McIndoe v. Huntington Ingalls Inc.
817 F.3d 1170
| 9th Cir. | 2016Background
- James McIndoe served aboard two Navy ships in the 1960s: USS Coral Sea (Huntington-built, commissioned 1947) and USS Worden (Bath-built, commissioned 1963). He later died of mesothelioma in 2011.
- Plaintiffs (McIndoe’s heirs) sued shipbuilders Bath Iron Works and Huntington in California state court, alleging asbestos exposure from pipe insulation originally installed on those ships; claims sounded in strict products liability and negligence.
- Case was removed to federal court under federal-officer removal statute; district court granted summary judgment for defendants on two grounds: (1) naval warships are not “products” for strict liability under maritime law, and (2) plaintiffs failed to show genuine dispute that shipbuilders’ original insulation caused McIndoe’s fatal disease.
- On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo, applying federal maritime law and the Restatement (Third) of Torts for products-liability concepts.
- Fact evidence: two lay witnesses (Tench, Sappington) recalled seeing insulation removal near McIndoe decades earlier and inferred insulation was original; an asbestos consultant (Ay) opined it was unlikely McIndoe avoided exposure to original asbestos; plaintiffs’ medical expert (Dr. Raybin) opined an ‘‘every exposure’’ causation theory.
- Court accepted a jury could find McIndoe was exposed to originally installed asbestos (fact dispute), but held plaintiffs failed to show that exposure to the shipbuilders’ original materials was a substantial contributing cause of McIndoe’s mesothelioma.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether naval warships are "products" for strict products liability under maritime law | Warships should qualify as products so strict liability applies for defects in materials originally installed | Warships are custom government-contracted vessels not "distributed commercially," so not "products" under Restatement (Third) | Warships here are not "products" for strict liability; strict products liability claim dismissed |
| Whether plaintiffs showed exposure to asbestos originally installed by the shipbuilders | Lay witness testimony and consultant opinion suffice to create a factual dispute that original insulation was removed in McIndoe’s presence | Testimony is speculative and unreliable; defendants not shown to have installed the specific materials causing injury | Jury could reasonably find exposure to original insulation (genuine factual dispute) |
| Whether plaintiffs proved asbestos exposure from shipbuilders’ materials was a substantial factor in causing mesothelioma | Medical expert’s "each-and-every-exposure" theory establishes causation without proof of prolonged/intense exposure to original materials | Plaintiffs lack evidence of intensity/duration of exposure to originally installed insulation; sweeping expert theory cannot substitute for substantial-factor proof | Plaintiffs failed to prove substantial-factor causation; ‘‘every exposure’’ theory rejected; negligence claim fails |
| Standard for maritime asbestos causation | Plaintiffs urged that any exposure above background suffices if expert says so | Defendants argued maritime asbestos cases require substantial/frequent/intense exposure to attribute causation | Court applies substantial-factor standard (as in Lindstrom) and rejects generalized "every exposure" causation theory |
Key Cases Cited
- E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (recognition that maritime law incorporates products-liability principles)
- Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875 (citing Restatements in maritime products-liability analysis)
- Lindstrom v. A-C Prod. Liab. Trust, 424 F.3d 488 (6th Cir.) (maritime asbestos causation requires substantial/frequent/intense exposure)
- Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668 (maritime law’s aim to protect maritime commerce)
- Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir.) (summary judgment review standard)
- Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics Corp. Sys., 637 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir.) (evidentiary limits on speculative causation at summary judgment)