305 Ga. 39
Ga.2019Background
- In June 2013 Joshua McKelvin shot and killed Marilyn Patterson and wounded three others at a motel; he admitted being the shooter but claimed no memory after two sips of an "odd" tasting beer.
- McKelvin was indicted for malice murder, multiple aggravated assaults, and weapons charges; a jury convicted him and the trial court imposed life without parole plus additional terms.
- Defense obtained a court-ordered psychological evaluation (filed under seal and provided to defense counsel); the evaluator found McKelvin competent and saw no evidence of involuntary intoxication.
- The State moved to compel disclosure of the evaluation and for written pretrial notice of any insanity-type defense; after an ex parte hearing the trial court ordered notice under Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.5 and production of the report.
- At trial the defense pursued involuntary intoxication (retained an expert), moved to remove a supposedly sleeping juror, and objected to admission of handwritten rap lyrics found among defendant's possessions.
- McKelvin appealed, arguing (inter alia) the court erred in requiring pretrial notice and production of the evaluation, in refusing to excuse a juror and declare a mistrial, and in admitting rap lyrics and allowing evidence that implied prior incarceration.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (McKelvin) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rule 31.5 required pretrial written notice for an involuntary-intoxication defense | No — involuntary intoxication is distinct and need not be treated as an insanity defense requiring notice | Yes — involuntary intoxication is functionally a subset of insanity and triggers Rule 31.5 notice | Court held notice required: involuntary intoxication is an insanity-type defense and triggers Rule 31.5 notice |
| Whether trial court erred in ordering turnover of court-ordered psychologist's report | Turnover violated Neuman and attorney-client/expert work-product protections | Report was generated at court direction for the court and not a trial-retained counsel expert, so Neuman does not apply | Court affirmed turnover: Neuman inapplicable because the evaluator acted for the court, not as counsel's retained expert |
| Whether the court abused discretion by refusing to excuse a juror and declaring mistrial for alleged sleeping | Juror was repeatedly sleeping; excusal (and mistrial) warranted | Observations conflicted; juror took notes and court counseled him; discretionary to retain juror | Court found no abuse of discretion in retaining juror and denying mistrial |
| Whether admission of rap lyrics and testimony implying they were on an inmate form unfairly placed character at issue or required mistrial | Lyrics irrelevant and improper character evidence; mention of inmate form suggested prior incarceration and warranted mistrial | Connection between lyrics and McKelvin was tenuous; any reference to inmate form was truncated and, if heard, a passing mention harmless in light of overwhelming evidence | Any error was harmless; admission and brief reference did not require reversal or mistrial |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for sufficiency of the evidence)
- Foster v. State, 258 Ga. 736 (1988) (involuntary intoxication construed in light of insanity statute)
- Neuman v. State, 297 Ga. 501 (2015) (attorney-retained expert communications protected unless expert will testify or inform other experts)
- Crossley v. State, 261 Ga. App. 250 (2003) (involuntary intoxication characterized as temporary insanity)
- Rauschenberg v. State, 161 Ga. App. 331 (1982) (defendant presumed sane; burden to show inability to distinguish right from wrong)
- Smith v. State, 298 Ga. 357 (2016) (trial court discretion to replace juror with alternate)
- Clements v. State, 288 Ga. 640 (2011) (abuse-of-discretion standard for juror-replacement decisions)
- Rivera v. State, 295 Ga. 380 (2014) (harmless-error standard where evidence of guilt overwhelming)
- Jordan v. State, 303 Ga. 709 (2018) (passing reference to prior incarceration does not place character in evidence)
