Maturo v. State Employees Retirement Commission
162 A.3d 706
| Conn. | 2017Background
- Joseph Maturo retired in 1991 from East Haven as a firefighter on a service‑connected disability pension under the Municipal Employees’ Retirement Act (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-425 et seq.).
- East Haven participates in the municipal retirement system but had not designated the mayoral office as a participating position; Maturo served as full‑time, salaried mayor 1997–2007 while continuing to collect his disability pension under the agencies’ prior interpretation.
- In 2009 the retirement services division concluded that its prior interpretation was incorrect: a retiree who accepts paid employment with the same participating municipality may not collect a retirement allowance while so employed (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-438(b)). Maturo’s pension was suspended when he was reelected mayor in 2011.
- Maturo administratively appealed; the State Employees Retirement Commission denied reinstatement and the Superior Court affirmed. Maturo appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court.
- The Supreme Court evaluated statutory interpretation of § 7-438(b), the relationship between reemployment and disability provisions, claims of detrimental reliance/legislative acquiescence, and constitutional (equal protection and due process) and procedural challenges.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether mayoral service is "employment" under § 7-438(b) | Maturo: elective officers like mayors are not "employees" for § 7-438(b), so the subsection does not apply | Commission: ordinary meaning and statutory context treat elective officers as employees for retirement purposes | Held: mayoralty is employment; § 7-438(b) applies (statutory text and history support treating elective officers as employees) |
| Whether § 7-438(b) allows retirees reemployed in a nonparticipating municipal position to retain pensions (despite an eligibility clause) | Maturo: statute contemplates either earning credit (if reemployed) or collecting pension; the Legislature could not have intended retirees to end up with neither when serving in nonparticipating roles | Commission: read § 7-438(b) to bar pension payments while reemployed by a participating municipality; eligibility clause is reasonably read to permit credit only if the position is a participating one | Held: § 7-438(b) bars pension while reemployed by a participating municipality even in nonparticipating positions; policy and text support this construction |
| Whether disability pension could be suspended only after medical examining board reexamination (§ 7-432(g)) | Maturo: his disability pension can be discontinued only upon medical examining board reconsideration based on new medical facts | Commission: § 7-432 (pre-2013) vested the Commission (not a separate board reconsideration rule) with authority to determine continuance of disability benefits | Held: § 7-432(g) (restricting board reconsideration) was added in 2013 and does not govern the 2011 suspension; Commission had authority to suspend under existing statute |
| Whether agencies were bound by prior interpretation (estoppel/legislative acquiescence) | Maturo: he reasonably relied on agencies’ long‑standing pre‑2009 interpretation; legislature’s inaction and Attorney General opinion support reliance | Commission: agency may correct an erroneous statutory interpretation after fair notice; legislative inaction was inconclusive and later failed amendment attempts were vetoed | Held: no estoppel or binding effect; agency correction permissible after notice, and legislative acquiescence evidence was insufficient |
Key Cases Cited
- Lieberman v. Aronow, 319 Conn. 748 (Conn. 2015) (standards for judicial review of agency statutory interpretation and deference)
- Schieffelin & Co. v. Dept. of Liquor Control, 194 Conn. 165 (Conn. 1984) (no special deference when agency construction is of recent vintage or inconsistent)
- Southern New England Telephone Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, 274 Conn. 119 (Conn. 2005) (statutory interpretation should give effect to every provision)
- Chotkowski v. State, 240 Conn. 246 (Conn. 1997) (stringent standards for estoppel against the state)
- Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wichita Board of Trade, 412 U.S. 800 (U.S. 1973) (agency must conform policy to correct statutory interpretation after notice)
- Stuart v. Stuart, 297 Conn. 26 (Conn. 2010) (requirements and limits of legislative acquiescence doctrine)
- Wiseman v. Armstrong, 269 Conn. 802 (Conn. 2004) (attorney general opinions are nonbinding on courts)