553 S.W.3d 289
Mo.2018Background
- Vincent McFadden was convicted (guilt and penalty phases) of first-degree murder and related counts for the killing of Leslie Addison; a jury recommended death and the sentence was imposed after retrial. Prior convictions and a Batson error led to an earlier reversal and retrial.
- At the retrial (2008) the State's case relied on eyewitness Eva Addison and corroborating witnesses; defense presented no guilt-phase evidence and pursued lay-only mitigation in penalty phase after prior experts performed poorly.
- Postconviction (Rule 29.15) McFadden alleged multiple errors: limited juror questioning (to two jurors) to investigate whether a juror intentionally failed to disclose prior exposure to him; that a judge who later recused tainted the postconviction process; and ineffective assistance for failing to call additional lay and expert witnesses (guilt and penalty phases) and for not obtaining PET imaging.
- The motion court held evidentiary hearings, questioned Juror Williams and one other juror, and denied relief; subsequent judges declined broader venire questioning and denied postconviction relief.
- The Missouri Supreme Court reviewed for clear error, applying Strickland for ineffective-assistance claims and established standards on juror contact, recusal, and penalty-phase mitigation strategy, and affirmed the denial of postconviction relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (McFadden) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Court limited postconviction juror questioning | Counsel should have been allowed to contact all 170 venire members to prove Juror Williams intentionally lied about recognizing McFadden | Court has discretion to limit juror contact; initial inquiry of Williams and a seated juror found no intentional nondisclosure | Denial of broad venire questioning not an abuse of discretion; motion court's limited inquiry sufficient |
| Effect of initial judge's recusal on juror inquiry | Judge Goldman's prior in-chambers questioning should be disregarded because he later recused; tainted postconviction process | Goldman recused out of caution and denied recalling extrajudicial facts; subsequent judges independently reviewed the transcript and ruled | No showing of extrajudicial bias or reliance; recusal did not require nullifying prior questioning; no due-process violation shown |
| Ineffective assistance — voir dire of Juror Williams | Trial counsel ineffective for not specifically re-asking Williams whether he recognized McFadden when Williams "looked familiar" | Court and counsel asked the venire whether anyone recognized McFadden; no objective basis then to follow up; Williams repeatedly denied memory later | Counsel not ineffective; no prejudice shown because Williams credibly denied any recollection |
| Ineffective assistance — failure to call additional lay/experts & obtain PET | Counsel should have called multiple lay witnesses, Drs. White/Draper/Gelbort, and obtained a PET scan to strengthen mitigation or impeach eyewitness, producing reasonable probability of different outcome | Counsel conducted investigation, reasonably chose lay-heavy mitigation (experts previously performed poorly), avoided witnesses/evidence that risked opening damaging topics, and reasonably declined PET due to limited value and risk of State access | Motion court not clearly erroneous: counsel's strategic choices were reasonable; additional evidence would be cumulative or risky and did not create Strickland prejudice |
Key Cases Cited
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (prohibition on race-based peremptory strikes)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (duty to investigate mitigating evidence)
- Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (when further investigation is required for mitigation)
- State v. McFadden, 391 S.W.3d 408 (Mo. banc) (prior appeal and discussion of juror nondisclosure and sentencing issues)
- Strong v. State, 263 S.W.3d 636 (Mo. banc) (no inherent right to juror contact; discretionary post-trial juror inquiries)
- Zink v. State, 278 S.W.3d 170 (Mo. banc) (presumption counsel effective; limits of PET/PET evidence in mitigation)