May v. State, 295 Ga. 388

Background

Kristin May, a River Ridge High School teacher, learned in Jan. 2011 that a former student (P.M.), then 16 and no longer enrolled at River Ridge, had a prior sexual relationship with a paraprofessional that fit OCGA § 19-7-5(b)(10)’s definition of "sexual abuse." May did not report it.
The State charged May criminally under OCGA § 19-7-5(h) for failing to report suspected child abuse by a mandatory reporter (teacher).
At trial May demurred and filed a plea in bar, arguing she had no statutory duty to report because P.M. was not a student under her care when the disclosure occurred.
The trial court denied the demurrer, reasoning mandatory reporters must report abuse of any child of which they become aware; May sought interlocutory review and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court analyzed OCGA § 19-7-5’s text, structure, legislative history, and common-law background and concluded the reporting duty is limited to children whom the mandatory reporter attends in the scope of the reporter’s professional/occupational/volunteer duties.
Because P.M. was not then a student at May’s school and May was not attending to P.M. pursuant to her duties, May had no statutory obligation to report; the conviction was unsustainable and the judgment was reversed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (May)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Scope of OCGA § 19-7-5(c)(1) mandatory-reporting duty: whether it extends to any child a reporter learns about or only to children the reporter attends pursuant to duties	May: duty is limited — only applies to children the reporter attends in the course of duties (so no duty here)	State: the phrase "a child" in § 19-7-5(c)(1) should be read broadly to require reporting of any child about whom a mandatory reporter has reasonable cause to believe is abused	The duty is limited to children the mandatory reporter attends pursuant to the profession/occupation/employment/volunteer role that makes them a reporter; May had no duty to report P.M.
Meaning of § 19-7-5(c)(2) alternative reporting procedure	May: (implicit) § 19-7-5(c)(2) presupposes duty is tied to attending to the child, supporting a limited duty	State: (implicit) (argued broadly) (c)(2) merely addresses one common way reporters obtain knowledge and should not limit duty to only those who attend to the child	Court: (c)(2) is best read to make the alternative (facility-management) reporting channel the exclusive channel for employees/volunteers who attend to a child, implying the duty arises from attending to the child
Use of statutory history and structure in interpretation	May: legislative history and prior statutory language show a longstanding limitation to children who are "brought to" or "come before" the reporter	State: omission of earlier limiting language suggests scope was broadened	Court: history & structure support retaining the limitation; 1990 reorganization did not meaningfully expand scope
Interaction with common law duties	May: limiting the duty aligns with common-law principles that strangers owe no affirmative protective duty absent a special relationship	State: broader statutory duty acceptable regardless of common law	Court: presumes legislature intended to conform to common-law background unless clearly altering it; interpretation limited to those who stand in a position to attend the child fits common law

Key Cases Cited

Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170 (statutory interpretation starts with text and context)
Smith v. Ellis, 291 Ga. 566 (read words in context)
Brown v. State, 290 Ga. 865 (words gain meaning from context)
Hendry v. Hendry, 292 Ga. 1 (look to other provisions of same statute)
Peachtree-Cain Co. v. McBee, 254 Ga. 91 (consider surrounding legal background)
City of Rome v. Jordan, 263 Ga. 26 (special-relationship duties at common law)
Haley v. State, 289 Ga. 515 (discussing canons like rule of lenity and constitutional doubt)
Gladson v. State, 258 Ga. 885 (noting potential constitutional questions about statute)