McKenna v. City of Philadelphia
649 F.3d 171
| 3rd Cir. | 2011Background
- Carnation, a Philadelphia police officer, was terminated in 1999 following disciplinary proceedings arising from Memorial Day weekend conduct and alleged retaliation for protesting racial discrimination.
- Carnation alleged that Captain Colarulo’s retaliatory animus toward his complaints influenced the disciplinary charges and the ultimate termination.
- The Philadelphia Police Board of Inquiry (PBI) adjudicated the charges; it found Carnation guilty on several counts and recommended dismissal, with the Commissioner ultimately terminating him.
- The PBI proceedings were technically separate from the charging unit; the PBI could only recommend sanctions, while the Commissioner imposed punishment.
- At trial, a jury found that Carnation’s termination was retaliatory; damages were awarded, but Title VII’s damages cap and PHRA considerations were addressed by the District Court.
- The City challenged whether the PBI’s involvement severed the causal link between Colarulo’s animus and Carnation’s termination; the district court and jury upheld the causal connection.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Staub proximate-cause applies to imputing animus to the final decision | Carnation argues Staub shows proximate causation from nondecisions to the termination. | City contends PBI severed causal chain as independent decisionmaker. | Staub applies; no reversible error; causation not severed. |
| Whether the PBI’s involvement was an intervening superseding cause | PBI did not operate independently; could be influenced by Colarulo’s bias. | PBI was an independent adjudicatory process. | PBI could not be deemed independent; jury could impute Colarulo’s animus to the termination. |
| Whether Abramson’s influence test governs imputing retaliatory animus to the final termination | Influence or participation in the termination satisfies causation. | Requires more explicit independence of the final decisionmaker. | Abramson can support imputing animus; Staub later governs whether this suffices. |
| Whether the jury instructions properly conveyed causation proximate to Carnation’s termination | Instructions allowed finding of causation despite an intervening PBI process. | Instructions should reflect independent adjudication. | Harmless error; instructions sufficient to support verdict under Staub/ Abramson framework. |
Key Cases Cited
- Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011) (proximate-cause approach to employer liability for nondecisionmaker bias)
- Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2001) (influence or participation in termination suffices for liability)
- Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (causation standard for affirmative action under federal law)
- Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331 (3d Cir. 2006) (McDonnell Douglas framework for retaliation claims)
- Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1 (2010) (principles regarding causation and foreseeability in proximate-cause analysis)