Jordan v. StateJordan v. State
Michael Jordan was convicted of felony murder and related offenses arising out of the shooting death of Stacy Johnson and the aggravated assaults of Rodney Miles and Shatik Bryant. On appeal, Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdicts, that the triаl court erred in admitting certain evidence, that he was entitled to a mistrial, and that the trial court should have granted his motion for new trial. Though we find no reversible error, we do see error in certain aspects of Appellant‘s sentence, and we must, therefore, vacate and remand for resentencing.1
1. When viewed in a light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence adduced at trial established as follows. On the evening of March 3, 2013, Shatik Bryant, Rodney Miles, Darnell Miles, and Stacy Johnson made the short drive from Bryant‘s gated apartment complex to a local gas station and convenience store. While in the store, Bryant and Rodnеy observed a man wearing a dark-colored, letterman-style jacket emblazoned with “Southside Mafia Elite”
Moments later, the group of men heard squealing tires and observed the blue Dodge quickly approaching from the rear; gunfire erupted from the blue Dodge, shattering the back window and striking Johnson in the head. A nearby resident also heard squealing tires and five very loud gunshots from a passing vehicle. Bryant turned into the entrance of his apartment complex, but it was blocked by a car waiting at the gate. Bryant and the Miles brothers ran from their vehicle after the blue Dodge missed the turn, but the reprieve was short lived as the blue Dodge turned around and assailed the men with a second round
Emеrgency services transported Johnson to Grady Hospital, where he later succumbed to his injuries. At the hospital, investigators interviewed Bryant and Rodney, both of whom independently identified Appellant in a photographic lineup as the man from the convenience store with the blue Dodge. Meanwhile, law enforcement recovered six shell casings at the entrance of the apartment and secured surveillance video from the convenience store, which shows Bryant and his friends, as well as Appellant, independently shopping in the store. A gas station employee identified Appellant as a regular and testified that, on thе night of the shooting, Appellant was in the store, wearing his letterman-style jacket, and driving a blue Dodge Avenger.
Investigators later searched the apartment that Appellant shared with his girlfriend, Alexandria Grace, and discovered under a sofa a “Southside Mafia” jacket and a .40 caliber Taurus pistol. Grace testified that both the jacket and the firearm belonged to Appellant, and, further, that she had permitted him to use her bluish-grey Dodge Avenger on the night of the shootings. The State‘s firearm expert opined that the six shell casings recovered from the scene came from Appellant‘s .40 caliber Taurus; the gun did not, however, match the
Appellant asserts that the evidence was insufficient because the State‘s case was speculative, conflicting, and filled with “mistrustful” testimony. However, “‘[t]his Court does not reweigh evidence or resolve conflicts in testimony; instead, evidence is reviewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, with deference to the jury‘s assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence.‘” (Citations omitted.) Hayes v. State, 292 Ga. 506, 506 (739 SE2d 313) (2013). Likewise, there is no merit to Appellant‘s complaint that the State failed to adduce fingerprint evidence, DNA evidence, or the actual murder weapon. “Although the State is required to prove its case with competent evidence, there is no requirement that it prove its case with any particular sort of evidence.” Plez v. State, 300 Ga. 505, 506 (796 SE2d 704) (2017).
The evidence presented below established that, on the night in question, Appellant — a convicted felon and gang member — was at the convenience store driving a blue Dodge Avenger where he encountered the victims, including Johnson, a member of a rival gang. After a verbal altercation between Appellant
2. Appellant contends that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress the photographic-lineup identifications made by Bryant and Rodney Miles. This argument is without merit.
“It is error to allow testimony concerning a pre-trial identification of the defendant if the identification procedure was impеrmissibly suggestive and, under the totality of the circumstances, the suggestiveness gave rise to a substantial likelihood of misidentification.” Miller v. State, 270 Ga. 741, 743 (512 SE2d 272) (1999) (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U. S. 188 (93 SCt 375, 34 LE2d 401) (1972)). “An identification procedure is impermissibly suggestive when it leads the witness to an ‘all but inevitable identification’ of the defendant as the perpetrator.” (Citations omitted.) Miller, 270 Ga. at 743. “[I]f the court
Appellant complains that the lineup was improper because, he says, it occurred following a “stressful” and “traumatic” incident, and neither Bryant nor Rodney Miles had an adequate opportunity to observe Appellant or the shooter from the blue Dodge. Appellant‘s concerns, however, relate to the second prong of our analysis — likelihood of misidentification — not whether there was an impermissibly suggestive lineup in the first instance. With respect to the first prong regаrding suggestiveness, the trial court received testimony at the suppression hearing that the photographs included in the lineup were automatically generated by the Department of Driver Services; the photographs depicted individuals with similar physical features; Bryant and Miles were kept in separate rooms during thе photographic-lineup procedure; both men were given proper instructions regarding the photographic array; neither man was told whether Appellant‘s photograph was included in the lineup; and each witness made his identification independently and without suggestion from
3. Over Appellant‘s objection, the trial court permitted the State to adduce evidence at trial pursuant to
Assuming without deciding that the admission of the 404 (b) evidence was erroneous, any error was harmless. The evidence concerning Appellant‘s involvement in Johnson‘s death was compelling. Appellant, a member of the Southside Mafia gang, was identified by two surviving victims as the man standing beside the blue Dodge immediately before the shooting, and a convenience-store attendant — who characterized Appellant as “a regular” — testified that Appellant was at the store with the blue Dodge on the night in question. Just moments after Appellant‘s verbal altercation with Bryant and encounter with rival-gang member Johnson, multiple witnesses heard squealing tires and numerous gunshots, which witnesses said came from the blue Dodge. Further, the six bullet casings recоvered from the entrance of the apartment complex matched a firearm that was hidden in Appellant‘s apartment and that was later identified as belonging to him; notably, the jury heard testimony that the gun was missing exactly six bullets. We also note that the evidence concerning the January 2013 incident was not particularly potent. Though the jury heard testimony that Appellant and Trammel had been involved in the January 2013 burglary, the homeowner did not identify Appellant as the man
4. During direct examination, Appellant‘s ex-girlfriend, Grace, was asked whether she had seen Appellant since the shooting, and she replied, “Not besides visitation, no.” Appellant moved for a mistrial, arguing that Grace‘s “visitation” response was a сlear reference to Appellant‘s pre-trial incarceration and was therefore impermissible character evidence; the trial court denied the motion, and Appellant contends that the trial court‘s ruling was erroneous.
“It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to grant or deny a motion for mistrial, and suсh ruling will not be disturbed ‘unless it resulted from a manifest abuse of that discretion.‘” (Citation omitted.) Taylor v. State, 303 Ga. 225, 229 (3) (811 SE2d 286) (2018). “When prejudicial matter is improperly placed before the jury, a mistrial is appropriate if it is essential to the preservation of the defendant‘s right to a fair trial.” White v. State, 268 Ga. 28, 32 (486 SE2d 338) (1997). Here, Grace‘s mention of “visitation” did not
5. Appellant asserts that the trial court erred by denying his motion for new trial. Specifically, Appellant contends that the trial court should have exercised its discretion as the “thirteenth juror” and granted a new trial pursuant to
Under
The order denying Appellant‘s motion for new trial reflects that the trial court acted as the thirteenth juror — weighing the evidence and considering the credibility of the witnesses — аnd determined that Appellant was not entitled to a new trial on the general grounds. “The trial court having exercised its discretion as the thirteenth juror, and this Court having found the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict, we find no abuse of discretion in its denying the motion for new trial.” Smith v. State, 300 Ga. 532, 534 (796 SE2d 671) (2017).
6. Finally, though not raised by the parties, we find error in Apрellant‘s sentencing. As to Count 5 — possession of a firearm by a convicted felon —
Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part, and case remanded. All the Justices concur.