McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm'n
134 S. Ct. 1434
SCOTUS2014Background
- BCRA imposes both "base" contribution limits (per-candidate/committee) and "aggregate" limits (total to all candidates/committees). Appellant Shaun McCutcheon and the RNC challenged BCRA’s aggregate limits after McCutcheon was prevented from making additional otherwise base-compliant contributions.
- McCutcheon alleged he wanted to give additional contributions to candidates and party committees but was barred by the statutory aggregate ceilings; he seeks to make similar future donations.
- The three-judge District Court denied a preliminary injunction and dismissed, reasoning aggregate limits prevent circumvention of base limits and are a coherent part of the contribution regime.
- The Supreme Court granted review to decide whether the aggregate limits violate the First Amendment; the Court assumed base limits are constitutional and focused on aggregate limits.
- The Court held (5–4) that BCRA’s aggregate limits are invalid because they do not meaningfully further the anticorruption interest and are not closely drawn to prevent circumvention of the base limits.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether aggregate contribution limits violate the First Amendment by restricting political expression and association | McCutcheon: aggregate limits severely restrict ability to support many candidates/committees and therefore abridge expressive and associational rights | FEC: limits are constitutional anticircumvention measures that prevent funneling massive sums to a single candidate and reduce corruption | Court: aggregate limits are unconstitutional — they impose substantial First Amendment burdens and fail tailoring/corroboration requirements |
| Whether aggregate limits further the only legitimate governmental interest: preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance | McCutcheon: base limits already reflect Congress’s judgment about corruption risk; aggregate limits therefore cannot be justified as preventing corruption | FEC: aggregate limits prevent circumvention of base limits and also deter corruption by capping large overall checks that could create influence | Court: anticorruption interest is limited to quid pro quo or its appearance; aggregate limits ban contributions below base thresholds and do not materially prevent circumvention today |
| Whether Buckley v. Valeo controls upholding aggregate limits | McCutcheon: Buckley’s brief treatment of aggregate limits does not control because statutory/regulatory landscape has changed and appellants directly challenge BCRA limits | FEC: Buckley treated aggregate limit as corollary to base limits and supports upholding aggregate ceilings | Court: Buckley’s three-sentence analysis is not dispositive here given intervening statutory/regulatory changes and developed arguments; Buckley need not be overruled but aggregate limits fail even under Buckley’s test |
| Whether less restrictive alternatives exist to address circumvention | McCutcheon: Congress can use narrower tools (transfer restrictions, tighter earmarking, segregated funds, disclosure) to address circumvention without broad aggregate caps | FEC: aggregate limits are necessary to stop complex circumvention schemes | Court: numerous feasible, less restrictive alternatives and disclosure improvements undercut necessity of aggregate limits; aggregate limits are overbroad |
Key Cases Cited
- Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (distinguishes contribution vs. expenditure limits; upheld base limits and briefly treated aggregate limits as anticircumvention)
- Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (limits on independent expenditures and discussion that anticorruption interest is confined to quid pro quo)
- McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (upheld BCRA provisions addressing soft money based on broad anticorruption concerns and a detailed evidentiary record)
- Davis v. Federal Election Comm'n, 554 U.S. 724 (2008) (robust exercise of First Amendment rights cannot be penalized)
- Federal Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449 (2007) (First Amendment requires erring on side of protecting political speech)
- Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (courts should not accept mere conjecture to justify speech restrictions)
- Federal Election Comm’n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985) (discussion of corruption and influence in campaign finance context)