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Bigby v. State
892 S.W.2d 864
Tex. Crim. App.
1994
Check Treatment

*1 materially alter the condition of the mecha-

nism, thereby destroying his best evidence of Eugene BIGBY, Appellant, James the forces and fractures involved in the acci- 167(l)(g) (“testing dent. See Tex.R.Civ.P. or examination shall not extend to destruction Texas, Appellee. The STATE of

or material alteration of an without article notice, hearing, prior approval by No. 71234. court”). According to the affidavit of GM’s controvert, expert, Gay which did not Appeals Court of Criminal of Texas. cleaning SEM exam degreasing involves Nov. of the mechanism creating and then acetate replicas, which would be viewed with the expert

SEM. The swore no fracture damaged destroyed,

surfaces would be examination,

and that without the SEM GM examination,

would be limited to a visual

which part would reveal whether the

defective or damage. the extent of

In the absence of evidence that the tests materially destroy

would alter or the mecha-

nism, the trial court abused its discretion

refusing permit toGM conduct the SEM An appeal

examination. circum- under these inadequate. Denying

stances would be GM very part

access to Gay claims injury effectively

caused his denies GM a opportunity

reasonable develop the merits Packer,

of its defense. See Walker v. (Tex.1992) (“a denial of dis-

covery going party’s to the heart of a case appellate remedy render inade-

quate”).

Therefore, pursuant to Rule 122 of the Procedure, Appellate

Texas Rules of without

hearing argument, majority oral conditionally grants

Court the writ of manda- permit

mus and directs the trial court to

SEM examination. The writ will issue if

the trial court refuses to act in accord with opinion.

866

868

father and Ms infant son. Tex.Penal Code. 19.03(a)(6) (West 1990). § Ann. affirmatively special answered the submitted issues, and court appel- sentenced lant to death. Tex.Code art. Crim.Proc.Ann. 37.071(b) (West 1990). Appeal to this court is automatic. art. Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. 37.071(h) (West 1990). We will affirm. I. SUFFICIENCY THE OF INSANITY DEFENSE the first jury’s rejection msamty contends the of Ms against defense at trial so great weight preponderance the evidence unjust. to manifestly At trial a criminal prove defendant has the burden Ms insam ty and, by preponderance of the evidence case, appellant tMs mounted a considerable insamty Tex.Penal defense. Code Ann. 8.01(a) 2.04(d); § § Meraz v. (Tex.Crim.App.1990). argues State tMs Court does not have power conduct factual review of this nature, alternative, and in the evi against great dence is not weight so preponderance manifestly unjust. so as to be

A. JURISDICTION begm jurisdictional We with the State’s Richards, Logan Ware, David L. Michael argument. In support argument of its Worth, appellant. Fort for State, State v. cites to White 591 S.W.2d (Tеx.Crim.App.1979), heavily case re- Tim Curry, Atty., Dist. and Charles M. Meraz, upon by lied supra. this Court Mayfield, & Attys., Mallín Robert Asst. Dist. White the asked our re- Court to Worth, Huttash, Atty., Fort Robert State’s Austin, jury’s view competency finding set to the State. finding

aside if we concluded it was against weight great preponderance rejectmg of the evidence. In explicitly invitation we stated that we did not OPINION power questions have the review to of fact as MEYERS, Judge. White, appeals the then courts of civil could. Our we 855.1 conclusion that Appellant guilty capital was found of mur- 12, 1991, on March power questions der the murder of a lacked the to review such (en Interestingly, opinion appears (Tex.Crim.App.1978) in White to 566 S.W.2d 941 banc), Court, opinion only year conflict with this Court’s Ae Graham v. case in which system had intermediate provisions when the civil peculiar of the was based that, “this The Court held appellate Constitution.2 courts. Texas appel- to jurisdiction has do what Court no governed jurisdiction is The of this Court Ap- requests a Court of Civil lant as would V, It of the constitution. by Article Section 5 peculiar peals [factual of a somewhat because provides: applicable conclusivity] provision Appeals of shall The Court Criminal White, Appeals.” 591 S.W.2d of Civil Court appellate jurisdiction have final coextensive section Amendment to this at 855. The 1980 state, limits and its with the deter- changed of the Courts of the constitution final, shall in all criminal minations be Appeals and Appeals the Courts of Civil excep- grade, of with such cases whatever juris- granted appellate criminal those courts regulation may as tions and under such be diction. In Meraz we held that White pre- or provided this Constitution as applicable decisis further that still stare by law. scribed conclusivity” grant clause was the “factual appeal all eases which the jurisdiction appeals. of fact to the courts of penаlty assessed shall death has been be Meraz, at 155. this we erred. 785 S.W.2d Appeals.... of Criminal the Court 851, incorrectly v. White conclusivity” doc- interpreted the “factual 6 of the same article of Texas Section jurisdiction. This is grant trine as a of fact grants of Appeals the Courts Constitution perspective historical evidenced both a jurisdiction, providing: conclusivity” adoption of the “factual Appeals ap- ... shall Said Court of have jurisprudence in this clause and criminal jurisdiction pellate co-extensive with the days Republic to the State from the districts, their respective limits of which 1960’s. shall extend all cases of which the Dis- County origi- trict or Courts Courts have grants the courts The constitution appellate jurisdiction, nal or under such appeals “appellate jurisdic and our Court regulations pre- as restrictions be V, respec tion” in 6 and 5 of Article Sections Provided, by law. scribed the deci- tively. grant jurisdiction general This is sion said be on courts shall conclusive appeals is all lower which the basis for from questions brought all them before fact Procedurally, superior in Texas. courts appeal courts error. Said shall have by a “appeal” superior a review court jurisdiction, original appel- other such an inferior court’s decision. White late, may prescribed law. (Tex.Crim.App.1976); [Emphasis emphasized clause added.] (Tex. Smith, Republic Dallam 6 has of Section been referred as the (5th 1841); Dictionary Law Black’s conclusivity” “factual clause. *8 Ed.1983). Supreme In the Court 1841 scope “appellate Republic the of delineated interpreting Arti- The Court White was V, jurisdiction” prior 6 in Texas: cle Section to the 1980Amendment earlier, Conclusivity appellant’s Question: of the The conducted a factual review sus Constitutional Graham, Clause, 423, (1991); insanity Mary’s defense. the Court exam- In LJ. 442-449 23 St. insanity ined the evidence of to determine wheth- (Tex.App. S.W.2d v. 714 108 Meraz - El against weight preponder- great and er it was the 1986) (“The appeals caught in Paso courts of are testimony. the Court determined it ance of The holdings of a conflict those of the Court between upheld and conviction. was not the legion the Appeals the of cases to Criminal 'd, Texas.”), contrary by Supreme Court the of aff jurisdiction ap- of 2. Our and that courts (Tex.Crim.App.1990); v. Minor 785 S.W.2d 146 peals the has become confused as result of 349, (Tex.App.-San ton 653 351 S.W.2d V, An interpretations Article inharmonious of sec- (Cadena, C.J., 1983, ref'd) concurring) pet. io 6, by the tion our Court and our Brethren on (Our opinion appeals lacked that the court of Supreme divergence opin- of Texas Court. This the jurisdiction of to conduct factual review caused bewilderment ion has considerable misinterpretation of the evidence was constitution). clear among appeals. & our Susan Bleil courts of Bleil, Appeals The Criminal Ver- Charles Court of

872 appeal

An process origin, harmony pursuance is a of civil In and in of law with this entirely, subjecting removes a cause import construction the given of thus to the fact as well as the law to a jurisdiction, review and appellate the terms of our all retrial. A process writ of error is a of subsequent expressly constitutions have common origin, nothing law and removes given jurisdiction Supreme to Court of the for the re-examination but law. appel- criminal as as civil cases well as an tribunal, late and statutes have been (Tex.1841). Bailey Haddy, v. Dallam 376 passed providing means court which the year, Supreme Later that same Court of power should be enabled exercise its full Republic its “appel- addressed criminal revising upon of cause law a criminal jurisdiction.” late presented and facts as in the record. then, It opinion, is our that [constitu- (1875). 390, Bishop v. 43 Tex. 400 adopt tional] convention intended law, the common use their own lan- 1891 State amended the 1876 guage, “as a rule of decision” criminal Texas Constitution created the courts proceedings; and no more of the forms (1876). V, appeals. § civil Tex. Const. Art. 6 peculiar that might writs of code than provision, In that appeals courts of civil necessary carry objects be found out the jurisdiction,” granted “appellate were which contemplated adoption. by that And sure- brought meant appeal that an both facts ly intended, never convention when Bailey, the law of a ease review. they provi- inserted the constitution a Smith, supra; supra; Bishop, supra. How creating appellate sion court in criminal ever, general grant jurisdiction after the cases, deny as well as civil the accused the Framers what has known added become might who appeal wish to from the district conclusivity” as the “factual clause. supreme right court to the court the “Provided, clause states: that the decision of ease, having the facts of as well as the ques said courts shall conclusive on all law, opened to re-examination. We cannot appeal brought tions of fact before them on decide, then, believe it. that We the de- Const, V, § or error.” Tex. art. 6. The prosecution fendant in a criminal the Supreme interpreted provision Court right district court appeal has the to this limit, appeals, not on the court of civil but court judgment from the or sentence of the upon jurisdiction. Cropper their own Cat v. below, court and to have the facts as well Co., 646, erpillar 754 648 Tractor S.W.2d law, election, as the opened at his own (Tex.1988); Co, v. Pool Ford Motor 715 re-examination. 629, (Tex.1986); Traylor S.W.2d 633 (Tex.1973); 944, Goulding, 497 Smith, 407, (Tex. S.W.2d Republic v. Dallam 410-411 Estate, 662, 1841). King’s In re 150 Tex. S.W.2d Supreme Court of the (1951); A.P. v. San Antonio & recognized Choate “appel State Texas also (1898).3 Ry., jurisdiction” 91 Tex. S.W. 69 superior late conferred support authority interpreta clause itself lends to this court to revise facts a crimi By “[provided case. stating nal tion. cases, appeals points In civil tion facts. court's find on these is final as to the factual ing subject Cropper, is final and at 648. is not review the both Supreme appeals Supreme Cropper Caterpillar courts of and the Texas Court Court. Tractor Co., (Tex.1988); power points have the to review "no evidence” Pool v. *9 Co, 629, (Tex.1986); question question a and because such a is of law Ford Motor 715 S.W.2d 633 Choate, 944, (Tex. not of 44 S.W. at Traylor Goulding, 69. v. S.W.2d 497 945 fact. Estate, 1973); King’s 150 re Tex. 244 jurisdiction discretionary Our in would cases (1951); S.W.2d 660 v. San Choate Antonio & A. appear Supreme identical to the Texas Court’s (1898). Ry., 91 Tex. 69 P. 44 S.W. In a civil jurisdiction. logically writ of error that, It follows case, appeals power the have opposite reading courts of the of Texas absent an the Constitution, insufficiency of the by review "factual evidence" or our Court is also bound factual "against great preponderance weight by appeals. and Tex. the of the courts of determinations is, V, points Cropper, appeals § evidence” error. Const. art. That a court of the of 6. appeals insufficiency” "factual or S.W.2d at 651. The of determina- determination of courts appeals, civil and to the court of of shall be on ments

decision said court conclusive” questions made is presup- upon clause their action such questions, fact the seems already final, subject by this possesses the and not review pose that the court This is to conduct factual review. court. power “ap- by meaning historical of the

buttressed sys- Essentially, in at 70. the civil 44 S.W. jurisdiction.” pellate be conducted tem factual review appellate court. the direct system In the civil after the 1891 amend- mеnts, appeal- in losing party the a civil suit given this was created and In 1891 Court appeals. the of civil This first to court ed “appellate jurisdiction” over criminal final right. appeal a direct and matter of was Const, (1891 V, § art. law matters. Tex. appeals “appel- the court of civil had Because Amendment). years ninety this Court For jurisdiction” appeal, the to consider the late appellate in criminal court was the exclusive party or complaining could seek a factual again was Texas. 1980 the Constitution of of civil legal review his case. court appeals of changing the courts civil amended court, power had appeals, like the trial ‍​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌‍the giving appeals of and those to the courts jury. finding by the set aside factual jurisdiction criminal matters. over law courts Choate, Any 91 Tex. S.W. at 69.4 by appeals the court of civil determination Supreme and the Court the Courts While concerning questions of fact final and were Appeals consistently held that of Civil had Supreme binding the Texas Court. jurisdiction” grant “appellate general the of Questions by court Ibid. of law decided the review appellate the direct court to allowed appeals appealed of civil could be via a writ fact, Court had wavered questions our However, Supreme of error to the Court. through the 1970’s and 1980’s. See the late appeals the court’s of determination of civil State, 851; v. v. 591 S.W.2d Combs White question fact was on the final because (Tex.Crim.App.1982), 643 S.W.2d 709 conelusivity” As the “factual doctrine. Ibid. overruled; Van Guilder Choate, Supreme the stated Court overruled; (Tex.Crim.App.1986), (Tex. 719 S.W.2d 320 Schuessler court, supreme before the amend- This held Crim.App.1986), overruled. Court question, jurisdiction ap- ments had the granted constitution White the peal or writ of error over facts of the jurisdiction in the appeals civil fact courts of сase, that, only; but to if the this extent clause, conelusivity” than “factual rather conflicting upon any evidence was material general grant appeals the courts civil from issue, it and af- could sustain verdict authority. In Meraz S.W.2d if, judgment; opinion, firm their holding to the courts of we extended this against preponder- verdict such a However, as is appeals. 785 at 155. justify ance of the evidence as to such developments from historical illustrated aside, action, it could set and remand late and the creation of in the 1800’s It power cause for trial. had no new clause, it this conelusivity” was not “factual original make an final determination juris generated fact the court’s might finding clause approve fact. It jurisdictional general This but rather the jury, and make it conclusive. diction thus grant. power same is conferred the amend- great support the “against weight preponderance there evidence to 4. Where was no points remedy finding evidence” of error is final in criminal jury's proper was to reverse cases, appli- absent an error that court on the judgment jury's finding enter a in favor Meraz, Choate, cable law. at 154. complaining party. 44 S.W. at 69. of the However, have unlike our brethren we also the evi- where there was conflict in non-discretionaiy; appellate jurisdiction that is proper remedy was to reverse dence is, appeal directly to cases in which the finding jury’s award a new trial. Ibid. V, 5;§ court. Const. art. Tex.Code Tex. 37.0711, 37.071, 2(h) § arts. Crim.Proc.Ann. *10 3(j). §

874 State, did White misconstrue the “factu-

Not Villareal v. 675, 140 Tex.Crim. 146 clause, 406, conclusivity” (1941); al Franklin v. but it S.W.2d 409 - 410 recog- failed to State, 636, 183 573, 147 Tex.Crim. nize S.W.2d 574 jurisprudence considerable by this Court State, (1944); Lozano v. 229, 154 Tex.Crim. predecessors and our jurisdic- with criminal 226 Parker (Tex.Crim.App.1950); S.W.2d 118 tion continually which had recognized the State, v. 432 S.W.2d 526 (Tex.Crim.App. authority, though exercised, infrequently 1968). highest State’s criminal court to review a evidentiary This review has included re upоn case the facts as well as the law. See views of cases in which a defendant has Smith, e.g., Republic v. (Tex. Dallam 407 presented the insanity. affirmative defense of State, 1841); Bishop v. 390, 43 Tex. 399-400 State, e.g., See Holmes v. Tex.App. 20 110 State, (1875); Tollett v. (1875); 44 Tex. 95 State, (1885); Kiernan v. 500, 84 Tex.Cr.R. State, Tex.App. Loza v. (1877); 1 Mont 488 State, 518, (1919); v. 208 S.W. Gardner 519 State, gomery v. (Tex.App.1891); 16 S.W. 342 103, (1919); 85 Tex.Cr.R. 210 S.W. 694 State, Mitchell v. 575, 33 Tex.Cr.R. 28 S.W. State, McCann v. 105, 129 Tex.Cr.R. 83 State, (1894); Murphy v. 475 65 Tex.Cr.R. (1935) (on 967, 972 rehearing); second 55, State, 616, (1912); 143 S.W. Smith v. 620 State, (Tex.Crim. Graham v. 566 S.W.2d 941 355, 660, (1919); 85 Tex.Cr.R. 212 661 S.W. (en App.1978) banc); but see Hernandez v. State, Jolly v. 288, 87 Tex.Cr.R. 221 S.W. State, 112, 260, 157 Tex.Crim. 247 S.W.2d 261 State, 279, (1920); Cook v. 281 213, 228 S.W. (1952) (question jury not to be disturbed (1921) (on State, rehearing); Vogel v. 216 89 State, it); if Ross v. support evidence to 153 474, 1096, Tex.Crim. 231 S.W. 1096-1097 312, (1948) 137, Tex.Crim. 220 144 State, (1921); Rochetszky v. 94 Tex.Crim. (sole province to believe or not be 423, (1923) (on 232, 251 S.W. 233 rehearing); theory lieve a defendant’s defensive of insani State, v. Green 52, 97 ty). Tex.Crim. 260 S.W. 195 State, (1924); Claxton v. 308, 105 Tex.Crim. ability review facts of a case has (1926) 444, (on 288 S.W. State’s motion consistently recognized by also been Leg- State, rehearing); Mason v. 108 Tex. islature. Article 44.25 of the Code of Crimi- 452, 283, (1928) (on Crim. 1 S.W.2d re nal provides Procedure the “courts of State, hearing); Powell v. 34, appeals 116 Tex.Crim. or the Appeals Court of Criminal State, may (1930); reverse Stevens v. judgment 28 S.W.2d in a criminal ac- tion, upon the law as upon 511, well (1931); Tex.Crim. Davis 50 S.W.2d 284 facts.” added.) (Emphasis provision This State, v. 6, 125 Tex.Crim. 66 S.W.2d 343 Code has remained almost identical since State, (1933); Armistead v. 130 Tex.Crim. subsequent giving 1857 with each code 501, (1936); 94 S.W.2d 1161 Ralston appellate power State’s criminal courts the 100, (1937); Tex.Crim. 109 S.W.2d 185 reverse a upon criminal case the facts.5 Ballard v. 188, 136 Tex.Crim. (1939); Lozano S.W.2d 131 138 Tex. Clearly under either the statute or (1940); Crim. empowered the constitution we are to review provision 5. This appeals may Code of Criminal judg- Proce- "The court of reverse the action, upon ment in a criminal as well virtually unchanged dure has law remained since facts; but, as the when a cause is reversed for Supreme 1857 when the Texas Court had crimi- contrary the reason that the verdict is to the jurisdiction. Code, nal Article 744 of the 1857 evidence, shall, weight of the the same in all provided, cases, be remanded for a new trial.” And when our Court was created in article Supreme judgment “The Court revise the 905 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was iden- action, upon in a criminal as well the law as code, except tical to article 870 of the 1879 facts, upon the but when a cause is reversed Appeals Court of Criminal was substituted for contrary for the reason that the verdict is appeals. court of Article 848 of the 1950 Code evidence, weight the same shall in all provided, cases be remanded for a new trial.” Appeals may Court of Criminal reverse the provision ap- This remained when the court of action, judgment upon in a criminal as well peals granted jurisdiction in Texas was over law as the facts. A cause reversed be- Code, criminal matters. Article 870 of the 1879 contrary cause the verdict is to the evidence provided, shall be remanded for new trial.

875 persuasion and the burden of upon the the facts. of evidence a both law and case Meraz, insanity. defense of Therefore, his affirmative 851 White v. 591 S.W.2d begin with a brief overruled, at 150. We 785 S.W.2d (Tex.Crim.App.1979) expressly facts the case. narrative of the any by on that our Court and reliance case misplaced. Meraz was Trekell, friend, Mike Appellant killed son, Jay- friend’s sixteen month-old and his power questions Our review son, p.m. December after 6:00 on sometime v. prior fact was well established White 23, appellant was 26th 1987. On December 851, amending the by 591 S.W.2d County. a Tarrant apprehended at motel in creating appel a two-tiered constitution appellant’s where- Acting on information of system, late the Framers of our Constitution abouts, police dispatched a S.W.A.T. limit factual again evinced desire to have negotiator to the mоtel. team and By appellate the direct courts. review to Ansley, ap- Detective contacted negotiator, appellate making the direct courts’ determi appellant’s room. through the door of pellant final, questions of the Fram nations of fact door, and Eventually, appellant cracked the permitting single factual ers intention of Appellant detec- spoke. said to the the two any has In case been accorded. review tive, you.” guilty I am so do “I know capacity appellate our as a direct court heard Ansley, if he had Detective unsure capital cases which defendant receives repeat correctly, appellant to asked death, ability we sentence of retain our further Appellant After the statement. did. pow factually review a criminal cause. This and was negotiations, appellant surrendered jurisdiction” er “appellate is inherent our arrest, Subsequent appel- to his arrested. any corresponding constitu and the lack of confessed: lant Smith, Republic Dallam tional restriction. v. past 14 months I have felt for the (Tex.1841);

407, Bishop v. 43 410-411 against conspiring has Mike been [Trekell] (1875); accord, 390, Cropper v. Cat Tex. 400 concerning a trying to me and discredit me Co., 646, erpillar 648 Tractor Lay. I had against I have Frito lawsuit Co, (Tex.1988); 715 Pool v. Ford Motor him thinking getting been about back 629, (Tex.1986); Traylor v. my mind and it on for a while has been (Tex.1973); 944, Goulding, 497 S.W.2d I my it was mind when when I—and Estate, King’s re Tex. night. house Mike came to his While (1951); A.P. Choate San Antonio & him, fixing the steaks I went over was (1898); Ry., Bailey 91 Tex. S.W. 69 thing I I with next knew shot Mike and the (Tex.1841). Therefore, Haddy, Dallam 376 grain Magnum, sil- Ruger .357 with appellant’s proceed we with first sitting I was tips. shot Mike he ver When error. saw the kitchen table. He never at the going to shoot

gun and didn’t know I was him. B. FACTUAL REVIEW why, Mike after I shot I don’t know but conducting review of a factual refriger- cellophane from the I took somе defense, standard proper affirmative Jayson’s room. I and went into ator is, considering all for review whether after Jayson’s cellophane wrapped the around relevant to affirma the evidence I then filled and suffocated him. head insanity, judgment is so tive defense of “the Jayson face up placed water and sink with against great weight preponderance him there. just I left into the water. down manifestly un so as to the evidence my Meraz, into

just.” got At trial 785 S.W.2d at 155. I then left trailer I threw drove around for a while. production car and appellant had both burden of adopted present provision Code in form. the 1979 This 44.25, changed to its and in it was article *12 cellophane alleged recording I out but am not sure father testified that got I I actually connecting

where. After to the motel room devise was block for a sleep. I couldn’t took a lot of medication telephone. Despite all the modular evidence trying sleep myself. I to force on was paranoia, appellant’s appel- father believed kept thinking disturbed and about Iwhat right lant knew the difference between baby. had done to the It bothered me a wrong. regret killing baby I lot. but ‍​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌‍not the appellant’s compen- Both of civil worker’s thought police other. I would come in attorneys sation testified at trial. His first apartment and shoot me. attorney appellant’s fi- withdrew because disagreement by parties There is no appellant’s nancial demands and because appellant suffering trial that was from de- investigation desired increased role concerning employer,

lusion his former Frito Appellant had informed this attor- the case. Lay, compensation and its worker’s insur- ney Frito-Lay people following had him. company. ance The nature and effects of Appellant’s attorney second had also been apрellant this delusion and whether knew his by appellant of informed his beliefs cer- wrong on conduct Christmas was were con- him, Frito-Lay people following tain were tested issues in the trial. trying through him poison the emission of In appellant began working for the poisonous green gas, recording his Lay Company. Frito in the He assisted attorney’s During repre- conversations. delivery maintenance of their fleet of trucks. appellant, appellant sentation of rammed his year job injured appellant After a on the his car into the automobile of one of the insur- incapacitating back. Because of the effects following investigators ance who had been injury, compensa- he filed a worker’s charges him. Criminal mischief were filed Lay. tion claim with Frito This claim even- basis, against appellant plead and he tually erupted into a lawsuit between the guilty. Appellant’s compensation worker’s parties. attorney filed a motion for new trial to set Appellant convinced that Frito plea appellant became aside that on the basis that Lay compensation and its worker’s insurance competent plea was not when he entered the company conspiring against pre- him were guilty. a few instances in his any Appellant vent on his claim. years attorney, an collec.tion seventeen as had he gathered enough believed that he had data thought incompetent or a client was insane company compa- on the insurance to have the necessary pleadings. and filed the Texas, ny suspended operating in from psychiatric There was considerable evi- result, company pre- aas the insurance was psy- dence introduced at trial. Five different pared him to “take out.” The number of professionals during chiatric testified the tri- “conspirators” grew slowly evеntually includ- concerning appellant’s past present al ing family some close friends and members. Appellant’s psychiatric mental condition. theory insanity The defensive was that began in treatment 1986 when he first was protect Trekell himself killed Jr., psychiatrist, Eudaly, referred to a Dr. conspirators. from these doctor, Septem- medical Dr. his Saifee. progressed As time after his accident so 1986, appellant was admitted for se- ber appellant’s paranoia. Appellant did informed depression psychiatric to the floor of vere worker, father, postal that the his former Joseph Hospital. was the first of Saint This conspirators trying to kill him infus- were appellant’s separate hospitalizations for three conditioning ing through the air vent of his psychiatric prior to the commission of care poisonous “green gas.” He apartment also today. at issue the crime apartment told his father that his was diagnosed electronically Joseph appellant “bugged,” or monitored. His At St. was contrary. appel- having a schizoaffective This di- fied to the Each said disorder.6 agnosis suffering was ruled out sec- from disease or after a severe lant hospitalization. Appellant ond was released he could not know defect such that did October, Eudaly and Dr. continued wrong. also had conduct was The State appellant every four meet with three to Coons, ap- expert, Dr. testified that who *13 seeing Dr. Appellant began also weeks. legally pellant was sane. Much of the “battle a week. Koechel once concerning disputes involved experts” prescription drugs of certain and wheth- Appellant July was of 1987 admitted er, testified, halluci- appellant’s as Dr. Coons Hospital. Bend He there until Oak remained amphet- in fact result of nations were mid-October of 1987. There was some evi- history Appellant past had a amine abuse. his departure prema- at trial that was dence abuse, amphetamine although the extent of appellant’s have ture and been due to of this abuse was uncertain. improve- and lack of insurance not his mental ment.7 appellant’s experts of testi- While several appellant could not know fied that not or did 1987, appellant was re- December wrong, testify was did his conduct several under- Joseph admitted Saint where he illegal. his appellant that knew conduct was therapy. took a series of electro-shock This supported by appellant’s first This is also testified, therapy, Dr. type Eudaly was Ansley appre- statements to Detective at his employed when medical treatment has failed. stated, Appellant I am hension. “I know appellant’s time after final Some third and you.” guilty so do an un- and This evinces treatment, appellant electro-shock left derstanding by appellant his that he knew hospital returned to his home. He illegal, hospital conduct was whether or not he be- phoned nursing inform longer would staff that he no treatment. lieved it to be or have characterized needed informed, Eudaly When so Dr. “wrong.” indicated as appellant’s premature,

he believed exit was however, day he decided to if wait a to see C. LAW OF INSANITY change appellant would his mind. The next day Eudaly appellant Dr. Section 8.01 of the Penal Code spoke over the phone concerning appellant’s provides status. After for the of insani affirmative defense Eudaly appel- their discussion Dr. dismissed ty: hospital’s

lant from the care. (a) prosecu- It is an affirmative defense to that, tion at of the conduct time that month appellant Later killed his actor, changed, as a result of severe friend Trekell and infant son. Dr. Trekell’s defect, Eudaly disease or did not knоw that appellant testified that mental did not “suf- wrong. fer from a severe mental disease or defect his conduct was could not such that he tell or did not know medical; insanity strictly The issue of not wrong.” his conduct was legal consid- it also invokes both and ethical witnesses, Appellant’s expert three erations. See Graham v. other (en Griffith, banc); Finn, Grigson, all testi- (Tex.Crim.App.1978) doctors 948-949 Eudaly Eudaly, generally pre- 6. Dr. testified disor- that “schizoaffective Dr. Prolixin was designate a "term that is a condi- psychotic specifi- der" is used to symptoms scribed to treat Primarily tion which has some mixed features. cally schizophrenia. This was the reason category of it’s in the emotional disturbance such hospi- drug prescribed upon appellant’s first depression, but it's to indicate that also used Eudaly Dr. talization. this instance probably thinking there is some dis- element of prescribed for the Prolixin use as booster present turbance associated with their condi- drugs pre- anti-depressant been had also which tion." at the When was arrested scribed. possession prescription was in of nine hotel he concerning testimony 7. There was considerable including Prolixin. medications Prolixin, prescribed drug, at Bend. Several Oak testified, including experts health of the mental Taylor v. right 468-469 lant knew the difference between (Tex.App. pet. wrong multiple he [1st Dist] when committed the mur- — Houston granted). deciding sanity ders. This evidence of is also but- ultimate issue by appellant’s tressed own statements sanity, only join can the non-medical at Appellant arrest the motel. informed components that must be considered in de the officer that guilty. he knew he was Graham, ciding the ultimate issue. question There is no evi- sanity 949. Otherwise the issue dence of his delusions was extensive. How- would hospitals be decided and not the ever, question this does not resolve the “Ultimately courtrooms. Ibid. the issue of appеllant’s “legal” sanity. jury’s deter- insanity at the excusing time the offense sanity mination of the fact issue of does not responsibility criminal province lies in the appear undisputed to be resolved or to one jury, credibility as to the *14 spectrum, end of the nor does that determi- weight evidence, witnesses and the of the but appear beyond nation to be the realm of also as to the limits of the defense itself.” Graham, jury. discretion afforded to the See Id., However, at preclude 952. this does not at 852. jury’s a factual review of the determination. Graham, As this Court stated expert Several testified witnesses many The limits of defenses are left to the appellant illegal, knew his conduct was how jury. usually expressed Such limits are ever, experts appellant these contended that jury terms that application leave to the the did not “morally” wrong. know the act was readily susceptible of norms that are not to words, appellant In other believed that re reduction to a concise factual formula. gardless society’s of illegal views about this jury The participates this sense in de- understanding illegal, act and his it was un termining the law as well as the facts. permissible. der his “moral” code it was Many defenses exhibit this characteristic upon appellant’s morality This focus is mis through incorporation the placed. question insanity a standard of should fo cus on “reasonable belief.” Ac- whether defendant understood the [cites omitted.] quality nature and cording of his action and whether scope to the standard and the ought it-was an act issue, he to do. Zimmerman v. degree the the of discretion accorded 85 Tex.Cr.R. 215 S.W. jury resolving undisput- the issue on (1919) (on rehearing). By accepting and ac vary. ed facts will Before such a decision knowledging “illegal” by his action was socie appeal, be overturned on the fact standards, tal he understood that others be undisputed issue must be resolved “wrong.” lieved his conduct was spectrum, one end of the fact determination must be found to lie outside Therefore, upon our review we do not be- jury the realm of discretion accorded the preponderates lieve the evidence to such an standard, applicable under the be it “rea- appellant jury’s extent favor of that the belief,” firmness,” sonable “reasonable implicit finding against great was so cause,” “likely to or some other. weight preponderance of the evidence manifestly unjust. Appellant’s it was at n. 3. point first of error is overruled.

In the instant cause both the State produced experts and the defense medical II. DIRE VOIR concerning appellant’s sanity who testified Appel time he committed the crime. through fourth seventh appel- points complains lant’s father testified that he believed he the trial court argument Appellant’s expert’s conforming requirements and his testimo- his conduct to the ny present stronger (1974). defense under the old in- § the law. Tex.Penal Code Ann. 8.01 sanity defense. Prior to 1983 it was defense August this defense was eliminated in a crime if a defendant knew his conduct was of 1983. "wrong,” incapable but nevertheless he was completion Upon him of voir dire eleventh refusing permit to see the erred in deciding veniremember both jury panel prior entire whether juror appellant passed the jury demand a shuffle. See Tex.Code Crim. juror, presence Outside the

Proc.Ann. art. 35.11. After venire was State. the State ac- impaneled, appellant requested trial court whether filed motion to have potential juror. accept- jury cepted the The State individuals included in the absent Appellant’s challenged counsel then prior list to his determination of ed. trial and seated At this right for cause. whether would exercise his to a the veniremember he court, motion was discussion ensued between shuffle. This denied prosecution, attorneys. the defense court. eventually number eleven was Veniremember accepted by appellant and State. the absent were both Because individuals jury, appel eligible to serve Prior to of veniremember the examination untimely. request lant’s 35.01 of Article discussion be- twelve after considerable pro of Criminal Texas Code Procedure attorneys judge, the tween the and the trial summoning potential jurors. vides for the challenges in future court ruled that the voir provides specifically article individu proceed dire would as follows: State’s chal- als who are absent: *15 cause, lenge challenge for for person pres- A is summoned who but not cause, challenge, ap- peremptory State’s ent, may upon appearance, Appellant’s pellant’s peremptory challenge. before jury qualifi- tried as to qualified, be his objected, specifically trial counsel comment- juror impaneled as a unless cations and proce- ing ruling this the selection violated be challenged, but no cause shall unreason- 35.13, supra. dure set forth in Article ably delayed on account of his absence. requires Appellant’s point of error eighth (empha- art. Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. 35.01 first time interpret that we now for the added). request Appellant’s sis occurred af- for meaning “Passing of Juror Chal qualifications ter the court tried the of those of lenge” provision the Texas Code Crimi of Therefore, present. the absent individuals 35.13, supra. nal Art. “When Procedure. jurors. were to serve as not entitled Be- legisla attempting to collective [the] discern eligi- cause those absent individuals not were statute], or we purpose [of tive intent nec serve, ble to the court did not its abuse essarily focus attention on the literal text our overruling appellant’s in request discretion to attempt question in statute jury have those individuals included in the fair, objective meaning discern the that list for 35.11 purposes of article of the code. Boykin text at the of its enactment.” time Appellant’s through seventh points fourth State, (Tex.Crim.App. 818 785 S.W.2d error overruled. are 1991). exception has been noted One rule, is, such a general that that where read eighth his com- that ing result could would lead to an absurd by plains requiring court erred intended, possibly we will not not have been challenges counsel for cause in a to exercise Ibid.; Faulk v. favor such construction. contrary Article 35.13 manner of the Tex- State, (Tex.Crim.App. 630 Article Code of Criminal Procedure. 1980). provides, 35.13 succinctly that juror in Article capital A in a case which the state 35.13 states accep- passed “be for has it known it will seek the death veniremember shall made to the state and then penalty, qualified, challenge tance or first held be shall be jurors Challenges to are passed to the acceptance challenge for or first to defendant. It for cause.” seems peremptory either or state and then to defendant. Chal- that lenges jurors apparent, legislature intended defen- peremptory are either or cause could made challenges dant’s for cause. non-application application after the State has made its decision to ac- The cept particular a veniremember. In this instance the harmless error rule has been of statutory language logical evokes no other concern to Marin v. this Court of late. See State, interpretation. (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (violation legislative prophylactic proce selecting jury capital The manner of concerning days dural rule number of regulated by ease is Article 35.20 of the preparation speculative for trial was too to be part, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. rule); considered harmless error Meek v. provides the article State, (Tex.Crim.App.1993) 851 S.W.2d 868 (the right defendant’s written waiver of the In selecting persons from the by jury subject summoned, to trial is not to a harmless persons the names of such rule); error Warmoski v. 853 S.W.2d they shall be called the order which (the (Tex.Crim.App.1993) right to sever appear upon the list furnished the defen- 3.04(a) juror indictments under Section of the Pe passed dant. Each shall be tried subject upon separately. nal Code is not to the harmless error (Tex. rule); Sodipo v. 35.13, conjunction When read with Article (violations Crim.App.1990) of Article 28.10 import provide the clear the statute is subject analysis are not to harm because cases, jurors capital shall be appellate court cannot determine from record individually. Upon completion called of voir existed); whether harm Nunfio juror, parties potential dire both of that (denial (Tex.Crim.App.1991) S.W.2d 482 accept the State must choose to the venire- proper question prevents voir dire intel challenge per- member or him for cause or ligent peremptory challenges exercise emptorily, and then the defendant or his 81(b)(2)). subject analysis to harm under peremptory counsel exercise its or caus- *16 challenge.9 al Marin, stated, In this Court interpretation

This of Article 35.13 is nei- general, The harmless error rule in Indeed, explanation ther novel nor new. 81(b)(2) particular, in not Rule was de- previously recognized by the Honorable signed hypothetical of for the retrial defec- 1965, Judge shortly in John Onion after the litigation appellate criminal tive the Special statute was enacted. Com- Speculation possible the ef- courts. about 35.13, mentary to Article of the Texas Code ignoring procedural prophylactic fect of Procedure, Presiding Judge of Criminal On- rules, disregarding let essential fea- alone ion wrote that adversary process, always a tures of the is application perverse inappropriate of support Article 35.20 would seem to Indeed, it is the harmless error doctrine. provisions of Article 35.13 which would precisely many of these de- because rules permit to demand that defense fine, aggregate, tolerably what is accept challenge State for cause each system criminal fair trial under our

juror before the defense exercises its chal- justice disregard that their must necessari- lenges peremptorily. for cause or ly out- undermine the confidence (Vernon 1989). Therefore, Otherwise, the trial court may eventu- come of trial. we objection overruling appellant’s denying erred ally come to believe that an ac- the order of voir dire. is cused even the assistance of counsel harmless whenever the would almost Having thus found the court fell into any him certainly have convicted event. harm anal- we must next consider whether a 81(b)(2) reason, error doc- ysis For this the harmless should be considered under Rule broadly Appellate Procedure. trine is consistent with a rule- of the Texas Rules Nothing opinion contemplates prevent- continuing need for needless and time consum- in this making challenge ing party either from ing voir dire. moment, eliminating the cause at an earlier thus

881 challenge for cause remained governed system adjudication only that the State’s when peremptory chal- very first and the defendant’s not threaten to undermine the does distinctly lenged precepts specify fair was last.10 which operation system. precepts These challenges would have The reversal of fundamental rules of due

include jurors. This no effeсt the selection law, process prophy- due course of but ability challenge so because the State’s designed, procedure lactic in most rules of persons for cause is broader and en- venire impose Legislature, cases a uni- ability to compasses chal- the defendant’s requirement form where the fairness of a may lenge potential juror. A defendant is too uncertain. flexible rule for the challenge exercise a for cause reasons 35.16(c) 851 S.W.2d at 281. enumerated in Article Texas may The State Code Criminal Procedure. Marin, considerably ap- we limited challenge juror pur- for these reasons also plication by appel- error of the harmless rule 35.16(b)(3), and it suant to Article have reviewing procedural late courts in errors of State, duty Allridge v. challenge. to so See trial The rationale for such a limita- courts. 471, (Tex.Crim.App.), 486-487 speculation prevent tion was to as to harm — denied, U.S. -, 101, 126 cert. 114 S.Ct. legislature prophylac- where has created (1993); State, v. L.Ed.2d 68 White 779 procedure. tic rules Marin Id. itself con- 809, (Tex.Crim.App.1989), cert. S.W.2d 826 given prepara- cerned the allotted time denied, 962, 2575, 495 110 S.Ct. 109 U.S. appointed legis- tion of counsel. Because the (1990); State, Nethery L.Ed.2d 757 v. 692 specific lature intended a manner of notice 686, (Tex.Crim.App.1985), 691 cert. providing the effect of not because denied, 1110, 897, 474 106 S.Ct. 88 U.S. best, specified speculative notice was (1986); Holloway L.Ed.2d 931 691 appellate apply court was not to harmless (Tex.Crim.App.1984), 608, te vaca pro- error rule the trial court’s failure to 1105, grounds d on other 475 U.S. 106 S.Ct. statutory vide the notice. (1986); Hernandez v. L.Ed.2d (Tex.Crim.App.), in the instant case cert. there is no S.W.2d 397 denied, speculation necessary to 103 S.Ct. determine whether U.S. (1983); proper

harm existed. The order of chal- L.Ed.2d 1379 Chambers *17 lenges (Tex.Crim.App.1978), challenge should have been State’s for 313 overruled S.W.2d cause, State, grounds, peremptory challenge, Grijalva other 614 State’s Defen- cause, 420, challenge (Tex.Crim.App.1981). dant’s for Be- Defendant’s S.W.2d 425 peremptory challenge. challenge In cause this the or- cause the State’s tor encom- ease challenges challenge, der of there passes occurred as could follows: State’s defendant’s cause, challenge challenge possible forcing for Defendant’s be no harm defendant cause, prior peremptory challenge for for cause to challenge, State’s to exercise its challenge. peremptory challenge. peremptory Defendant’s Essen- the State’s Accord- tially peremptory ingly, the order of the State’s we the trial court erred in over- hold challenge challenge ruling concerning defendant’s motion and the defendant’s note, however, challenges, cause do order of and that error was were reversed. We responses Clearly advantage juror being to influenced there is the defendant from making challenge peremptory his after the State. Capital others. defendants do not have to ex- State, In this Court Janecka v. noted: against particular peremptory a ercise a strike 35.13, supra, It is obvious that Art. on its face the State has first decided venireman until practice capital Thus, and in is beneficial to defen- if the State and the whether to do so. ways dant in that the other relevant statutes venireman, given defendant do not want non-capital felony are not beneficial to defen- cause, the he cannot excluded for defendant capital dants. A murder defendant examines saving peremptory one of his will benefit individually veniremen in isolation. challenges. generally This more allows for detailed evalua- 1987). 813, (Tex.Crim.App. 739 S.W.2d 834 prevents potential tion a venireman and 882 81(b)(2). Tex.R.App.P.

harmless. Appel- reviewing In ruling, the court’s eighth point lant’s of error is overruled. Spark’s we look at entire voir dire examina

tion to support determine whether there is In ninth and tenth ruling. for the court’s Satterwhite v. error, points argues he the trial 412, 858 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. — requiring appellant’s court’s error in chal denied, -, 455, U.S. 114 S.Ct. lenge precede per for cause to the State’s (1993); Moody L.Ed.2d 387 emptory challenge violated both the Texas 875, (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. de Constitution, I, 10, — Article Section and the nied, -, 119, U.S. S.Ct. Sixth Amendment of the United States Con (1992). great L.Ed.2d 75 We afford defer stitution, respectively. Appellant’s argument ence to the court’s decision because is “[i]t designed provide that the statute is to him judge the trial opportunity who has the advantage with a tactical advantage and that demeanor, view each venireman’s evaluate deprived. has previously been As has been and, credibility ultimately, his who is mentioned, advantage there is no tactical position pass challenges better on the forcing appellant to exercise his causal chal Satterwhite, presented.” cause 858 S.W.2d lenge prior to peremptory the State’s chal ruling 415. This will not be disturbed lenge. eight, supra. See Point of error Ad showing absent a anof abuse of discretion. ditionally, appellant furnishes this Court with Ibid.; Williams v. explanation argument support no denied, (Tex.Crim.App.1988), cert. 493 U.S. argument. appellant present any Nor does (1989). 110 S.Ct. 107 L.Ed.2d 207 explain statutory

rationale to how this rule rises to constitutional dimensions. See Tex. Appellant correctly points out that 74(f). Therefore, R.App.Proe. appellant’s Sparks distinguish indicated that he could points ninth and tenth of error are overruled. between the terms. a review of the entire Sparks ap record indicates that error, point appel the eleventh peared equivocate response ques argues lant the trial granting court erred in tioning subject. on the рoint fact at one challenge the State’s for cause of venire- Sparks indicated that an intentional action Sparks. challenged member "Whenthe State encompassed and was than broader deliber Sparks grounds upon it advanced numerous ate action. In our examination of the entire challenge. which the to base such causal dire, voir we do not believe the trial court granted challenge The court the State’s be in sustaining abused its discretion the State’s cause the veniremember was unable to dis challenge. Appellant’s eleventh of er tinguish “deliberately” between the terms ror is overruled. “intentionally” and because the venire- member would proof “[reverse] the burden of In his twelfth and thirteenth give and not a fair consideration of the insan points appellant alleges *18 ity appellant’s defense.” Much of brief ob improperly challenge court overruled his for jects ability to the challenge State’s cause to veniremembers Ledbetter and Blei. Sparks opposition on the basis of his to the However, appellant preserve has failed to insanity defense. because the appellant error. After exercised his fifteenth court did not in granting abuse its discretion peremptory challenge, granted the trial court challenge upon Sparks’ the State’s based ina request peremptory his for two additional bility sufficiently distinguish between the challenges. challenge Neither was used. In “deliberately” “intentionally,” terms we preserve order to error for a trial court’s ruling. need not further examine the court’s cause, challenge denial of a defense for distinguish A veniremember who cannot be must be demonstrated on the record that the killing tween a “deliberate” and “intentional” subject challenge specific is defendant asserted a clear and chal Nethеry for cause. State, 691; lenge clearly articulating grounds v. 692 S.W.2d at for cause Tex.Code Crim. 35.16(b)(3). therefor, Proc.Ann. peremptory art. that he used chai-

883 State, 630, (Tex.Crim.App. 632 521 lenge juror, peremptory that all his v. S.W.2d on 1975) (evidence context flight, in the of exhausted, of request challenges were his as evidence denied, bail-jumping, may be construed that an strikes is additional 870, State, guilt); 506 S.W.2d 873 Hodge of v. objectionable juror the sat on ease. Harris (on rehearing). (Tex.Crim.App.1974) To State, 568, (Tex.Crim.App. 581 v. 790 S.W.2d relevancy under such excluded State, have evidence 760, 1989); 766-767 Felder v. S.W.2d (T ‍​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌‍to the challenges, shifts defen State, the burden Payton ex.Crim.App.1988); v. affirmatively escape dant to show 677, (Tex.Crim.App.1978). flight directly to some other trans connected By exercising his two additional chal not not connected action and further that it was lenges, his appellant failed exhaust all Wockenfuss, trial. with the offense at failed challenges preserve peremptory 632; Hodge, at 873. 506 S.W.2d propriety the trial complain error to of of challenges his cause. ruling court’s appellant concedes that While

Appellant’s points and thirteenth twelfth admissible, argues flight generally he error are overruled. insanity the issue of because defense was However, appel guilt was not contested. III. TRIAL ERROR not relieve the lant’s affirmative defense does error, point appellant In the second all proving from State its burden the trial court erred admit- beyond Appel contends that doubt. elements reasonable ting attempted escape of his from clearly evidence attempted escape lant’s had relevance prior to the conclusion of the charged courtroom of the crime as it guilt guilt phase the trial. See Tex.R.Crim. during guilt phase of was committed 404(b). presence 404(b). Evid. Outside the trial. second Tex.R.Crim.Evid. guilt phase conclusion of the near the point of error is overruled. trial, appellant gun somehow secured judge’s bench. He located behind his third chambers,

proceeded judge’s into the aimed argues that if this evidence were some even gun judge, at the him that relevant, informed prejudicial how deemed effect they leaving together. judge were trial outweighed any substantially of the evidence leapt grabbed weap- the desk and across probative Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 403. value. See bailiff, help finally on. of a With the who had an court reviews a trial appellate When arrived, attorney and an assistant district it should court’s decision on this basis they appellant. and subdued disarmed ruling if the is “within a reverse court disagreement.” Mont

reasonable zone of (Tex. flight escape 372, Evidence is gomery v. 810 S.W.2d (on as a circumstance from rehearing). admissible which Crim.App.1990) guilt may inference of be drawn. Foster 845, (Tex.Crim.App.1989), 779 S.W.2d reviewing the court’s decision denied, 494 U.S. 110 S.Ct. rt. strength proponent’s look to we

ce (1990); 108 L.Ed.2d 639 Cantrell tending other to show the defendant evidence (Tex.Crim.App.1987) charged. Montgomery, committed the crime (evidence forfeiture admissi of bond This should take into 810 S.W.2d at 390. flight); Rumbaugh v. tending ble to show any affirmative defense account nature of *19 (Tex.Crim.App. Additionally, we look to see defendant. 1982); sup likely 401. To im presented See Tex.Crim.R.Evid. if would the evidence escape jury but port press admission of evidence of “in some irrational never way.” A trial court custody flight appear from it must theless Ibid. or indelible pro “need” the flight legal have some rele also to see what escape or should look and the time it ponent has for evidence prosecution. offense under such vance to the 752; in determin- prove take to such evidence at Rumbaugh, 629 S.W.2d Wockenfuss mg prejudicial effect of the evidence. APPELLANT: I dangerous am I now and Ibid. will continue to be. Well, THE going COURT: I am not to do casе, appellant presented this anything you you with get but see that an insanity affirmative defense of and did fair trial. going put We are this guilt.

little to contest his These factors tend do, hands of community like we but to favor the exclusion of extraneous offenses you what do want me to do? that are not insanity admitted to rebut the [DEFENSE I think COUNSEL:] what defense.11 we must also look to part is, having of the concern he is difficul- compelling probative how the evidence of ty sitting through flight proceedings here concerning at consequence. a fact of point, Judge, I Montgomery, basically and told him 810 S.W.2d at 391. In this instance, alternatives that the Court flight goes evidence of has. to the very guilt appellant. flight, Evidence of THE you COURT: changed your Have many unlike offenses, other extraneous something? medicine or You’ve been hav- guilt shows a consciousness of of the crime ing pretty good you’ve time or at least for which the defendant is on trial. See in— been Foster, Cantrell, 859; 779 S.W.2d at I myself. APPELLANT: discontinued it 93; Rumbaugh, 752; S.W.2d at Wockenfuss, 632; Hodge S.W.2d at THE your- COURT: You discontinued it State, 506 S.W.2d at 873. Because the evi self? flight case, dence of enhances the State’s APPELLANT: I myself. discontinued it ruling trial court’s was within the “zone of disagreement.” Appellant’s reasonable third Well, THE COURT: Lord knows we have point of error is overruled. doctors, problems our think you with but I you better continue it and I why. will tell In his fourteenth appellant Maybe you’ve forgotten. got go I’ve contends the trial court abused its discretion you absent, an awful lot of trouble for to be in denying request appointment for the trying you we ques- are on the when psychiatrist additional to determine his tion of whether or not there is future competence January 9, to stand trial. On dangerousness, people saying you are 1991 a appellant determined compe- here, people you mean and kill are not 26, 1991, tent February to stand trial. On question that leaves the in their mind as to dire, appellant near the conclusion of voir why you you are not if here. So can sit appointment moved for the of an additional normal, fairly there and you look which psychiatrist to determine whether far, your have so it’s to benefit. Because if competent. was still precip- This motion was I putting you have to start shackles on itated, part, by appellant’s statements to all going bad; of that stuff it’s to look morning court the of the 26th. That Attorney’s District trying prove Officeis morning following exchange occurred: you dangerous you are sitting are Leonard, Judge APPELLANT: I am dan- there with gag shackles on and a on. It’s gerous and I don’t think I can control your dangerous life and it’s to discontinue myself. I you don’t know going what are it if the doctor has recommended medicine. to do with me. your attorney you Unless tells to the con- THE you to, trary, I referring COURT: What are think —I would take it I don’t have mean, do, son? I sitting you you in Court to bear are the troubles and I am dangerous dangerous having or future sitting you certainly or what are hell here so talking we help about? all you get. need can ap- 11. The State guilt also contended at trial and on ent consciousness of is relevant to whether peal escape that the evidence of his was also wrong he knew his act was when he committed appellant's insanity relevant to defense. Howev- the murders. er, appellant’s pres- we are uncertain as to how *20 its trial abused think, only where the court you why you did discontin- versible doWhat should a determination discretion. Id. Such your ue medicine? totality be made from a review the APPELLANT: if I could summon To see instance, facts, any other including, as in this him. jury deter- prior competency examination or instance do not believe mination. In this we THE COURT: him? Well— Summon deny- its the trial court abused discretion Leonard, Judge APPELLANT: I know 46.02, ing motion under Article appellant’s wrong. right and the difference between 3(a). Section why standing you right I am That’s before now, anyone I to hurt because don’t want appellant’s with During conversation else. February morning judge the trial on 26th, appellant had ceased you indicated that he THE COURT: What do law- Well. longer taking and he no his medication that yers to want do? had a to remain in the courtroom desire I would like to [DEFENSE COUNSEL:] “dangerous.” he was because he feared just [appellant] a and talk to take minute competency hearing, his appellant’s previous pull if and see he thinks he can himself longer expert appellant was no testified enough together through to sit here Finn, expert Dr. taking his his medication. options dire. his to explained rest of voir I appellant was psychologist, testified him, your I none of which are to benefit. his placing prescription medication under his if can be us am not sure he feels he with pills. tongue feigning swallowing the why that’s I to talk him. wanted to pre failure take the appellant’s Because evidence, not scribed was new medication you make THE COURT: I won’t take trial court did not abuse its discretion medicine, your Bigby, I Mr. but can make refusing motion appellant’s for re-examina you your be still. Go back and talk to tion. if lawyers, you to call want over you your medicine it. can do Additionally, appellant’s other state day following appellant moved for the attorneys in their of his ments and those expert appointment of disinterested to ex- indicate con affidavit do not appellant competency his amine determine changed, necessitating thus dition had 46.02, 3(a), trial. to stand Article Section expert. Appellant’s statements additional provides: of Criminal Procedure Code present not concerning his desire to be not danger he was are his belief that

any At time the issue defendant’s incompetent. appellant evidence that raisеd, incompetency to trial is stand judge Appellant’s with the trial conversations may, court own motion or motion its understanding pro complete indicate defendant, counsel, prosecut- or the his statements, ceedings. while ad Appellant’s ing attorney, experts appoint disinterested mittedly affidavit strange, and counsels’ experienced qualified mental health not have do not indicate that did or mental to examine the de- retardation ability to with his present consult “sufficient competency regard with to his fendant lawyer degree of rational with a reasonable testify any trial and trial or stand fac understanding” or “a rational as well as hearing on this issue. understanding proceedings tual appellant’s request. court The trial denied art. Crim.Proc.Ann. against him.” Tex.Code 46.02, 1(a). Accordingly, § court did appoint a disin decision deny appellant’s its discretion abuse expert to with terested examine defendant point of er Appellant’s motion. fourteenth competency to his or stand regard her ror overruled. trial trial is left to sound discretion error, appellant point of Leyva v. In the fifteenth court. by failing to argues trial court erred (Tex.Crim.App.1977). That decision is re- that the *21 jury instruct opening the State’s his cross-examination of Grace Kehler —Tre- statement was not evidence. At the conclu- surviving spouse kell’s and the infant’s moth- opening sion of the appel- State’s statement Specifically er. he contends “the trial court requested jury lant the court instruct preventing erred in defense counsel from opening that the statement was not evidence. questioning specific [Kehler] about the alle- request. trial ap- court denied his On gations against in she made her lawsuit vari- peal, appellant contends the State mislead appellant ous doctors who nu- treated jury by indicating arguments that certain hоspitals appellant merous where was treat- However, actually were facts. even if it is prior killings.” ed to the Kehler had filed a proper in jury some instances to instruct the negligence civil in alleged suit which it was manner, necessary this not hospital, employees, its and the doc- ease. negligent discharging appellant. tors were appellant argued questions At trial con- jury We do not believe the could cerning the civil suit were relevant for two believing have been mislead into that those purposes show a motive or and to bias actually statements were evidence. The —to prior ap- show a inconsistent statement. On statement, began opening State its “Ladies peal, his contention is couched in terms of gentlemen, present you the State will limiting the trial court’s error in his cross grisly evidence in this case that will tell tale multiple examination of opening murder.” The Kehler. continued discussing “chapters” story the three to the “epilogue” being

and its the trial. Appellant’s objections The State trial were they informed the of what would “hear” 612 of based Rule the Criminal Rules of story. told and who would tell the (a) While provides Evidence.12 Section for the ex a, appellant is able to locate two statements concerning prior amination of witness the record in which the State did not state inconsistent statement. state show,” “the evidence will we do believe by ment must made In be her. this instance from a review of the entire record Kehler, pleadings signed by were not but jury was misled or that the trial court abused therefore, by attorney, they rather her overruling its discretion re prior are not her inconsistent statements quest Appellant’s for the instruction. fif meaning within the of the rule.13 point teenth of error is overruled. Appellant’s ground

In the second sixteenth improperly admissibility contends the trial court limited or examination was that the interest, witness, part 12. Rule 612 of the Rule of Criminal Evidence on the of such and be- provides: concerning, fore further cross-examination or of, may extrinsic evidence such bias or interest (a) Examining concerning prior witness incon- allowed, supporting be the circumstances such examining sistent statement. a witness statement, claim or the details of such includ- concerning prior inconsistent statement where, ing the contents and when and to him, written, made whether oral or made, whom must be made known to the wit- concerning, before further cross-examination ness, given oppor- and the witness must be of, or extrinsic evidence such statement tunity explain deny or to such circumstances allowed, the witness must be told the contents written, writing or statement. If need not place of such statement and the time and time, request be shown to him at that but made, person to whom it was and must be opposing shall be shown to counsel. same opportunity explain deny afforded an or unequivocally If the admits witness such bias written, writing such statement. If need interest, extrinsic evidence shall not be ad- time, not be shown to him at that but on party permitted present mitted. A shall be request opposing the same shall be shown to rebutting any impeaching evidence evidence unequivocally counsel. If the witness admits party’s grounds one statement, of said witnesses on having made such extrinsic evi- bias or interest. dence same shall not be admitted. This provision apply par- does not to admissions of 801(e)(2). Additionally, that there the trial court held ty-opponent as defined in Rule (b) Examining concerning was no inconsistent statement made Ms. Keh- bias or in- witness examination, During impeaching by proof terest. ler. her Ms. Kehler testi- witness showing circumstances or statements bias or fied as follows: *22 Appellant’s proof her to bill a bias or motive for be attributed her. documents showed аdmitting 612(b), pleadings the limited to testifying. su- was See Tex.Crim.R.Evid. not indi- record. The record does into the to pra. permitted appellant The trial court specif- she knew or believed the cate whether up by jury before that “prove question the or at- negligent alleged whether her ic acts has, fact, asking in a suit for dam- she filed prove do torney could them. We believed he mentally ages that he ill. on basis was nevertheless, recognize, that the documents would, any pecuni- And that of course show testimony.14 for her show a motive or bias do any might that be ary interest and bias there permitted appellant properly trial court than somewhat available other what would be of the and the inquire into the basis suit to brief, any com- appellant in event.” In his not pecuniary in that suit. do interest We permitted that he that in plains was to show believe, though, the trial abused that court “had, separate pleadings, three Kehler objec- overruling appellant’s in discretion its length, speci- great extended indicated with limiting Keh- his cross examination of tion ficity negligent acts she had been believed permitting appellant into not to delve ler [by] providers committed mental health care civil suit. the intricate details Kehler’s appellant; improper in the treatment Appellant’s point of error is over- sixteenth alleged to be proximate treatment she ruled. cause of victim’s death.” previously separate appel- indicated three In the seventeenth signed by complains court in not pleadings were not and cannot lant erred her Well, Koechel, you pital, Joseph Hospital, Q: [appellant] believe that is men- Saint Dr. John ill, tally you? don't Eudaly; and Dr. is that correct? things, A: I believe a lot of not one Yes, and that's it is. A: of them. you plain- Q: And have sued in that case as a Q: You that? don’t believe individually tiff both and on of the еs- behalf A: No. Kehler, Jayson your tates Mike Trekell and Q: any You don’t believe he suffered from son; is that correct? kind of mental illness at all? A: A: Yes. Well, he’s sick. Q; is, essentially, The nature of the suit what limine, jury to Pursuant a motion in was action; right? wrongful we call a death is that concerning excused discussion Kehler’s Ms. right. A: That sounds negligence against hospitals civil suit And, basically, Q: the claim in the suit is that Appellant sought was doctors discussed. to in- hospital, Joseph Hospital Oakbend Saint original subsequent plead- troduce the and two Eudaly, Joseph Hospital, Dr. Harold and Dr. ings purpose in the civil case. of the admis- Koechel, negligent were all in their failure to was to sion show the witnesses or motive for bias perceive [appel- (her treat the mental illness of case), testifying, financial interest in the civil lant,] right? that secondly, is impeachment purposes, “be- position petition cause she A: Yes. submit[ted] in the further, position your that is with the she is Q: inconsistent that is And claim that lawsuit that, on [took] the witness stand.” The court ruled they knowing negligent were by that there inconsistent was no statement made illness, on the of his he was dan- based extent permitted appellant witness. to The court possible gerous danger create a could "prove up question before that she son; right? your your husband and is that fact, has, asking damage filed a suit They supposed professionals, be A: were would, mentally basis that he ill. was And they? aren’t course, any pecuniary show interest and bias you’ve Q: that’s the That's true. And claim might that there other than some- what would them; against made in the civil suit is that any Appellant what be available in event.” re- right? quested "go further be able into the he Yeah, yes. A: negligence has basis for claim of that she against hospi- made each of doctors and the anything, civil it would 14. If this suit shows tals.” The court ruled that was not be to indicate that Kehler's bias or motive would suit, permitted body gо into the of the mentally testify that he in fact ill. While appellant objected. finding jury’s appellant’s case that he criminal presence jury, In the Kehler testi- Ms. criminally dispositive would not be insane fied: suit, greatly posi- her civil would enhance her Kehler, you Q: plaintiff Mrs. are the in a civil tion in that suit. currently pending suit that is district court in a County against here in Tarrant Oakbend Hos- admitting into upon hearsay, objected Exhibit 48 evidence. based Exhibit the State 48 was a testifying motion for new trial filed Mr. Obeidin state of Obeidin, appellant’s compensation witness, worker’s During mind. voir dire attorney, in appellant’s following exchange criminal mischief occurred between the guilty Appellant plead ease. to criminal mis- State and Obeidin: allegedly ramming chief for Frito-Lay in- *23 Q: you any personal knowledge Do have vestigator’s automobile. Obeidin filed the of talking this criminal offense? We are grounds motion on for new trial the that about involving the criminal mischief case appellant competent give plea was not to ramming investigator’s the ear. fully and that he did not understand the Gary, A: what I know about it was from terms of doing and conditions what he was in reading report, the of the offense and then pleading guilty. objected The State to the majority my opinion the as of to his mental hearsay grounds admission of this on motion state at from the time came the doctors’ and relevancy grounds. Because the written proven up records that I in had the work- hearsay, statement was inadmissible we need compensation er’s ease. argument not appellant’s address that the document was relevant. Tex.R.Crim.Evid. Q: Any opinion you have about that 402. hearsay reports based on from doctors and report you from some offense “ statement, ‘Hearsay’ is a other may have we can’t cross and that examine than one made the declarant while testi here; right? is that hearing, fied a the trial or offered evidence to A: At the time of the offense? prove the truth of matter asserted.” 801(d). A in Tex.R.Crim.Evid. statement Q: Any opinion you have about his condi- expression. cludes written verbal Tex. tion at the time of offense. 801(a)(1). R.Crim.Evid. The motion for new A: That is correct. by appellant trial prove appel was offered to compensation attorney lant’s objected any worker’s be The to State answer to the appellant competent previous lieved not question regarding appellant’s when he men- plead charge to the mischief in criminal No tal condition of the at the time misdemeanor Additionally vember of objection, 1987. as is indicated offense. The court sustained the eighteenth error, in point post, of admonishing the witness at- underlying assumption to, the motion torney your questions for new “Limit and answers trial, appellant personal knowledge witness, Obeidin believed was in of upon personal sane was not please.” based knowl edge, upon opinion rather it was based of agree appellant lay We with correctly others. The trial court sustained may testify opinion witness to his that an objection to its Ap State’s admission.15 legally individual is insane. Fuller v.

pellant’s seventeenth of error is over (Tex.Crim.App.1968); 428 S.W.2d 924 see Pa ruled. (Tex. checo v. 757 S.W.2d eighteenth point appellant Crim.App.1988) (“Properly opinion of admitted improperly testimony lay contends the trial court sustained witnesses is sufficient to objection testimony support finding insanity.”) opinion, State’s that Obeid- That though, personal believed was insane at the must time be based Again experiences he committed criminal mischief. observations or the witness. Appellant by appellant further contends that the State claim that have been caused "opened during the door" to the motion pleading guilty charge. its the criminal misсhief cross-examination of Obeidin. a re- charge plea criminal A discussion about the questioning view of the indicates that the State "open does to the written the door” state- motion, did not ask Obeidin about the but rather ments contained within motion for new trial. any damage compensation about the worker’s both the Texas right process under to due Rule 701 the Texas Rules testimony lay opinion arguments governs Evidence These and U.S. Constitutions. that, provides rule witnesses. The rejected previously in Robison were (Tex.Crim.App.1994). 476-77 testifying as an If the is not ex- witness Appellant’s points are overruled. testimony opinions pert, form of opinions or is limited to those inferences twenty-second point of er- In appellant’s (a) rationally are based inferences which ror, court erred complains he (b) perception the witness and objection portion overruling his understanding helpful a clear of his guilt phase jury argument during the State’s testimony or the determination of fact prosecutor argued the fol- trial. issue. lowing: By requiring testimony *24 to be based on Eudaly you Dr. And did Harold tell what witness,” pre- the rule “perception of the December, [ap- him in who knew who saw underlying sumes facts were observed time, long period what did pellant] for a of portion of experienced the witness. This opinion [appel- His was that you? he tell knowledge incorporates personal the rule in month of De- not insane lant] was requirement of Rule 602. See Criminal Goode, Sharlot, 2 Texas Prac- Wellborn in 1987. cember (1993). 701.2, provides: §

tice at 4 The rule objected, contending that doc- Appellant testify A not to a matter witness appel- the time opinion tor’s was limited to unless is introduced sufficient to evidence discharged. During his lant examina- was support finding personal has a that he tion, I Eudaly that “At time Dr. testified knowledge of the matter. Evidence to him to him or in De- last tаlked examined prove knowledge may, but personal need (sic), my opinion he had cember 1986 of not, testimony of the of the witness consist right distinguish from capacity subject is the provi- himself. This rule days wrong.” passed Eleven between 703, opinion relating sions of Rule testi- charged. and the crime doctor’s release mony by expert witnesses. jury proper, argument To be case, opinion In this it was Obeidin’s that generally be a of the evi ‍​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌‍must summation competent appellant plea not to enter was a dence, from evi opinion, deductions to the His reasonable misdemeanor offense. however, any dence, not argument opposing was based observa- of answers to by him, tions rather on the was based counsel, pleas for law enforcement. opinion is ad- of others. Such evidence not (Tex.Crim.App.), 875, Moody lay opinion testimony. missible as There- — U.S. -, denied, t. cer fore, the court did not abuse its discre- trial (1992). 119, 121 prose L.Ed.2d 75 S.Ct. his requiring tion Obeidin to limit testimo- specific nor incor argument cutor’s was not Appellant’s ny knowledge.” to his “personal argue that the prosecutor did not rect. The eighteenth of error overruled. point is appellant that was not insane doctor testified December, only during the whole month ERROR

IV. JURY CHARGE that not insane in month he was nineteenth, twentieth, Technically, this was correct twenty- December. In the error, testimony. points Appel first contends the the doctor’s summation of failing jury trial court erred to inform the twenty-second point is overruled. lant’s finding appellant not consequences twenty-third appel- legis- guilty insanity. This is reason charge during pun- complains the court’s lant prohibition. Crim.Proc.Ann. lative Tex.Code “deliberately.” improperly defined ishment 1(e). Appellant argues § this fail- art. 46.03 acknowledges such instrue- Appellant that no deprived appellant of his constitutional ure however, necessary, argues tion any argument, appellant that he Without asks this given where such a longstanding definition is that defini- to reassess Court our stare de- tion required should be correct. The Court instructed has cisis which such a defini that, tion. We are not so inclined. See Lewis v. 560, State, 815 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), “Deliberately” as used herein is a term of denied, rt. U.S. S.Ct. ce usage, linguistic common but it is not the 1296, 117 (1992), L.Ed.2d 519 and cases cited equivalent of intentional as in the used twenty-fourth point therein. of error is

guilt/innocenee phase of the Deliber- trial. overruled. ately is more than intent but it less than premeditation. Rather, is a deliberate twenty-fifth twenty-sixth points In his involving thought pro- conscious decision error, appellant complains the trial court cess which embraces more than mere overruling request separate erred for a engage will to conduct and activates the special mitigation issue concerning and intentional act. To find deliberateness satisfy the “nullification” instruction did not there must be moment of deliberation Penry Lynaugh, the commands of and a part determination on the U.S. 109 S.Ct. 106 L.Ed.2d 256 defendant to kill. (1989), respectively.16 Appellant does not complain specific instruction was Appellant argues given that the definition erroneous, complains only rather he *25 jury does not inform the what the term generally a inap- nullification was instruction means, only rather the definition tells the rejected propriate. appel- and We addressed jury deliberately what does not mean. He State, argument lant’s in v. Robertson 871 argues specific that without that definition 701, (Tex.Crim.App.1993); S.W.2d 710-711 jury interpret the to was left definition the State, 829, see 882 also S.W.2d Wheatfall requested Appellant themselves. the follow- (Tex.Crim.App.1994); 839-40 Fuller v. ing “deliberately” definition of included in 191, (Tex.Crim.App.1992), 209 jury the charge: — denied, U.S. -, 2418, cert. S.Ct. (1993). Appellant’s 124 L.Ed.2d 640 final “deliberately” ... means a manner of do- points two error are overrulеd. ing by resulting act characterized or consideration; thorough from careful and judgment The trial court is the affirmed. by characterized awareness of the conse- willful, quences; slow, unhurried, planned CAMPBELL, J., participating. not steady though allowing time for as

decision. WHITE, Judge, concurring. agree appel with the We State that resolving appellant’s eighth point In of er- lant to a not entitled definition of “delib ror, majority the the trial court holds erred erately,” in and that this case the definition the order which it conducted voir dire. given apprise was sufficient to the cause, In the instant the trial court decided the terms “intentional” and “deliberate” are both sides would make a decision on whether distinct and See different. Fearance (with challenge a for to veniremember cause 577, (Tex.Crim.App.1980), first), deciding before the State either side denied, cert. 454 U.S. S.Ct. would decide whether to exercise one of its (1981). twenty-third point L.Ed.2d 215 His (with peremptory challenges again the State of error is overruled. first). majority deciding finds this deci- twenty-fourth point appel- the not with comport sion did TEX.CODE argues majori- lant trial court the erred over- CRIM.PROC.ANN. Art. 35.13. The ruling requested “probabili- ty interprets capital his definition of Art. 35.13 mean in a ty” charge during punishment. accept the court’s the State choose to case must 3(e) (Effective 1993). August generally § 16. See Tex.Code art. Crim.Proc.Ann. 37.0711 decision to challenge a that a defendant’s or veniremember the extent veniremember only after the for comes peremptory challenge with its chal- cause for cause or one of challenges cause and lenges used both for before defendant or counsel State has juror. they challenge prospective on a peremptories must whether will the decide one of their for cause with veniremember majority’s decision will lead I believe result, As a peremptory challenges. ma- possibly could not “an result absurd jority the trial court’s decision was holds 879; Boy at Op., have intended.” been error. In the voir individual kin v. majority trials, holds that capital murder State dire of most court’s “error” was harmless and overrules venireperson voir dire takes on individual appellant’s eighth point of I concur in challenges error. argues for before a defendant eighth to overrule the they during decision voir arise dire. cause as majori- agree I do error. But with usually permit Trial courts rehabilitation 85.13, ty’s interpretation Art. nor I ruling do making on a before defense that the trial court erred in establish- believe challenge waits for cause. The State State ing procedure dire the voir which chose to peremptories whether to use on its decision follow in the instant case. venireper- is until voir dire concluded. passed is a defendant who follows son then decision, majority supporting its individual pattern as State: same Presiding able call former requests venireperson voir dire of Commentary Judge to Art. Onion’s Practice arise, they with the challenges cause majority misinterpreted 35.13. I believe the rehabilitate, usually being permitted to State Commentary Practice the stat- both the waiting until the end of the individ and then ute. peremptory chal ual voir dire exercise par lenge. voir After individual dire *26 requires Art. that the 35.13 concluded, venireperson if a ties has been deciding precede state the in wheth defense challenged successfully for cause was not accept challenge venireperson. er to or a defense, might the trial court the State or explains challenges The the statute at question venireperson its own discre the peremptory either for I believe or cause. passed venireperson will then be tion. The in disjunctive phrasing the use of the they wish at to see if tо to the the end State gives the courts to statute trial the discretion challenge venireper- peremptory a on the use permit challenges the exercise of for cause son, if he a must decide before defendant moving any to use of both sides before procedure has the will. This been usual This, peremptory challenges. and not the capital murder in voir dire followed “fair, interpretation, objec is majority’s the judge on this cases I have reviewed a meaning tive of that text” in Art. 35.13. Court. (Tex. Boykin 818 S.W.2d at 785 defense, State, as as the often

Cr.App.1991). well The urges challenges during cause the course for soon as the individual voir dire as of their complied trial with Art. court venireperson the cause raise answers required any it the to assert 35.13when state challenge they not for so that will need- the challenges for cause before lessly dire. time on that individual voir waste then, their chal after both sides finished whether to often does not decide State cause, pres to lenges required the state for has until after a defendant peremptory use a challenges peremptory appel before ent its a venire- voir dire of his individual finished present any lant to decide whether to had is for the reason that statute, person. This done challenges. Neither the peremptory the venire- voir dire of during the individual Commentary, support the Practice the defense, venireperson might by the person majority’s that a defendant enti decision something give reason say that will the State challenges, on all tled have the last word to peremptory to challenge objection, use a on that ... venire- Over defense counsel’s person. capital typical Within this judge voir dire trial groups dismissed one of twelve process, majority's today venirepersons prior decision will of ten individual produce chaos. voir that group, dire of based mistaken belief that he had violated the me, is clearly To absurd us to inter- V.AC.C.P., 37.071(g) dictates of Article pret require Art. 35.13 the State to exer- during introductory his remarks that cise its choice whether peremptorily chal- group. lenge venireperson venireper- before that Id., dissent, at I re- passed son has been even to the defense for statutes, viewed our various voir dire includ- majority’s individual voir dire. The decision 35.13, and, ing Meyers Judge today, art. like today will make this ridiculous scenario the argued judge’s the trial “mistake” violated dire, capital rule in voir because it will violate import the clear of those statutes. Rous- right permit- of a defendant if the State is seau, (Baird, J., 689-690 dis- any ted to challenges venireper- exercise to a Nevertheless, senting). majority, with- requested son after that defendant has any legal authority, out citation to held “the challenge first venireperson. cause of that trial court did abuse its discretion This type is the essential of absurd result dismissing group and ... no error is spoke Boykin that we of in v. State. Id., presented.” 676. At S.W.2d at join I disagree majori- with and do not time, I grant stated: “Such a broad of discre- ty’s recognize failure to trial court tionary authority improperly permits the tri- legal acted within its discretion when it con- judge al legislative provisions to override our comported ducted voir dire manner Id., concerning jury.” the selection of a with Art. 35.13. “By today, S.W.2d at 689. its actions majority permits judge ... plurality appellant’s Because overrules concerning ‘thwart’ our laws the formation of eighth point of I judg- concur its jury. ... comply Failure to with our ment to affirm conviction. With subject selection is now statues discre- eight, these comments on error I Id., judge.” tion of the trial 855 S.W.2d at join opinion otherwise of the Court on 691. remaining points of error. majority opinion Were it not for the Rousseau, join Meyers I Judge would *27 McCORMICK, P.J., MILLER, finding error in the instant case. OVERSTREET, MALONEY, JJ., join clear, judge as Rousseau made a does trial this concurrence. changing, ignoring, not err in or even the statutory concerning framework voir dire.1 BAIRD, Judge, concurring. Rousseau, Consequently, 855 S.W.2d at 676. the judge trial in the instant did not case err eighth con- complying with art. 35.13. judge comply tends the trial to failed with Judge Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 35.13. reason, join judgment I only For this Meyers agrees but finds the error harmless. of the Court. hand, On Judge the other White finds no Judge Meyers error. Judge Neither nor MILLER, J., joins opinion. provide any authority respec- White for their positions. tive CLINTON, Judge, dissenting. 35.13, V.A.C.C.P.,

We considered similar issue Rousseau Article is derived from State, 632, 1879; (Tex.Cr.App.1993). applica- v. 855 S.W.2d 666 former article C.C.P. also Rousseau, cases, capital provided, ble to it viz: pause § 1. I note that instant to neither the case nor United States Constitution or I 19 of the art. Rousseau, presented an issue under the Due Pro- Texas Constitution. cess Clause Fourteenth Amendment to the

893 Commentary Commentary Special juror quali- has held to tative been be “When (common of individual examination practice passed parties, first he shall be to the fied into stat- capital cases now written in certain defendant, then for to the state and utes). challenge.” acceptance or correctly Therefore, majority ob contemplated “ex- The code further same is serves, of Article 35.13 its construction venire-person relating, to of a amination” Slip opinion at 18. nor new.” novel “neither to an- challenge cause was not confined for court has recognizes that trial This Court may be given, that “other evidence swers voir “over the course discretion broad challenge.” support against the heard in of or State, examination,” 823 e.g., Earhart v. dire Id., 687; 577; 35.18. article O.C. now Article Yet, 607, (Tex.Cr.App.1991). at 623 S.W.2d made the statute its peremptory challenge, without also has discerned that it therefor, capital practice beneficial to any goes face and in assigning reason back respects not accorded other 571, inevitably defendants which came from O.C. defendants, of which is that the Collins, not the least English v. common law. See Knox peremptory have exercise a (C.A.5 former “do not 657, 1991), and 928 F.2d at 660-661 particular venireman until against a strike cases cited therein. so.” whether to do State has decided first statutory things order of remained State, 813, at 834 v. Janecka substantially same until 1965.* Some that should (Tex.Cr.App.1987). It follows way ap along time and somewhere venireperson, in turn the accept the the State side, parently borrowing from civil accept may opt to or exercise then defendant Court an “examination” of venire- sanctioned fairly challenges. Accordingly, the Court dire,” persons “on voir their became “corruption per consistently resisted parties may accepted practice that seek through innovative emptory practice” strike glean enabling information them more intelli statutorily prescribed departures from the perempto gently respective to exercise their exercising challenges, either order State, See, ry challenges. e.g., 94 Reich v. See, e.g., peremptorily. Ibid. Gri cause or 449, (1928), citing Tex.Cr.R. 251 S.W. 1072 (Tex. State, 420, jalva v. S.W.2d State, cases; civil v. and criminal Belcher S.W.2d Cr.App.1980); Pierson v. 561, (1924); Tex.Cr.R. 258 S.W. 815 Kincaid 102, cf.; Bridge v. (Tex.Cr.App.1980); at 107 (Tex.Cr. 103 Tex.Cr.R. 281 S.W. 855 State, at 563-564 (1926). proposal Accepting a recommended also App.1986); see McClain Special (by Committee for Revision of (Tex.Cr.App.1968) virtue at 75 Procedure, Legislature applicable Code of Criminal Article 35.13 of 1967 amendment practice cases), and authorities cited capital refined and codified common Interpre- therein. Article 35.17 the code. See

* juror statutory qualifiеd, steps such is held he 35.12]. code When The 1925 outlined initial state, capital forming jury, be passed each of which and then to the shall first *28 through the and 1895 per- traced back codes acceptance challenge, defendant, or either for Code, as code the Old summarized or emptory A [35.13]. cause. Article 613 or for follows. challenge assigning peremptory made without is going trial the names of any [35.14]. [Provi- When case is reason therefor. Article jurors [and called seat- challenges the summoned ed], shall be procedure for sions of reasons present [now 35.01]. Article 602 Those proper examination the After omitted]. cause touching questions shall then be sworn to answer challenges delay judge without shall decide all qualifications. on their service and Article [35.21], argument. Article 621 deter- The court shall then hear and [35.02]. See, e.g., 72 Tex.Cr.R. Bizzell excuses, sufficient, if the deems mine court (1914). statutes did not Former S.W. [35.03, juror discharged. the § shall Article 604 be purposes expressly provide for voir dire for 1], exemption claiming [Provisions for challenges, making peremptory as shown but challenging array court then omitted]. The shall developed general inquiries post into such try present proceed qualifications of those statutory entitle- practice would become jurors in the who were summoned serve present code. ment demand under [35.10, prescribed. Article 611-612 mode

For these additional reasons and with such observations, agree I

further imposing regimen

court erred in for voir capital in a

dire case direct contravention legislative mandate of Article 35.13 shall

(qualified juror passed for accep- etc.). challenge

tance But I can not ac-

cept the strained exercise the Court to

justify its saying an error of such fundamen- selecting

tal character and nature

try capital case harmless.

Because this above all Court ‍​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌‍others should thereby approve

not make excuses for and departures

“innovative” from that which the

Legislature commands in cases where the life stake,

of a citizen is at I respectfully, stoutly

dissent. Roschke, Ming appointed, College

K. court Station, appellant. HERN, Appellant, Robert William Turner, Bill Atty. Glynis Dist. & McDaniel Davis, Kyle Attys., Bryan, & Asst. Rob- Dist. Texas, Appellee. The STATE of Huttash, Austin, Atty., ert State’s for the State. No. 107-94. Texas, Appeals

Court Criminal En Banc. OPINION ON PETITION APPELLANT’S FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW Nov. WHITE, Judge. facts, unique

Under a somewhat set of *29 appellant brings jeopardy challenge a double attempt retry the State’s him an pled guilty offense to which he and the validi- ty challenged. of which he has never 10, 1992, July appellant pled guilty On charging him theft of a indictment with

Case Details

Case Name: Bigby v. State
Court Name: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Nov 2, 1994
Citation: 892 S.W.2d 864
Docket Number: 71234
Court Abbreviation: Tex. Crim. App.
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