Maurice Frazier v. State of Indiana
2013 Ind. App. LEXIS 276
| Ind. Ct. App. | 2013Background
- Frazier, a former Marion County Jail corrections officer, was convicted at bench trial on four counts arising from interactions with Deputy S.R.
- Incident 1: during a cell-block inspection, Frazier grabbed S.R.’s shoulder from behind and ground his pelvis against her buttocks.
- Incident 2: in the control center weeks later, Frazier forced S.R. to touch his crotch and touched her breast and crotch himself.
- Count I and II charged sexual battery; Count III charged criminal confinement; Count IV charged official misconduct, all Class D felonies.
- The trial court found all four convictions; Counts I and II were based on the two incidents, Count III on confinement, Count IV on misconduct.
- The Court of Appeals reversed Count I for insufficient force to support sexual battery but remanded to enter Class A misdemeanor battery for Count I.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of Count II sexual battery | Frazier argues no force/compulsion in Count II. | State contends forceful compulsion was proven for Count II. | Count II sustained; Count I insufficient. |
| Count I sufficiency and lesser offense | Count I lacks force, but is sexual battery. | Count I should stand as sexual battery. | Count I reversed; remand to enter Class A misdemeanor battery. |
| Double jeopardy—actual evidence | Using same evidence for multiple offenses violates double jeopardy. | Different victims/contexts avoid double jeopardy. | No double-jeopardy violation between Count I (dep. S.R.) and Count II; different acts/victims. |
| Double jeopardy—continuing-crime doctrine | Counts II and III may be same continuous conduct. | Counts II and III are separate crimes; doctrine does not apply. | No continuing-crime violation; Counts II and III are separate offenses. |
| Double jeopardy—Count IV (official misconduct) | Same sexual-battery evidence used for official misconduct. | Official misconduct is separate, not barred by double jeopardy. | No double-jeopardy violation between Counts II/IV; different victims; affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Richardson v. State, 771 N.E.2d 55 (Ind. 2002) (actual-evidence test for double jeopardy)
- McCarter v. State, 961 N.E.2d 43 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (victim-centered force assessment in sexual-battery cases)
- Bailey v. State, 764 N.E.2d 728 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (implied force may support compulsion)
- Guyton v. State, 771 N.E.2d 1141 (Ind. 2002) (coextensive conduct concerns in double jeopardy)
- Bald v. State, 766 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 2002) (no double jeopardy when multiple victims arise from one act)
- Whaley v. State, 843 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (multiple injuries from one resistance do not equal single count)
- Williamson v. State, 798 N.E.2d 450 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (multiple arson convictions not barred by double jeopardy)
- Vermillion v. State, 978 N.E.2d 459 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (double jeopardy analysis de novo review)
- Grabarczyk v. State, 772 N.E.2d 428 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (continuing-crime doctrine limits)
- Riehle v. State, 823 N.E.2d 287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (continuing-crime doctrine application)