McCray v. Capra, 45 F.4th 634

Terrence McCray was convicted of first-degree rape after a jury credited the victim’s testimony over his claim the encounter was consensual and a post-sex struggle ensued; physical evidence (bruises, bite marks, DNA) was consistent with both accounts.
Prosecutors disclosed a synopsis of the victim’s extensive mental‑health history (diagnoses, hospitalizations, prior sexual‑abuse reports); McCray requested the full records (>5,000 pages).
The trial judge conducted an in‑camera review and provided the defense a 28‑page sample deemed representative; the rest were sealed; the victim testified about her mental‑health issues and defense cross‑examined her at length.
McCray appealed, arguing the limited disclosure violated Brady (due process) and the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause; New York’s Appellate Division and Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding the sample representative and nondisclosure not material.
McCray sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; the district court denied relief but granted a certificate of appealability on the Brady issue and expanded to include confrontation; the Second Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (McCray)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Brady materiality: Did withholding the full mental‑health file (providing only a 28‑page sample) violate due process by suppressing materially impeaching evidence?	The undisclosed records contained uniquely material impeachment (confabulation, memory distortion, a prior alleged rape by her father) that could have changed the verdict; the sample was inadequate.	The sample plus in‑court testimony gave McCray ample impeachment material; much of the file was duplicative or irrelevant, and nothing in the withheld records created a reasonable probability of a different outcome.	Affirmed: under AEDPA, the New York Court of Appeals’ conclusion that withheld material was not Brady‑material was a reasonable application of Supreme Court law.
Confrontation Clause: Does the Sixth Amendment require broader pretrial discovery of a witness’s records to ensure a meaningful opportunity to cross‑examine?	Denial of full records deprived McCray of a meaningful opportunity to confront and cross‑examine the accuser about mental‑health based credibility issues.	The Confrontation Clause secures trial‑rights (a meaningful opportunity at trial), not a constitutional right to broad pretrial discovery of materials.	Affirmed: no binding Supreme Court precedent extends the Confrontation Clause to require pretrial discovery of this kind; the state court’s approach was not contrary to clearly established law.

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecutor must disclose evidence favorable to accused when material to guilt or punishment)
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (Brady materiality tested by "reasonable probability" of a different result; cumulative analysis)
Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73 (2012) (defines "reasonable probability" as undermining confidence in the outcome)
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (Brady extends to impeachment evidence affecting witness credibility)
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987) (Confrontation Clause is fundamentally a trial right; plurality declined to require broad pretrial disclosure)
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004) (AEDPA deference: more general rules allow leeway in application)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA standard: state‑court decisions must be objectively unreasonable to warrant habeas relief)
Fuentes v. Griffin, 829 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2016) (contrast: suppression of complainant psychiatric records found Brady‑material when defense lacked prior access and testimony was sole evidence)
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (prosecutor is not required to turn over entire file; focus is on materiality)