McGruder, Michael Anthony
PD-1263-14
Tex.Feb 27, 2015Background
- Defendant Michael McGruder was arrested for DWI after a traffic stop; officers learned he had two prior DWI convictions and a warrantless blood draw was taken after he refused breath testing.
- The blood test showed a .09 BAC; McGruder did not file a pretrial suppression motion but objected at trial; he was convicted and sentenced to 30 years.
- McGruder appealed; the Tenth Court of Appeals (Waco) affirmed, treating his challenge as a facial attack on Tex. Transp. Code §724.012(b)(3)(B). Two-justice majority rejected the facial challenge; one justice dissented.
- McGruder petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals, which granted discretionary review. The grant was with no oral argument.
- Core legal question: whether the mandatory-blood-draw statute authorizes or mandates warrantless, nonconsensual blood draws (thus violating the Fourth Amendment) or whether the statute is constitutionally valid (facially and/or as applied).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (McGruder) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held (Court of Appeals) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Facial constitutionality of Tex. Transp. Code §724.012(b)(3)(B) | The statute is unconstitutional because it permits mandatory, warrantless, nonconsensual blood draws of repeat-offender arrestees, violating the Fourth Amendment | The facial challenge fails; statute presumed constitutional and McGruder did not show it is always invalid in all circumstances | Majority: facial challenge fails; statute presumed valid. Dissent: statute poses a facial problem. Review granted by Court of Criminal Appeals. |
| As-applied warrant requirement for involuntary blood draws | As-applied, the warrantless blood draw here violated the Fourth Amendment because no exigent circumstance or other exception existed | The officer reasonably relied on statutory mandate and/or implied-consent framework | Appellate majority focused on facial claim and did not find statute invalid; dissent and several sister courts have held warrantless nonconsensual draws absent exigency violate the Fourth Amendment. |
| Good-faith / implied-consent exception to warrant requirement | Officer's reliance on the statute or implied-consent does not justify warrantless compelled blood draws; statutory silence on warrants cannot override Fourth Amendment | State contends statutory framework and implied-consent support compelled draws in some circumstances | Appellate majority did not accept McGruder’s facial theory; other courts and the dissent reject broad application of good-faith/implied-consent as a free-standing exception to the warrant requirement. |
| Reliance on Beeman and precedent | Beeman’s dicta cannot authorize warrantless compulsory blood draws where no warrant/exception exists; later authorities limit Beeman | State and majority cited Beeman language to reject overbreadth concerns | Majority relied on Beeman-language; dissent and later appellate decisions treat Beeman’s dicta as inapposite and not controlling post-McNeely. |
Key Cases Cited
- Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013) (Supreme Court: natural dissipation of alcohol does not create a per se exigency; exigency must be judged case-by-case)
- Beeman v. State, 86 S.W.3d 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (discussed language about limits on compelled blood draws; treated as non-controlling dicta by some later panels)
- Weems v. State, 434 S.W.3d 655 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014) (appellate court rejecting argument that §724.012 is a per se substitute for Fourth Amendment warrant requirement)
- Forsyth v. State, 438 S.W.3d 216 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2014) (warrantless blood draw under §724.012 violated Fourth Amendment where officers relied on statute and no exigency existed)
- Aviles v. State, 385 S.W.3d 110 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012) (examined interplay of implied-consent/mandatory-draw statutes and Fourth Amendment; later proceedings after cert. activity)
- Santikos v. State, 836 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (standards for facial challenges and statutory validity in Texas)
- State v. Johnston, 336 S.W.3d 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (principle that state law cannot authorize conduct inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment)
