McAfee, Kenneth Cooper
PD-0667-15
| Tex. App. | Jul 15, 2015Background
- Appellant Kenneth Cooper McAfee was convicted of murder and sentenced to 99 years and a $10,000 fine in Harris County.
- The state proceeded on a traditional insanity defense, with expert and lay testimony regarding his mental state before, during, and after Janet McAfee’s murder.
- McAfee called Charles Storer, a long-time attorney and friend, on the night of the murder seeking legal advice and discussing the case; the State challenged whether communications were protected by attorney‑client privilege.
- A suppression hearing determined whether Storer’s statements were admissible under the attorney‑client privilege; the trial court ruled privilege did not apply.
- The First Court of Appeals upheld admission of Storer’s statements, and the Supreme Court granted discretionary review to address waiver of the privilege and related evidentiary issues.
- Additionally, the trial court and appellate courts addressed whether the court costs, including a crime stoppers fee, were constitutional.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Waiver of attorney‑client privilege | McAfee; no waiver shown by State | McAfee owned waiver; privilege not waived by disclosures | Waiver not proven; privilege protected; admission improper |
| Burden and scope of proving waiver | State failed to prove waiver beyond reasonable doubt | State bore burden to prove waiver by totality of circumstances | State failed to prove waiver; privilege preservation affirmed |
| Admission of Storer's testimony under privilege | Testimony should be suppressed | Friendship does not negate privilege; communications were confidential | Trial court abused discretion for admitting privileged communications |
| Definition of ‘wrong’ in insanity voir dire | Prosecution’s broad definition misstates law | Voir dire allowed broader, common understanding | Non-constitutional error; harmless under Rule 44.2(b); voir dire acceptable |
| Constitutionality of crime stoppers costs | Crime stoppers fee improperly a tax; violates separation of powers | Funds relate to legitimate criminal justice purposes | Costs upheld as constitutional; proper funding within framework of crime stoppers provisions |
Key Cases Cited
- Carmona v. State, 941 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (privilege held by client; waivers require client consent or disclosure evidence)
- Cruz v. State, 586 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (client may waive privilege; unilateral waiver by attorney not allowed)
- Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (burden to establish the existence of the privilege; waiver analyses)
- Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (insanity inquiry focuses on understanding of action and wrongness)
- Torres v. State, 976 S.W.2d 345 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1998) (juror may consider circumstantial evidence and demeanor in insanity analysis)
