McCutchen v. United States, 14 F.4th 1355

Background

After the 2017 Las Vegas massacre, DOJ/ATF issued a Final Rule (Dec. 26, 2018; effective Mar. 26, 2019) classifying “bump‑stock‑type devices” as “machineguns” under the National Firearms Act and Gun Control Act, requiring possessors to destroy or surrender them or face criminal penalties.
Plaintiffs McCutchen and Paducah Shooter’s Supply owned such devices and destroyed them before the Rule’s effective date; they sued in the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act seeking just compensation for an alleged taking.
The Claims Court granted the government’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, principally relying on the police‑power rationale.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed on a different, threshold ground: plaintiffs lacked a cognizable property interest in continued possession or transfer because 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (the preexisting statutory prohibition on possession/transfer of machineguns) and the delegated implementation authority limited any title.
The court noted ATF had issued informal classification letters (2008–2017) saying some bump stocks were not machineguns, but those letters were expressly provisional and did not create a protected property interest against a valid later agency interpretation.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Final Rule effected a compensable physical taking by requiring destruction/surrender of bump stocks	McCutchen: Destruction/surrender is a physical taking requiring compensation	U.S.: No compensable taking because plaintiffs lacked a protected property interest and government acted pursuant to statute/regulatory authority (police powers)	Affirmed: No taking — plaintiffs lacked a protected property interest in continued possession/transferability against a valid implementation of §922(o)
Whether plaintiffs had a legally cognizable property interest in continued possession/transferability	Plaintiffs: State‑law ownership plus prior ATF letters created vested expectations	U.S.: Title always limited by preexisting federal prohibition and delegated agency authority; no vested federal property right	Held: No cognizable property interest; preexisting federal law (and valid agency interpretation) limited title
Whether ATF’s 2008–2017 classification letters vested a protected property interest	Plaintiffs: Reliance on prior ATF classification rulings that devices were not machineguns	U.S.: Those letters were informal, expressly provisional, and subject to revision; they did not create an irrevocable property interest	Held: ATF letters were provisional and did not create a compensable property interest
Whether the police‑power doctrine bars compensation here (alternative rationale)	Plaintiffs: Police‑power defense inapplicable because the Rule effectuated a new regulatory change rather than mere enforcement	U.S.: Rule enforces the statutory machinegun prohibition to protect public safety, a classical police‑power action	Held: Court did not decide police‑power question as its holding rested on the lack of a protected property interest; concurrence would affirm on police‑power grounds

Key Cases Cited

Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (categorical rule: regulation denying all economically beneficial use is a taking unless background principles of law inhere in title)
Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063 (2021) (distinguishes physical appropriation and use‑restriction takings; background limitations on title may defeat takings claim)
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (flexible balancing test for regulatory takings)
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for judicial deference to reasonable agency interpretations)
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (property interests defined by existing rules and background principles)
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (preexisting regulatory reservations can prevent acquisition of a compensable property interest)
Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996) (forfeiture/seizure under criminal law is not necessarily a taking)
Calero‑Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974) (in rem forfeiture and seizure of contraband need not be treated as a taking)
Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 576 U.S. 350 (2015) (distinguishes treatment of personal property in takings doctrine)
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (public use/public purpose principles)