McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355

Background

Governor Robert McDonnell and his wife accepted loans, gifts, and benefits (totaling >$175,000) from businessman Jonnie Williams (Star Scientific) while McDonnell was governor; Williams sought the Governor’s help obtaining university research and other government support for Star Scientific’s product, Anatabloc.
Indictment charged bribery-related offenses (honest services fraud, Hobbs Act extortion), alleging McDonnell committed “official acts” such as arranging meetings, hosting events at the Governor’s Mansion, and contacting other officials to advance research on Anatabloc.
At trial the District Court instructed the jury using an expansive definition of “official act” (including acts a public official customarily performs and actions in furtherance of longer-term goals); the jury convicted McDonnell and his wife.
McDonnell challenged the jury instructions, moved for acquittal (insufficient evidence) and argued the statutes were unconstitutionally vague; the Fourth Circuit affirmed; the Supreme Court granted certiorari to clarify “official act.”
The Supreme Court held that the statutory term “official act” requires (1) a specific, focused question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or controversy that is pending or may by law be brought before a public official and (2) a decision or action on that matter (or an agreement to do so); routine acts like setting up meetings or hosting events, standing alone, do not qualify.
Because the District Court’s instructions were overbroad and could have allowed conviction without finding a proper “official act,” the Court vacated McDonnell’s convictions and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the narrowed definition.

Issues

Issue	McDonnell's Argument	United States' Argument	Held
Meaning of “official act” under 18 U.S.C. §201(a)(3)	Must be a decision/action on a specific government question or matter (not routine constituent activity)	Broad: any activity by an official concerning any subject (including meetings, calls, events) qualifies	“Official act” = decision/action (or agreement) on a specific, focused question/matter pending or which may by law be brought before an official; routine meetings/calls/events alone do not qualify
Whether jury instructions correctly defined “official act”	Instructions were overbroad and allowed conviction for lawful, routine acts	Instructions reflected statutory breadth and customary practices	Instructions were legally erroneous and overinclusive; vacated convictions because error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
Vagueness / Due process challenge to honest services statute and Hobbs Act	Statutes are unconstitutionally vague as applied under the Government’s broad reading	Statutes can be applied via §201’s definition to avoid vagueness	Court rejects facial vagueness challenge; adopts narrower definition to avoid constitutional concerns
Sufficiency of evidence to prove an “official act”	Evidence insufficient under narrowed definition; convictions should be dismissed	Evidence shown at trial supported jury’s findings under Government’s reading	Court declines to decide sufficiency in first instance; remands to the court of appeals to apply the correct standard and decide sufficiency/new trial or dismissal

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398 (1999) (routine meetings or speeches do not automatically constitute an “official act” under §201)
United States v. Birdsall, 233 U.S. 223 (1914) (official action can include advising a superior when that advice is expected to form the basis of formal action)
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010) (honest-services fraud limited to bribery and kickbacks; avoid vagueness by limiting scope)
Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992) (Hobbs Act extortion includes taking a bribe; agreement to perform specific official acts completes offense)
Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303 (1961) (noscitur a sociis interpretive canon: a word is known by the company it keeps)
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995) (context constrains ambiguous statutory terms)
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) (harmless-error doctrine in criminal cases)
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987) (narrow construction of federal corruption statutes to avoid intruding on state governance)
United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396 (1973) (limits on expansive readings of federal statutes that would intrude on state criminal jurisdiction)