Maya Arce v. John Huppenthal
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 11644
| 9th Cir. | 2015

Background

  • Tucson Unified School District (TUSD) ran a Mexican American Studies (MAS) program serving predominantly Mexican/Hispanic students; state actors viewed MAS as promoting ethnocentrism.
  • Arizona enacted H.B. 2281 (A.R.S. §§ 15‑111, 15‑112) prohibiting courses that (1) promote overthrow of the U.S. government, (2) promote resentment toward a race/class, (3) are designed primarily for pupils of a particular ethnic group, or (4) advocate ethnic solidarity instead of individual treatment.
  • Former State Superintendent Horne issued a pre‑effective-date finding that MAS violated the law; successor Huppenthal commissioned an audit (Cambium), rejected its favorable findings, pursued ADE review, found violations, and withheld funding, prompting TUSD to terminate MAS.
  • Plaintiffs (students and a parent) sued raising Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and vagueness claims and First Amendment claims (overbreadth and viewpoint discrimination); teachers’ claims were dismissed for lack of standing, leaving only student plaintiffs on appeal.
  • The district court: held §15‑112(A)(3) (designed primarily for pupils of a particular ethnic group) overbroad and severed it; upheld (A)(2) and (A)(4); granted summary judgment to defendants on other claims and sua sponte dismissed equal protection. Plaintiffs appealed; defendants cross‑appealed the (A)(3) ruling.
  • Ninth Circuit: affirmed that (A)(3) is overbroad and severable; affirmed that (A)(2) and (A)(4) are not overbroad or unconstitutionally vague; reversed the sua sponte grant on equal protection and remanded for trial; remanded viewpoint‑discrimination claim for further proceedings.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Equal protection (discriminatory intent) Statute enacted/enforced to target MAS and, in effect, Mexican‑American students — discriminatory intent/motivating factor Statute neutral on its face; aimed at curricular concerns, not race; actions targeted program, not people Reversed district court: genuine factual disputes exist under Arlington Heights; remanded for trial
First Amendment — Overbreadth of §15‑112(A)(3) (designed primarily for pupils of a particular ethnic group) (A)(3) chills valuable ethnic studies and is unnecessary given (A)(2)/(A)(4) Provision aims to prevent racially segregated/targeted courses Affirmed district court: (A)(3) is substantially overbroad and unconstitutional; severable
First Amendment — Overbreadth of §15‑112(A)(2) & (A)(4) (promote resentment; advocate ethnic solidarity) Too vague and could chill protected curricular materials and class discussions Statute targets course design/intent, not incidental classroom discussion; exceptions (e.g., Holocaust instruction) limit reach Affirmed: (A)(2) and (A)(4) not overbroad when read in context and under pedagogical‑relatedness standard (Kuhlmeier)
Fourteenth Amendment — Vagueness of (A)(2) & (A)(4) Terms like "resentment," "ethnic solidarity," "individuals" are subjective and invite arbitrary enforcement, chilling speech Statute read as a whole gives fair notice; "promote"/"advocate" imply intent and affirmative acts Affirmed: plaintiffs have standing (First Amendment stake); provisions are not unconstitutionally vague as written or as applied

Key Cases Cited

  • Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (students have a right to receive ideas; removal of materials for viewpoint reasons restricted)
  • Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (school editorial control over curricular student speech is permissible if reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns)
  • Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (students do not shed constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate)
  • Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (factors for proving discriminatory purpose in face‑neutral government action)
  • United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (overbreadth doctrine: statute may be invalid if a substantial number of applications are unconstitutional)
  • United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008) (statutory interpretation is a prerequisite to overbreadth analysis)
  • Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2000) (government‑speech analysis for materials like teacher bulletin‑board postings)
  • Chiras v. Miller, 432 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 2005) (textbook‑inclusion decisions treated as government speech; different analysis may apply to student rights)
  • Hynes v. Mayor & Council of Borough of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976) (broader standing to challenge vague statutes when First Amendment rights to receive information are implicated)
  • Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (vagueness doctrine: statutes must give fair notice and not invite arbitrary enforcement)
  • Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (due process does not require impossibly precise statutory language)
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