S18A1598. JACKSON v. THE STATE.
Supreme Court of Georgia
March 4, 2019
Reconsideration denied March 27, 2019
305 Ga. 614
BETHEL, Justice.
FINAL COPY. Murdеr. DeKalb Superior Court. Before Judge Jackson.
1.
Construed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence presented at trial showed that, in the morning and early afternoon of January 11, 2012, Steven Lewis and Paul Jones were playing video gamеs at the ground-floor apartment Lewis shared with a roommate, Zavrae Ruff. Jones had been staying at the apartment for several weeks, and he sold marijuana from the apartment. That morning, Titus Robinson was also present in the apartment, and he and Ruff were playing a video game in the back bedroom.
Jones heard a knock at the door, which was locked, and he asked who was there. Jones heard Jackson say that it was “Rock,” and he let Jackson and three other men into thе apartment.2 Jackson then asked Jones to sell him
Jackson and his three companions drew guns on Lewis and Jones, and Jackson shot Lewis, killing him. Jackson then turned the gun on Jones, threatened to kill him, and demanded money from him. Jackson‘s companions also had their guns drawn on Jones. Jones later testified that, at the time, he thought he was going to die.
After shooting Lewis, Jackson let two more men into the apartment and picked up another gun from the floor nеxt to Lewis’ body. One of the men who came to the apartment with Jackson ordered Jones to lie next to Lewis’ body. Jackson took a bag containing money and drugs from underneath a table on which bags of marijuana were sitting. Jackson and the men he brought with him then proceeded to ransack the apartment.
Robinson and Ruff were in the bedroom the entire time, and Robinson heard Jones beg Jackson not to kill him. After hearing the gunshot and Jones’
As Robinson sat on the bed, Jackson and one of the оther perpetrators rifled through Ruff‘s bedroom and closet. Jones had stashed a supply of marijuana and money in a bag beneath a clothes bin in Ruff‘s closet. Jackson left Ruff‘s room carrying the bag of drugs and money belonging to Jones. He instructed his fellow perpetrator who had been holding Jones at gunpoint to leave with him. At that instruction, Jackson and each of his companions left the apartment.
As Jackson left, Robinson jumped out the window and ran to join Ruff. Robinson‘s fiancée, Che Verdell, wаs driving to the apartment while the incident was occurring. When she arrived, she saw Ruff and Robinson running near the entrance to the apartment complex. As she drove closer to
Law enforcement officers who arrived at the scene took statements from Ruff, Robinson, Jones, and Verdell. Ruff, Robinson, and Jones each later identified Jackson in a photo lineup.
While Jackson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence only as to his conviction for burglary, we find that the evidence presented by the State was sufficient to authorize the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Jackson was guilty of each of the crimes for which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
As to his burglary conviction specifically, Jackson argues that because he entered the apartment with the consent of its occupants, the State failed to prove that he entered “without authority.” We disagree.
However, despite the fact that Jackson was admitted to the apartment by Jones, he was a party to the crime of burglary because, after shooting Lewis, Jackson opened the apartment door to admit two of his companions who, along with Jackson and the others whom Jones let into the apartment, proceeded to ransack the apartment, steal drugs and money belonging to Jones, and hold both Jones and Robinson at gunpoint. The jury was authorized to find that Jackson did not have the authority to admit those two perpetrators into thе apartment; therefore, their entry satisfied the element of entering without authority. As Jackson was a party to this act and the ensuing theft and other felonies committed inside the apartment, the evidence was sufficient to authorize his conviction for burglary. See Adams v. State, 271Ga. 485, 485 (1) (521 SE2d 575) (1999) (evidence sufficient to support defendant‘s burglary conviction where defendant‘s accomplice entered residence without authority and committed a burglary to which defendant was party).
2.
Jackson next argues that thе trial court committed plain error when it issued inappropriate jury instructions regarding circumstantial evidence, evidence of good character, and prior statements. We disagree.
Jackson‘s counsel did not raise an objection to the jury charges given by the trial court as contemplated by
First, there must be an error or defect — some sort of deviation from a legal rule — that has not been intentionally relinquished or abandoned, i.e., affirmatively waived, by the appellant. Second, the legal error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute. Third, the error must have affected the appellant‘s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means he must demonstrate that it affected the оutcome of the trial court proceedings. Fourth and finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the appellate court has the discretion to remedy the error — discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
(Citation, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) State v. Kelly v., 290 Ga. 29, 33 (2) (a) (718 SE2d 232) (2011). We consider each of Jackson‘s enumerations in turn.
(a) Jackson first argues that the trial court committed plain error when it gave an erroneous instruction regarding circumstantial evidence, which did not include certain language Jackson requested regarding the State‘s burden to exclude reasonable hypotheses other than guilt because the State‘s case was based on circumstantial evidence. While we agree that the trial court‘s denial of Jackson‘s request for this instruction was erroneous, Jackson‘s
The record reflects that Jackson‘s trial counsel made a written request for the follоwing instruction on circumstantial evidence: “To warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proven facts must not only be consistent with the theory of guilt but also exclude every other reasonable theory other than the guilt of the accused.” This language tracks the current language of
Evidence may be direct or circumstantial or both. In considering the evidence, you may use reasoning and common sense to make deductions and reach conclusions. You should not be concerned about whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial. . . . Circumstantial evidence is proof of a set of facts and circumstances that tend to prove or disprove another fact by inference[,] that is by consistency with such a fact or an elimination of such facts. There is no legal difference in the
weight that you may give to either direct or circumstantial evidence.5
Relying on this Court‘s decisions in Davis v. State, 285 Ga. 176, 177-180 (2) (674 SE2d 879) (2009) and Mims v. State, 264 Ga. 271, 272-273 (443 SE2d 845) (1994), and the Court of Appeals’ recent decision in Stroud v. State, 344 Ga. App. 827, 834-837 (5) (812 SE2d 309) (2018), Jackson argues that the trial court committed plain error when it refused to give the additional portion of the pattern charge on circumstantial evidence that he requested. We disagree that the trial court committed plain error.
Here, thе State‘s case involved, at least to some degree, circumstantial evidence of Jackson‘s guilt. Although Jackson‘s trial occurred after the effective date of the new Evidence Code,6 he primarily relies on decisions of this Court pre-dating the enactment of the new Evidence Code. However, that is of no consequence. Those decisions made clear that “if the case relies to any degree upon circumstantial evidence, a charge on [former
However, that does not end our inquiry. Jackson must also “demonstrate that [the error likely] affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Kelly, 290 Ga. at 33 (2) (a). This he has failed to do.
While circumstantial evidence comprised a portion of the State‘s case, the State also presented the eyewitness testimony of Jones and Robinson. In addition to testifying that Jackson held him аt gunpoint, Jones testified about directly witnessing Jackson shoot Lewis, admit additional accomplices into
(b) Jackson also argues that the trial court committed plain error when it issued its charge on character evidence. Specifically, Jackson suggests that it was error not to include language he requested stating that good character
The record reflects that, after a lengthy discussiоn at the charge conference, the trial court elected to include Jackson‘s proposed charge on his character trait of peacefulness, as it was supported by the evidence presented by Jackson at trial and because it was relevant to his malice murder charge. The trial court refused to include a requested charge on humility, finding that the requested instruction was not relevant to any issue in the case. The trial court‘s charge to the jury included the fоllowing:
You have heard evidence of the good character of the defendant and the character of the defendant for a particular trait, more specifically peacefulness, in an effort to show that the defendant likely acted in keeping with such character or trait at pertinent times or with reference to issues in this case. This evidence has been offered in the form of the opinion of another witness. You should consider any such evidence along with all the other evidence in deciding whether or not you have reasonable doubt about the guilt of the defendant.
This charge tracked the language of Georgia Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions § 1.37.10 and was tailored specifically to include a reference to peacefulness, as Jackson presented testimony at trial on that issue. We find no clear error in the trial court‘s decision to issue this instruction. See Parkerv. State, 305 Ga. 136 (823 SE2d 313) (2019); Williams v. State, 304 Ga. 455, 458-459 (3) (818 SE2d 653) (2018).
(c) Jackson also argues that the trial court gave an erroneous instruction regarding the use of prior statements, as the charge failed to include Jackson‘s requested language regarding the jury‘s ability to consider a prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence, rather than simply for purposes of impeachment. We disagree.
The record reflects that the trial court drew the relevant portions of its charge from the Georgia Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions on impeachment and prior statements, and it instructed the jury as follows:
To impeach a witness is to show that the witness is unworthy of belief. A witness may be impeached by disproving the facts to which the witness testified. Your assessment of a trial witness’ credibility may be affected by comparing or contrasting that testimony to statements or testimony of that same witness, before the trial started. It is for you to decide whether there is a reasonable explanation for any inconsistency in a witness’ pretrial statements and testimony, when compared to the same witness‘[ ] trial testimony.7
3.
Jackson next argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to his trial counsel‘s failure to preserve objections to the jury charges discussed in Division 2, supra, as such failure exposed him to a more stringent standard of review on appeal. We disagree.
To prevail on [this claim, Jackson] has the burden of proving both that the performance of his lawyer was professionally deficient and that he was prejudiced as a result. . . . In examining an ineffectiveness claim, a court need not address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Stuckey v. State, 301 Ga. 767, 771 (804 SE2d 76) (2017) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984)).
As to the failure of Jackson‘s counsel to object to the instruction on circumstantial evidence, Jackson has made no showing that he was
The other jury charges challenged by Jackson (regarding good character and use of prior statements) conformed to the relevant portions of the Georgia Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions and, specifically as to the charge on character evidence, were tailored to the evidence presented at trial. Pretermitting whether counsel was deficient for failing to object to the charges in the manner contemplated by
Finally, Jackson argues that the false imprisonment count should have merged with his conviction for thе aggravated assault with a deadly weapon of Titus Robinson. We disagree.
Here, the sole authority cited by Jackson for the proposition that these offenses merge is the decision of the Court of Appeals in Weaver v. State, 178 Ga. App. 91, 93 (4) (341 SE2d 921) (1986). That decision relied on this Court‘s 1982 decision in Haynes v. State, 249 Ga. 119 (288 SE2d 185) (1982), which the Court of Appeals cited for the proposition that two charges merge when the prosecution “uses up” all of the evidence that the defendant committed one crime in establishing another crime.
However, this Court set aside that analytical framework when it decided Drinkard v. Walker, 281 Ga. 211 (636 SE2d 530) (2006). In Drinkard, we overruled our prior decision in State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316 (206 SE2d 475) (1974), the progeny of which included Haynes. Drinkard, 281 Ga. at 217 n.38. Specifically, Drinkard abandoned as unworkable the “actual evidence” test adopted in Estevez (and applied in Haynes) in favor of the “required evidence” test previously adopted by the U. S. Supreme Court in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299 (52 SCt 180, 76 LE 306) (1932). Under that test, “the applicable rule is that where the same act or
The crime of false imprisonment includes the violation of liberty without lawful authority through arrest, confinement, or detention. None of
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
Murder. DeKalb Superior Court. Before Judge Jackson.
Clifford L. Kurlander, for appellant.
Sherry Boston, District Attorney, Emily K. Richardson, Deborah D. Wellborn, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Scott O. Teague, Assistant Attorney Generаl, for appellee.