McDonough v. Smith
588 U.S. 109
SCOTUS2019Background
- McDonough, a county elections commissioner, was investigated and prosecuted for allegedly forged absentee ballots; prosecutor Smith allegedly fabricated affidavits, coached witnesses, and manipulated DNA evidence to implicate McDonough.
- Smith secured a grand jury indictment; McDonough was arrested, released with travel restrictions, tried twice (first trial: mistrial; second trial: acquittal on December 21, 2012).
- McDonough sued Smith under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for fabrication of evidence and (separately) constitutional malicious prosecution on December 18, 2015—just under three years after acquittal.
- District Court dismissed the fabricated-evidence claim as time-barred; the Second Circuit affirmed, holding accrual occurred when McDonough learned fabricated evidence was used and he suffered a liberty deprivation (i.e., during the prosecution).
- Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit conflict over when the statute of limitations begins to run for a §1983 fabricated-evidence claim that alleges a liberty deprivation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When does the §1983 statute of limitations accrue for a fabricated-evidence claim alleging a liberty deprivation? | McDonough: accrual should occur when criminal proceedings terminate favorably (here, acquittal). | Smith: accrual occurs when plaintiff learns fabricated evidence was used and suffers a liberty deprivation (during prosecution/at arrest). | Accrual begins when the criminal proceedings terminate in the plaintiff’s favor (favorable termination — here, acquittal). |
| Is the fabricated-evidence claim analogous to malicious prosecution for accrual purposes? | McDonough: yes; malicious-prosecution analogy supports deferring accrual until favorable termination. | Smith: fabricated-evidence claims differ and can exist even if probable cause exists or the defendant is acquitted. | Court: the closest common-law analogy is malicious prosecution; the analogy supports favorable-termination accrual. |
| Does Heck v. Humphrey bar accrual-deferral or apply here? | McDonough: Heck’s principles (avoiding collateral attack and parallel litigation) support deferring accrual until favorable termination. | Smith: Wallace v. Kato shows Heck is inapplicable; some claims (e.g., false arrest) accrue before outcome. | Court: Wallace does not displace Heck here; Heck’s concerns govern because the §1983 claim necessarily impugns the criminal proceeding. |
| Are policy/workaround arguments (stays/abstention) sufficient to start the clock earlier? | McDonough: starting the clock only at favorable termination avoids forcing collateral civil suits and protection of trial rights. | Smith: earlier accrual gives clearer rules and prevents delay; stays or abstention can manage parallel litigation. | Court: practical problems and risks from early accrual outweigh potential benefits; stays/abstention are poor substitutes here. |
Key Cases Cited
- Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (false-arrest accrual principles; discussed limits of Heck)
- Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (favorable-termination rule to avoid collateral attack on convictions)
- Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (habeas is proper vehicle for attacking fact or duration of confinement)
- Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (due process implications of false testimony/fabricated evidence)
- Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353 (accrual can be deferred where claim cannot realistically be brought earlier)