McCRANIE v. THE STATE, 335 Ga. App. 548

In 2010 McCranie (age 38) pled guilty to child molestation and statutory rape for sexual intercourse with a developmentally disabled 14‑year‑old; one sexual battery count was nolle prossed.
At the plea hearing the prosecutor and defense counsel recited rights waived by a guilty plea; McCranie acknowledged guilt and satisfaction with counsel.
The trial judge repeatedly intervened in plea negotiations, rejecting the initial deal and pressuring for a longer sentence and indicating a willingness to preside at trial to impose a harsher sentence.
Judge imposed a negotiated aggregate 30‑year sentence (20 years for child molestation with 15 to serve; 10 years probation for statutory rape), made caustic comments to McCranie, and counsel did not file a motion to withdraw or a direct appeal.
In 2015 McCranie filed a consolidated motion to withdraw his plea, vacate a void sentence, and obtain an out‑of‑time appeal; the trial court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing.
Court of Appeals: affirmed denial of plea‑withdrawal (untimely), reversed denial of out‑of‑time appeal (trial court failed to inquire whether failure to appeal was attributable to defendant or counsel), vacated statutory rape sentence for noncompliance with former OCGA § 17‑10‑6.2 and remanded for resentencing.

Issue	McCranie’s Argument	State’s Argument	Held
Whether trial court erred denying motion to withdraw guilty plea	Plea involuntary due to judicial interference	Motion untimely; trial court lacks jurisdiction after term expires	Denial affirmed—motion untimely (court lacks jurisdiction)
Whether trial court erred denying out‑of‑time appeal	Counsel ineffective for failing to advise/file appeal; plea involuntary based on judge’s interference	Defendant slept on appellate rights; no entitlement to out‑of‑time appeal	Reversed—trial court must inquire whether failure to timely appeal was due to defendant or counsel; plea interference gave a possible appealable ground
Whether convictions for statutory rape and child molestation merge	Argued both convictions arise from single act and therefore merge	Record shows at least “at least one” act; indictment/factual basis do not limit to a single act	Merger denied—record does not establish only one act; convictions do not merge on this record
Whether statutory rape sentence is void under OCGA § 17‑10‑6.2	Sentence (10 years probation) violates mandatory split sentence and statutory procedures	Trial court had discretion to deviate	Statutory rape sentence vacated—trial court failed to impose mandatory minimum or make required written findings; remand for resentencing

McGee v. State, 296 Ga. 353 (timeliness and trial court jurisdiction to allow plea withdrawal)
Stephens v. State, 291 Ga. 837 (out‑of‑time appeals and limits when defendant pleaded guilty)
Barlow v. State, 282 Ga. 232 (relevant effectiveness inquiry for out‑of‑time appeals)
McDaniel v. State, 271 Ga. 552 (judicial participation in plea negotiations may render plea involuntary)
Pride v. Kemp, 259 Ga. 353 (plea involuntary where judge threatened longer sentence if defendant went to trial)
Simmons v. State, 276 Ga. 525 (trial court must inquire whether failure to pursue appeal was attributable to defendant or counsel)
Jackson v. State, 280 Ga. 27 (abuse of discretion where court fails to make factual inquiry on out‑of‑time appeal claim)
Nazario v. State, 293 Ga. 480 (merger claims may be raised despite guilty plea but are limited by the record)
Dennis v. State, 292 Ga. 303 (merger claims considered on out‑of‑time appeal)
Rooney v. State, 287 Ga. 1 (definition and correction of void sentence)
von Thomas v. State, 293 Ga. 569 (motions to vacate void sentence are limited to sentences the law does not authorize)
New v. State, 327 Ga. App. 87 (interpretation of former OCGA § 17‑10‑6.2 mandatory minimums)
Priest v. State, 281 Ga. App. 89 (probation in lieu of mandatory imprisonment can render sentence void)