Maye v. United States, 19-CO-589

Around 7:15 p.m. two uniformed officers parked near a group of ~8 people in a block the officers described as "high-crime."
Officer Kenney observed Maye manipulate his waistband, place his hand in his right front pocket, and saw a pocketknife clip; he approached and asked Maye to remove his hand and consent to a pat-down.
Maye (or the record) disputed aspects: friends testified officers directed the whole group to put hands on a car and that Maye was grabbed/handcuffed before being searched; officers testified Maye consented.
During the pat-down Officer Kenney felt a bulge, reached into Maye’s waistband, and recovered multiple small bags of cocaine; Maye was charged with possession with intent to distribute.
Trial court denied Maye’s suppression motion (initially crediting Kenney), a jury convicted, and this court remanded for clearer findings about whether consent was voluntary or the product of a seizure.
On remand the trial court found a lawful Terry stop (reasonable articulable suspicion) and alternatively that consent was voluntary; this appeal holds the record insufficient and rules the asserted seizure lacked reasonable suspicion if a seizure occurred.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Reasonable articulable suspicion to seize and pat-down Maye under Terry?	Maye: officers had only innocuous waistband adjustment and a legal pocketknife; no specific facts to suspect crime	Government: hand movements in a high-crime area plus visible pocketknife justified stop and frisk	Court: No. Collectively the facts were insufficient; waistband adjustment and a typical pocketknife did not yield reasonable suspicion; seizure not justified on this record
Whether consent was tainted by an illegal seizure	Maye: any consent was the fruit of an illegal seizure and therefore involuntary	Government: Maye was not seized when he consented; even if seized consent was voluntary	Court: If Maye was seized, the seizure was unlawful and any contemporaneous consent would be tainted; the record lacks findings about whether Maye was seized at the moment of consent, so the case is remanded for that factual determination

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1968) (establishes stop-and-frisk standard)
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (U.S. 2000) (contextualizes high-crime area in reasonable-suspicion analysis)
Jones v. United States, 154 A.3d 591 (D.C. 2017) (consent contemporaneous with unlawful seizure is tainted)
Robinson v. United States, 76 A.3d 329 (D.C. 2013) (reasonable-suspicion and frisk principles)
United States v. Hussain, 835 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 2016) (mere possession of a common pocketknife does not establish suspicion of other weapons)
Hawkins v. United States, 248 A.3d 125 (D.C. 2021) (rejects reliance on officer's generic "trend" to supply particularized suspicion)
Golden v. United States, 248 A.3d 925 (D.C. 2021) (observed bulge and innocuous conduct insufficient for reasonable suspicion)
Duhart v. United States, 589 A.2d 895 (D.C. 1991) (waistband/adjustment gestures often have innocent explanations)