May v. Segovia, 929 F.3d 1223

Background

In January 2015 a scabies outbreak at the Federal Prison Camp in Florence led prison officials to require Ivermectin or quarantine in the Special Housing Unit (SHU); May refused Ivermectin due to a claimed allergic reaction and was quarantined by then‑administrator Segovia.
While in the SHU May filed several grievances (5 while in SHU; 24 after leaving SHU), but none specifically complained about his SHU placement or the lack of a hearing.
May filed an initial pro se complaint (alleging due‑process failures), then a First Amended Complaint (FAC) reasserting a Bivens procedural‑due‑process claim while still incarcerated, and later a Second Amended Complaint (SAC) that added Segovia as a defendant after May’s release.
The magistrate judge granted Segovia summary judgment on two grounds: the PLRA exhaustion requirement applied to May, and May had not exhausted available administrative remedies (no genuine dispute that remedies were available).
May appealed both rulings; Segovia argued alternative grounds (whether a procedural‑due‑process Bivens claim exists and qualified immunity), which the panel did not reach because it affirmed on PLRA/exhaustion grounds.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the PLRA exhaustion requirement applies	May: PLRA does not apply because the operative SAC was deemed filed after his release; prisoner status should be assessed at the time the operative complaint is filed.	Segovia: The due‑process claim was first brought while May was incarcerated (initial complaint/FAC), so PLRA exhaustion applies.	Held: PLRA applies—claim was brought while May was a prisoner (relation‑back/timing of claim controls).
Whether adding Segovia as a defendant in the SAC created a "new" claim that avoids PLRA	May: Adding a new defendant creates a new claim; SAC was filed after release so PLRA does not apply to that claim.	Segovia: Relation‑back principles and timing of the original claim control; even if SAC adds a defendant, claim arose earlier.	Held: Adding Segovia does not avoid PLRA; claim arose in earlier pleadings and PLRA applies. Court also endorsed the tender‑rule approach (amendment/tender can fix filing date) as adopted here.
Whether administrative remedies were "available" so exhaustion was required	May: Administrative remedies were effectively unavailable because officials tampered with mail/scanned labels, thwarting grievance filings.	Segovia: May filed 29 grievances in the relevant period; no record evidence that the grievance process was blocked regarding the SHU placement.	Held: Remedies were available—May produced no evidence of intimidation/machination preventing filing; summary judgment affirmed.
Alternative defenses (Bivens viability; qualified immunity)	May: Not applicable on this appeal.	Segovia: Argued below and raised on appeal but urged as alternative grounds for affirmance.	Held: Court did not reach these issues because judgment affirmed on PLRA/exhaustion grounds.

Key Cases Cited

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (recognized damages remedy against federal officers for constitutional violations)
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007) (PLRA exhaustion is mandatory and applies claim‑by‑claim; do not depart from ordinary Federal Rules practice absent clear statutory command)
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (exhaustion as a jurisdictional pleading requirement distinguished from PLRA’s nonjurisdictional exhaustion)
Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850 (2016) (administrative remedies are required only if "available"; availability can be defeated by machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation)
Prime Care of Ne. Kan., L.L.C. v. Humana Ins. Co., 447 F.3d 1284 (10th Cir. 2006) (amendments adding defendants do not automatically commence a new action as to added defendants)
Jackson v. Fong, 870 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2017) (distinguishable; held exhaustion did not apply to supplemental Rule 15(d) claims filed after release)