May v. Morgan Cnty.
343 Ga. App. 255
Ga. Ct. App.2017Background
- In 2007 Christine May built a vacation home on Lake Oconee in Morgan County and began offering it for short-term rentals while the property was in an LR‑1 (Lakeshore Low Density Residential Recreation) zoning district.
- The pre‑2010 Morgan County zoning ordinance allowed only uses listed in Table 11.1 for the LR‑1 district and stated that uses not specifically listed were not allowed; Table 11.1 did not list or permit short‑term rentals (it prohibited motels/hotels).
- In October 2010 the County amended the zoning ordinance to expressly prohibit rentals of single‑family dwellings for less than 30 days in most districts; the LR‑1 district was not designated for conditional short‑term rental permits.
- County issued warnings and a criminal citation to May in 2011 for continuing short‑term rentals; prosecution was stayed while May litigated civil challenges to the ordinance.
- After remands and rulings on procedural exhaustion and timeliness, May renewed a motion to dismiss the criminal citation in 2015 arguing (1) her short‑term rental use was grandfathered because the pre‑2010 ordinance permitted it, and (2) alternatively the pre‑2010 ordinance was unconstitutionally vague.
- The trial court found the pre‑2010 ordinance prohibited short‑term rentals and convicted May under the 2010 ordinance; the Court of Appeals agreed the pre‑2010 ordinance prohibited the use but vacated and remanded so the trial court can rule on May’s unresolved vagueness challenge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether pre‑2010 ordinance permitted short‑term vacation rentals (so use was grandfathered) | May: her rental use predated the 2010 amendment and was lawful under the prior ordinance, therefore grandfathered | County: prior ordinance did not permit short‑term rentals; 2010 amendment lawfully prohibited them | Court: pre‑2010 ordinance, read with Table 11.1, did not permit short‑term rentals; May's use was not grandfathered |
| Whether the pre‑2010 ordinance was unconstitutionally vague (as‑applied) | May: prior ordinance gave insufficient notice that short‑term rentals were forbidden, so it is void and her use would be grandfathered | County: constitutionality of prior ordinance immaterial because prosecution is under the 2010 amendment | Court: trial court did not rule on vagueness; remanded for determination because vagueness may affect grandfathering/prosecution |
| Whether conviction should stand without trial court addressing constitutional claim | May: conviction should be dismissed if prior ordinance void for vagueness | County: conviction under 2010 ordinance valid regardless of prior ordinance's vagueness | Court: vacated judgment and remanded so trial court can consider constitutional challenge before affirming conviction |
| Whether other trial errors (right to trial, sufficiency of evidence, hearsay at sentencing) require relief | May: trial court erred on multiple evidentiary and procedural grounds | County: errors do not warrant reversal | Court: declined to address remaining enumerations pending resolution of vagueness issue on remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Rockdale Cty. v. Burdette, 278 Ga. 755 (explains nonconforming/protected use definition)
- Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170 (principles of statutory/or dinance interpretation; plain meaning)
- Daniel Corp. v. Reed, 291 Ga. 596 (textual construction and plain‑meaning canon)
- S. States‑Bartow Cty., Inc. v. Riverwood Farm Prop. Owners Ass'n, 331 Ga. App. 878 (nonconforming use and lapse principles)
- Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (void‑for‑vagueness doctrine and tolerance for civil enactments)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (vagueness doctrine as applied to criminal statutes)