Matthew McGrath v. Hillary Clinton, 399 U.S. App. D.C. 110

McGrath, a former Foreign Service Officer for the State Department, became unit chief of the Cultural Programs Division in 2001 and faced supervision issues with Wunder.
Wunder issued a March 8, 2002 memorandum criticizing McGrath, followed by a negative EER based largely on that memorandum, and a second expert EER with Wunder's supervisor's additional comments.
McGrath was involuntarily removed from his unit chief position, remained without assignment for months, and was ultimately terminated in 2004; the termination was based in substantial part on the 2002 EERs.
In 2005 McGrath filed a district-court complaint alleging retaliation under Title VII; the district court granted summary judgment for the Department, finding a legitimate non-retaliatory justification for the adverse actions.
The district court and the D.C. Circuit concluded McGrath did not show that Wunder’s conduct or the Department’s actions were retaliatory or that the proffered reasons were pretextual.
The court held there was no reasonable jury verdict that McGrath opposed a Title VII unlawful practice in a way that caused retaliation, and affirmed summary judgment for the Department.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did McGrath oppose a Title VII unlawful practice?	McGrath opposed discrimination against Montgomery and the alleged unlawful instruction.	There was no reasonable belief that the practice was unlawful under Title VII, and no discriminatory motive shown.	No, McGrath failed to show opposition to an unlawful practice.
Was there a materially adverse action against McGrath?	The negative reviews and removal were materially adverse actions supporting retaliation.	The actions were legitimate, non-retaliatory performance-based decisions.	Yes, there were adverse actions, but the issue is whether retaliatory motive existed.
Did the Department's reasons for McGrath's reviews/termination show retaliation?	The reasons are pretextual and meant to terminate due to opposition.	The reasons reflect performance failures, not retaliation, and are factually supported.	No, McGrath failed to show pretext or retaliatory motive; the reasons were non-retaliatory.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (summary-judgment standard requires no genuine dispute on material facts)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (burden-shifting framework for retaliation claims)
Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (U.S. 2001) (recognizes employee opposition to discriminatory practice as element of retaliation)
Calhoun v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (definition of unlawful retaliation under Title VII for purposes of prima facie case)
Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (elaborates on prima facie elements and evidentiary standards in retaliation claims)
Lathram v. Snow, 336 F.3d 1085 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (postures McDonnell Douglas framework application in circuit)
Waterhouse v. District of Columbia, 298 F.3d 989 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (summary judgment standard and evidence evaluation in retaliation context)