divided) affirmed, with one opinion relying partly on counsel’s closing statements and a concurrence treating the accusation as sufficient circumstantial evidence; this Court granted certiorari.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the accusation and guilty plea document (without a judgment) constituted sufficient evidence to prove McKie was a convicted felon for the firearm‑possession offense | The State: the accusation showing a guilty plea was circumstantial evidence of a prior felony conviction and—given no reasonable alternative hypothesis presented—sufficient to prove the felony element | McKie: the document alone was insufficient; other reasonable hypotheses (plea not accepted, plea withdrawn, first‑offender discharge, lesser offense or no judgment) remained and the State failed to exclude them | Held: Affirmed. The accusation was sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove the prior felony where no alternative reasonable hypothesis was offered to the jury and counsel offered no contrary theory in argument. |
| Whether counsel’s closing statements admitting felony status could be treated as evidence to supply the missing judgment | State (as relied on by Court of Appeals lead op): counsel’s concessions could be considered alongside the document | McKie: statements of counsel are not evidence and cannot substitute for proof | Held: Court rejects treating counsel’s argument as evidence; the decision rests on the sufficiency of the circumstantial accusation and absence of any other reasonable hypothesis. |
Key Cases Cited
- Daniel v. State, 301 Ga. 783 (2017) (statements of counsel in closing argument are not evidence)
- Menefee v. State, 301 Ga. 505 (2017) (jurors presumed to follow court instructions)
- Tiller v. State, 286 Ga. App. 230 (2007) (insufficiency where plea record did not establish felony status)
- Worthen v. State, 304 Ga. 862 (2019) (jurors may draw reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence)
- DePalma v. State, 225 Ga. 465 (1969) (definition of reasonable hypothesis in circumstantial‑evidence rule)
- Jackson v. State, 305 Ga. 614 (2019) (application of OCGA § 24‑14‑6 carried into new Evidence Code)
