Max Pharr v. State, A17A0708

In 1995 Max Pharr pleaded guilty to rape and was sentenced to life imprisonment; he did not appeal his conviction.
In July 2016 Pharr filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence claiming: (1) he was mentally incompetent when he pled and was sentenced, (2) the trial court failed to hold a competency hearing, and (3) trial counsel was ineffective.
The trial court denied the motion to correct an illegal sentence; Pharr appealed to the Georgia Court of Appeals.
The statutory rule (OCGA § 17-10-1(f)) generally limits a sentencing court’s power to modify a sentence to one year after sentencing (or 120 days after remittitur on appeal).
A sentencing court may modify beyond those time limits only if the sentence is void — typically because it exceeds the statutory maximum.
Pharr’s life sentence for rape was within the statutory maximum; his competency and ineffective-assistance claims do not amount to a void-sentence claim.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to modify Pharr’s sentence in 2016	Pharr: sentence is illegal because he was mentally incompetent, no competency hearing, and counsel was ineffective	State: sentence is within statutory range and claims challenge procedures, not the legality of the sentence	Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; Pharr did not present a colorable void-sentence claim
Whether mental incompetency at plea/sentencing renders a sentence void	Pharr: incompetency meant the sentence is void and subject to correction	State: competency/procedure claims do not make an otherwise authorized sentence void	Court: competency challenge is not a colorable void-sentence claim
Whether ineffective assistance of counsel makes the sentence void	Pharr: counsel’s ineffective assistance rendered the plea/sentence void	State: ineffective-assistance claim attacks fairness/process, not statutory validity of the sentence	Court: ineffective-assistance allegation does not allege a void sentence
Whether a sentence within statutory range may be vacated as void post‑statutory modification period	Pharr: seeks modification despite lapse of statutory time limits	State: only void sentences may be modified after statutory period; sentence falls within range	Court: sentence within statutory maximum is not void; no jurisdiction to consider appeal

Jones v. State, 278 Ga. 669 (2004) (a sentencing court may only modify a sentence beyond the statutory period if the sentence is void; a sentence within the statutory range is not void)
Harper v. State, 286 Ga. 216 (2009) (appeal from denial of motion to vacate sentence requires a colorable void-sentence claim)
Burg v. State, 297 Ga. App. 118 (2009) (denial of motion to vacate absent a colorable void-sentence claim deprives appellate jurisdiction)
von Thomas v. State, 293 Ga. 569 (2013) (void-sentence motions are generally limited to claims that the law does not authorize the imposed punishment)
Foster v. State, 294 Ga. 400 (2014) (challenges to trial court procedures on competency are not colorable void-sentence claims)
Jordan v. State, 253 Ga. App. 510 (2002) (ineffective-assistance allegations do not constitute a colorable void-sentence claim)