McCullough v. State
168 A.3d 1045
| Md. Ct. Spec. App. | 2017Background
- In 2004, when he was 17½, Matthew McCullough fired shots into a crowd with three others, seriously wounding four students (one left paralyzed). He was convicted of four counts of first-degree assault.
- At sentencing in 2005 the court imposed maximum 25-year terms on each count, to run consecutively, producing a 100-year aggregate sentence. Parole eligibility under Maryland law occurs after serving one-half of the aggregate for violent crimes (here, earliest parole eligibility in 2054 at age 67).
- In 2016 McCullough moved to correct an illegal sentence, arguing the 100-year aggregate for nonhomicide juvenile offenses is the functional equivalent of life without parole (LWOP) and therefore violates the Eighth Amendment under Graham v. Florida.
- The circuit court denied the motion; McCullough appealed to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals. The appeal asks whether Graham’s categorical bar on LWOP for juvenile nonhomicide offenders extends to multiple consecutive term-of-years sentences that cumulatively amount to de facto LWOP.
- The court reviewed federal Eighth Amendment jurisprudence (categorical rules in Roper/Graham/Miller and traditional proportionality review) and the split of authority in other jurisdictions about whether Graham applies to aggregate term-of-years sentences.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Graham’s categorical prohibition on LWOP for juvenile nonhomicide offenders extends to consecutive term-of-years sentences whose aggregate parole ineligibility approximates life | McCullough: four consecutive 25‑year terms (aggregate 100 years) are the functional equivalent of LWOP; Graham requires a meaningful opportunity for release and so the aggregate sentence is unconstitutional | State: these are lawful consecutive term‑of‑years sentences for distinct crimes/victims within statutory limits; Graham addressed LWOP only and courts should not substitute statutory maxima | Held: Graham does not extend to multiple consecutive term‑of‑years sentences for multiple offenses where no single sentence equals LWOP; apply traditional proportionality to each sentence |
| Whether Maryland’s parole scheme denies a juvenile a “meaningful opportunity” for release in violation of Graham | McCullough: parole ineligibility until age 67 and parole standards make meaningful opportunity illusory | State: parole statutes and COMAR require consideration of maturity/rehabilitation for juvenile offenders; parole eligibility exists and is cognizable | Held: Maryland parole provisions and regulations require consideration of youth-related factors; eligibility at 67 does not violate Graham in this case |
| If Graham applied, whether McCullough’s aggregate sentence would nonetheless be unconstitutional | McCullough: even under Graham, the aggregate sentence denies meaningful opportunity within life expectancy | State: if Graham applied, the sentences are within statutory limits and not grossly disproportionate | Held: even assuming Graham applied, parole eligibility at 67 is within life expectancy and the sentence is not cruel and unusual here |
| Whether the aggregate sentence is otherwise grossly disproportionate under Eighth Amendment proportionality review | McCullough: aggregate result is excessive and irreversible punishment | State: each 25‑year sentence is within statutory maximum and proportionate to the harm to each victim | Held: traditional proportionality review applied to each individual sentence shows no gross disproportionality given the severity of the multiple assaults and injuries |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (categorical Eighth Amendment bar on LWOP for juvenile nonhomicide offenders; requires meaningful opportunity for release)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory LWOP for juveniles convicted of homicide violates Eighth Amendment; sentencing authority must consider youth mitigating factors)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (death penalty unconstitutional for juveniles; juveniles have diminished culpability)
- Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (plurality: Eighth Amendment proportionality principle is narrow; forbids only extreme, grossly disproportionate sentences)
- Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (Solem framework for proportionality review: gravity of offense, sentences for other offenders in same jurisdiction, sentences in other jurisdictions)
- Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments that are disproportionate; foundational proportionality concept)
- O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892) (dicta rejecting aggregation‑based Eighth Amendment challenge to cumulative sentences for distinct offenses)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (Miller announced a substantive rule and applies retroactively; states may remedy Miller violations by allowing parole consideration)