McDowell Ex Rel. Jones v. Blankenship, 759 F.3d 847

Deputies Pinson and Manley stopped Jimmy Farris; Deputy Wynn arrived with a drug dog, the dog alerted, and a search followed. A struggle occurred when Wynn reached into Farris’s pocket and claimed Farris tried to strike him; deputies restrained Farris, who later became unresponsive and died. Autopsy attributed death to hypertensive heart disease exacerbated by methamphetamine and exertion.
Farris’s relatives sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force against Deputies Pinson, Manley, and Wynn; the excessive-force claim against the deputies proceeded to jury trial in the Eastern District of Missouri.
On the first day of trial, defense counsel revealed Wynn was absent—working in Afghanistan—and would not attend; relatives declined a continuance but requested access to Wynn’s deposition; the district court allowed it and later admitted Wynn’s deposition under Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(4)(E).
Relatives argued Wynn’s absence was self-procured through his choice of employment and asserted Rule 32(a)(4)(B) should bar use of his deposition; the district court found "exceptional circumstances" justified admission and permitted the defense to use the deposition; relatives counter‑designated portions.
Jury returned a verdict for the deputies; the relatives moved for a new trial based on admission of Wynn’s deposition; the district court denied the motion, finding admission proper and non-prejudicial; relatives appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether admission of Deputy Wynn’s deposition was barred because his absence was self‑procured by choosing overseas employment	Wynn procured his absence by taking the Afghanistan job, so Rule 32(a)(4)(B) should bar using his deposition	Rule 32(a)(4)(E) allows deposition when exceptional circumstances make live testimony highly impracticable; Wynn’s overseas deployment made live testimony impracticable	Court affirmed admission under Rule 32(a)(4)(E): district court did not abuse discretion in finding exceptional circumstances
Whether admitting the deposition violated the relatives’ rights because credibility was central and live testimony was preferred	Absence prevented jury from assessing Wynn’s demeanor; deposition reading limited credibility assessment and prejudiced the relatives	Deposition was cumulative of other witnesses, relatives had full opportunity to question Wynn at deposition, and they declined a continuance	Even if admitting deposition were error, it was harmless; no substantial influence on verdict

Sayger v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 735 F.3d 1025 (8th Cir. 2013) (standard for reviewing denial of new trial)
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Dunkin, 850 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1988) (deposition-admission review standard)
Allgeier v. United States, 909 F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1990) (interpreting "exceptional circumstances" for admitting depositions)
Angelo v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 11 F.3d 957 (10th Cir. 1993) (exceptional circumstances require inability to appear)
Garcia‑Martinez v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 392 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2004) (preference for live testimony where credibility is central)
Batiste‑Davis v. Lincare, Inc., 526 F.3d 377 (8th Cir. 2008) (harmless-error standard for evidentiary rulings)
Winter v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 739 F.3d 405 (8th Cir. 2014) (erroneous evidence may be harmless when cumulative)