McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675

In 2014 Kathrine McKee publicly accused Bill Cosby of rape and alleges Cosby’s lawyer wrote and leaked a defamatory letter about her that was widely published online and in news outlets.
McKee sued in federal court under state defamation law; the case was dismissed on appeal.
The First Circuit held McKee a "limited-purpose public figure" because she publicly disclosed her accusation and thereby thrust herself into a public controversy about sexual-assault allegations implicating Cosby.
Under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and related precedents, limited-purpose public figures must prove actual malice (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard) to recover defamation damages; McKee could not meet that standard.
Justice Thomas concurred in the denial of certiorari but wrote separately to argue that New York Times and its progeny are policy-driven, not grounded in the original meaning of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and should be reconsidered.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether McKee is a limited-purpose public figure	McKee is a private person whose disclosure was not enough to become a public figure	McKee voluntarily thrust herself into a public controversy by speaking to press	Court of Appeals: McKee is a limited-purpose public figure (cert. denied; Thomas did not revisit)
Whether public-figure actual-malice rule applies to state-law defamation suits	State law should govern; First Amendment doesn’t require heightened public-figure standard	New York Times and progeny require actual malice for public figures in defamation suits	Precedent requires actual-malice for public figures; Thomas urges reconsideration of that rule
Whether New York Times actual-malice rule rests on original constitutional meaning	McKee: (implicit) follow Supreme Court precedent	Cosby/defense: rely on established Supreme Court First Amendment doctrine	Thomas: historical evidence does not support that the First or Fourteenth Amendment originally displaced common-law libel; Court should reexamine precedents
Whether states should retain primary role in balancing reputation vs. speech	McKee: states can protect reputational interests under state law	Defense: national First Amendment rule protects speech and press interests	Thomas: favors returning to state-law governance; argues Court-crafted federal rule lacks original-meaning justification

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (constitutional actual-malice rule for public officials in defamation actions)
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (distinction between public figures and private persons; limited-purpose public figure doctrine)
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (criticisms of New York Times standard and commentary on difficulty of actual-malice standard)
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (extension of New York Times principles to public figures)
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (application of First Amendment protection in criminal libel prosecutions)
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (allocation of burden on matters of public concern in defamation cases)
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (discussion of judge-made constitutional rules and common-law evolution)
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (libel among unprotected speech categories historically)
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (recognition that libel rules historically were not abolished by the Constitution)
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (libel recognized as a historically proscribable category of speech)