Matwyuk v. Johnson
22 F. Supp. 3d 812
W.D. Mich.2014Background
- Michigan allows personalized (vanity) license plates but prohibits configurations that “might carry a connotation offensive to good taste and decency” (M.C.L. § 257.803b); the statute is undefined, and the Secretary of State’s office uses internal guidelines listing examples.
- Plaintiff Matwyuk, an Iraq War veteran, applied for a plate reading INF1DL (infidel) and was denied multiple times under the “good taste and decency” restriction; the Department later issued the plate after this lawsuit began.
- Plaintiff DeVarti applied for a plate reading WAR SUX and was denied under the same restriction; he seeks declaratory and injunctive relief (no damages claim).
- Defendants moved to dismiss arguing Matwyuk lacks standing/mootness for declaratory relief and that individual defendant Fildey is entitled to qualified immunity as to damages; they also argued DeVarti’s claims fail on the merits and injunctive-relief standards.
- The court concluded (1) it has jurisdiction over Matwyuk’s declaratory claims (standing, not moot, and Grand Trunk factors favor relief), (2) the statute and guidelines are susceptible to viewpoint discrimination and vagueness, (3) vanity plates are private, not government, speech under Michigan’s program, (4) Fildey is not entitled to qualified immunity on Matwyuk’s damage claim, and (5) DeVarti plausibly stated facial and as-applied claims requiring development.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing for declaratory relief (Matwyuk) | Matwyuk intends to apply for another plate and faces a real possibility of enforcement; prior denials establish risk | Denial became moot because plate was later issued and future harm speculative | Plaintiff has Article III standing; prior enforcement and continuing statute create a significant possibility of future harm |
| Mootness of facial challenge (Matwyuk) | Statute remains in force; issuance of plate did not repeal or remediate the challenged language | Issuance of INF1DL moots claim and shows lack of selective enforcement | Not moot: challenge concerns statutory language and risk of future enforcement remains |
| Facial and as-applied First Amendment challenge (overbreadth/viewpoint/vagueness) | Statute grants unbridled discretion; guidelines permit viewpoint discrimination and are vague | Program can exclude offensive speech; comparable precedents treat some specialty plates as government speech | Denied dismissal: statute/guidelines plausibly permit viewpoint discrimination and are unconstitutionally vague; facial and as-applied claims sufficiently pleaded |
| Whether vanity plates are government speech | Matwyuk: plates are private expressive conduct chosen by applicants | Defendants: rely on cases treating some specialty plates as government speech (e.g., Bredesen) | Court: Michigan vanity plates are private speech (distinguished from government-crafted specialty plates) |
| Qualified immunity for Fildey (damages to Matwyuk) | Fildey violated clearly established First Amendment rights by applying an overbroad/vague, viewpoint-discriminatory standard | Fildey had arguable defense based on unsettled law re: license-plate speech and Bredesen/higher-court uncertainty | Fildey not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage; constitutional question addressed on merits |
| Injunctive relief for DeVarti (WAR SUX) | WAR SUX asserted as political/expressive speech; denial stems from vague/overbroad standard | State asserts protectiveness of captive audience, sexual connotation, and children’s exposure | Denial of dismissal: factual development required; captive-audience and sexual-connotation justifications are not resolved on the pleadings |
Key Cases Cited
- City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988) (licensing schemes that vest unbridled discretion over speech invite facial First Amendment challenges)
- Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992) (prior restraints without objective standards are unconstitutional; overbreadth/viewpoint concerns)
- Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009) (distinguishes government speech where the government selects and controls messages)
- Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005) (government program can constitute government speech when government controls the message)
- American Civil Liberties Union of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2006) (specialty license plates bearing legislature-approved messages held government speech)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Article III standing requirements: injury-in-fact, causation, redressability)
- Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (qualified immunity two-step analysis) and Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (courts may exercise discretion in addressing qualified immunity steps)
- Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (vagueness doctrine in First Amendment context)
- Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (viewpoint discrimination is impermissible even in nonpublic forums)